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Civil Procedure. Gliottone v. Ethier, 870 A.2d 1022 (R.I.
2005). Motions for summary judgment may be argued before the
expiration of the ten-day waiting period delineated in Rule 56(c) of
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure if the non-moving
party fails to raise an objection to the timing of the motion
hearing. Additionally, under Rhode Island's comparative
negligence system, a plaintiff, notwithstanding his own
negligence, is entitled to survive summary disposition if he or she
can provide any evidence suggesting a genuine issue of material
fact as to the defendant's negligence.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Silvestro Gliottone filed a negligence action against Jeff
Ethier following a motor vehicle accident.' Gliottone was driving
northbound on Dyer Avenue in Cranston when he attempted to
turn left into a service station; while crossing the southbound lane
of the road, he struck the Ethier's vehicle. 2 Connie Martone was
traveling behind the car driven by the defendant, Jeff Ethier, and
in her deposition she stated that she saw the plaintiffs vehicle
cross the center of the roadway and strike the defendant's car
head-on. 3 Furthermore, Martone stated that Gliottone's vehicle
was not displaying a directional signal, and she estimated that
Ethier's vehicle was traveling between twenty-five and twenty-
eight miles per hour at the time of the collision. 4 Martone
"emphasized.. .that plaintiff crossed into oncoming traffic so
suddenly that defendant could not have avoided the accident." 5
Gliottone acknowledged in his deposition that he had no
recollection of the accident "other than seeing a 'white blur' just
before striking his head on his windshield."6 Additionally,
Gliottone stated that he had not seen Ethier's vehicle prior to
1. Gliottone v. Ethier, 870 A.2d 1022, 1023 (R.I. 2005).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1024.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1023.
759
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impact.7 Moreover, he could not recall whether he was wearing a
seatbelt at the time of impact, nor whether his foot was on the
accelerator or the brake.8 Discovery revealed that plaintiff had no
remaining vision in his left eye.9
At the encouragement of the Superior Court trial justice,
Ethier filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging an absence
of any issues of material fact to be submitted to the jury.10 That
same afternoon, Ethier argued his motion, asserting that
Gliottone had failed to raise evidence sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to defendant's negligence." Gliottone
argued in response that photographs depicting damage to the
vehicles at the scene of the accident created an issue of material
fact as to the comparative negligence of the defendant; Gliottone
did not, however, challenge the timing of the court's consideration
of the motion.1 2 The hearing justice granted the motion for
summary judgment and Gliottone filed a timely notice of appeal. 3
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Gliottone alleged that the hearing justice
committed both substantive and procedural errors.1 4  First,
Gliottone asserted that the hearing justice abused his discretion
by hearing the summary judgment motion without a showing that
plaintiff had received ten days notice of the motion in accordance
with Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which states,
inter alia, that motions for summary judgment "shall be served at
least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing."15 The plaintiff
alleged that this language in Rule 56(c) established a ten-day
waiting period that may not be waived under the "raise or waive"
rule.' 6
The court acknowledged that the application of the "raise or








15. Id. at 1024-25 (quoting R.I. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
16. Id. at 1025.
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waive" rule to Rule 56(c) was a novel question in Rhode Island.17
As a result, the court reviewed precedent from other federal
jurisdictions.1 8 Noting that Rhode Island Rule 56 is "substantially
similar" to its federal counterpart, the court found it appropriate
to consider federal authority, 19 which states that "in the absence of
an objection, the defect of untimely service under Rule 56 will be
deemed waived."20 Additionally, the court looked to other state
jurisdictions that have considered the application of the "raise or
waive" rule to Federal Rule 56(c) and found that those states
"likewise have held that failure to object to noncompliance with
Rule 56(c)'s ten-day requirement results in a waiver of the
argument on appeal."21 Since the court could "discern no reason to
deviate from the weight of authority from around the country," it
held that if a party fails to object to the timing of the court's
hearing on a summary judgment motion, "the defect in compliance
with the ten-day requirement is waived and the court's
consideration of the motion will not constitute reversible error."22
In further support of the holding, the court determined that the
plaintiff here was not prejudiced by the prompt consideration of
the summary judgment motion because, as plaintiffs counsel
admitted, both parties had knowledge of the facts intended to be
argued in support of the summary judgment motion at least ten
days prior to the hearing.23
On the substantive issues, the plaintiff asserted that the
17. Id. at 1025 n.2.
18. Id. at 1025.
19. Id. (citing Kelvey v. Coughlin, 625 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1993); Heal v. Heal,
762 A.2d 463 (R.I. 2000)).
20. Id. (citing 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2719 (3d ed. 1998); 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.10[2] [a] at 56-49 (3d ed. 2004)).
21. Id. at 1025-26 (citing McKenzie v. Killian, 887 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 2004);
Wahle v. Med. Ctr. of Del., Inc., 559 A.2d 1228 (Del. 1989); Richardson v.
Citizens Gas & Coke Util., 422 N.E.2d 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)).
22. Id. at 1026. The court also noted that "Rhode Island is not completely
without local guidance" on this issue. Id. at 1026 n.4. The court noted that in
Professor Robert Kent's "influential treatise," he wrote: "[flailure to serve the
motion [for summary judgment] 10 days before the hearing does not
necessarily void the motion. If it is in fact heard on the designated date, and
the opposing party does not raise the timeliness of notice, the defect is
waived." Id. (quoting 1 KENT, RHODE ISLAND CIVIL PRACTICE § 56.3 at 417-18
(1969)).
23. Id. at 1026-27.
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granting of summary judgment was reversible error because the
photographs of the damaged vehicles were sufficient to create a
material issue about the defendant's speed at the time of the
crash. 24 After reviewing the record de novo, the court vacated the
grant of summary judgment to the defendant and held that,
despite strong evidence of plaintiffs negligence, a "jury reasonably
could infer from the evidence presented. . .that defendant may too
have been negligent."25  Indeed, the court noted that in a
comparative negligence jurisdiction such as Rhode Island, the
plaintiff is entitled to avoid summary disposition of the action if he
presents evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to
the negligence of the defendant. 26 Previously, the court had held
that accident scene photographs are admissible to prove causation
of injuries even without expert testimony.27 Thus, in this case, the
court determined that summary judgment was improperly
granted because the photographs offered into evidence by
Gliottone depicted vehicular damage of sufficient degree that a
jury could reasonably infer that Ethier may have been speeding at
the time of the accident. 28 Therefore, a potential material issue of
fact was created, making summary disposition inappropriate. 29
COMMENTARY
This case articulates a frustration of the underlying principles
and policies of comparative negligence and summary judgment
when it declares negligence cases, no matter how weak, immune
from summary adjudication. 30  Under the rules of summary
judgment, as codified in Rule 56, cases in which "no issues of
material fact appear" allow the trial justice to enter an order
dismissing the case in favor of the moving party.31 This rule
serves a vital role in maintaining the efficiency of the court system
by providing a mechanism by which cases lacking merit are not
24. Id. at 1027.
25. Id. at 1028.
26. Id. at 1028-29.
27. Id. at 1028 (citing Boscia v. Sharples, 860 A.2d 674 (R.I. 2004)).
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 1028-29.
31. Id. at 1027 (quoting Steinberg v. State, 427 A.2d 338, 340 (R.I. 1981)).
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allowed to advance to trial.32 Without such a rule the court
system would be even more bogged down than it currently is
because the court would be required to adjudicate every minor
negligence claim, regardless of whether any substantial evidence
supports the charges alleged.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, however, potentially
frustrates the efficient administration of justice by the Superior
and District Courts when it states that "issues of negligence are
ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication, but should be
resolved by trial in the ordinary manner."33 In adopting such a
rule, the court abandons its doctrine of efficiency and instead
catapults negligence actions to a position of superiority above all
other civil wrongs in contravention of the policy of fairness that
underlies comparative negligence. Indeed, the principle of
comparative negligence is meant to eliminate the arbitrary and
unfair results of contributory negligence, not to provide the
plaintiff with a sure-fire avenue to trial.34 Such a system as the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has now created in Gliottone could
have a disastrous effect on the efficient administration of justice
because the courts in Rhode Island may now be required to hear
any negligence case in which a mere potential material issue of
fact is presented. No longer must a plaintiff in a negligence case
provide a concrete issue of material fact; a scant offer of proof
may now be sufficient to overcome a motion for summary
judgment. Such a standard means that, regardless of the strength
(or weakness) of the evidence, all negligence actions must be
resolved at trial as a matter of right.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that when a party fails
to challenge a hearing justice's consideration of a summary
judgment motion before the expiration of the ten-day period for
service of the motion, as prescribed by Rule 56(c) of the Rhode
Island Rules of Civil Procedure, the defect in compliance with the
ten-day requirement is waived and will not constitute reversible
32. See id. at 1027-28.
33. Id. at 1028 (quoting Rogers v. Peabody Coal Co., 342 F.2d 749, 751
(6th Cir. 1965)).
34. See id. at 1028-29 & n.6.
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error.35 Secondly, the court held that as issues of negligence are
not ordinarily susceptible to summary adjudication, the order of
summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claim was
inappropriate.3 6 Therefore, the court ordered that the case be
remanded for further consideration. 37
Russell E. Farbiarz
35. Id. at 1026-27.
36. Id. at 1028-29.
37. Id. at 1029.
Constitutional Law. Gem Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc.
v. Rossi, 867 A.2d 796 (R.I. 2005). The Mechanics' Lien Law, as
amended by Rhode Island General Law § 34-28-17.1 (the Statute),
does not violate procedural due process. A claimant has a pre-
existing interest in any property improved upon by him or her due
to labor and materials expended by the claimant. The deprivation
of a property owner's interest under the Statute does not amount
to a temporary total deprivation as a property owner has access to
a prompt post-deprivation hearing, as well as other procedural
safeguards, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
and under Article 1, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In October, 2000, Robert V. Rossi and Lynda A. Rossi
contracted with Gem Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. (Gem) to
provide the raw materials and labor required for water and sewer
lines necessary for an office building the Rossis were building in
Smithfield, Rhode Island (the Property).' On January 28, 2002,
Gem sent the Rossis notice of its intention to do work and furnish
materials in connection with the construction on the Property, and
then recorded a copy of this notice in the Land Evidence Records
office of Smithfield, Rhode Island, as required by the Statute.2
Four months later, on May 28, 2002, Gem filed a petition to
enforce its mechanic's lien, claiming that it was owed $35,500.00
in unpaid labor and materials.3 Gem also recorded a notice of lis
pendens on that same day.4
Subsequently, as prescribed by the Statute, the Rossis paid
$35,860.00, the total amount of Gem's lien claim, plus costs, into
the court registry.5 The Rossis then filed an ex parte motion to
dissolve and discharge the mechanics' lien and the lis pendens,
1. Gem Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. v. Rossi, 867 A.2d 796, 800 (R.I.
2005).
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which the court granted on June 4, 2002.6 On August 29, 2000,
the Rossis filed a motion to dismiss, charging that the Statute was
unconstitutional, in that it deprived them of their property
without due process. 7
The Rossis informed the Rhode Island Attorney General of the
constitutional claim (as required by Rule 24 (d) of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure), but the state refused to
intervene.8 After a hearing on October 23, 2002, the motion
justice entered an order that invited the Attorney General and
any other interested party to file amicus briefs, requiring that
notice of this invitation be given also to major building and
construction associations. 9  After the Attorney General and
several other amici curiae submitted their briefs, the court heard
the arguments as to the constitutionality of the Statute. 10
Afterwards, the motion justice then issued a written decision
declaring the Statute unconstitutional.11 The Statute, however,
has since been amended, and it was the amended Statute that was
ultimately reviewed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.1 2
In his decision analyzing the pre-amendment Statute, the
motion justice drew heavily upon the United States Supreme
Court's most current procedural due process decision that
addressed pre-judgment remedies, Connecticut v. Doehr.13 The
motion justice in this instance found that a mechanic's lien clouds
title (similar to the clouding the Supreme Court found with
attachment in Doehr) and that it impairs the owner's ability to sell
property; additionally, he found that it taints credit ratings,
reduces the likelihood of obtaining a home equity loan, and can
6. Id. In its order, the Superior Court stated that "the amount deposited
with the court registry was substituted forthwith for the mechanic's lien and
lis pendens in the event that Gem eventually succeeded on the merits." Id. at
800-01.
7. Id. at 801. The court clarified that the claim invoked was not "one of
procedural due process, which is manifestly different from a 'taking.' The
former prevents the 'deprivation' of life, liberty or property without due
process. The latter provides protection from the government's power of
eminent domain... [t]his is not a 'takings' case." Id. at 801 n.4.





13. Id. (citing Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991)).
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also place an owner's current mortgage in technical default. 14 The
motion justice held that the "tremendous significance" of the
property interest (along with the statutorily required sworn
affidavit of the claimant) was inadequately safeguarded against
the possibility of erroneous depravation; thus this interest
considerably outweighed both the claimant's interest in any
prejudgment remedy, as well as the potential burden on the
government, if additional safeguards were imposed. 15
The motion justice entered judgment in favor of the Rossis on
May 30, 2003, and dismissed the action, ordering that the
$35,860.99 be released from the court registry, with accrued
interest added. 16 The motion justice also issued an order staying
the judgment for thirty days. 17 Gem subsequently appealed.' 8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court focused on two major issues
on appeal: (1) whether the enactment of an amendment to the
Statute, which provided retroactive effect to all mechanics' liens
pending the day of the amendment's enactment (July 17, 2003), or
the pre-amendment statute would be controlling;19 and (2)
whether the amendment 20 provided the Rossis with adequate
procedural due process protections under both the United States
and the Rhode Island Constitutions. 21 The court held that the
Statute as amended was constitutional.22 The court noted that
after the motion justice had declared the Statute
• • 23
unconstitutional, the Rhode Island Legislature amended the
Statute on July 17, 2003 by adding § 34-28-17.1.23 The court
commented that "[g]enerally, if the Legislature amends or adds a




17. Id. at 801-02.
18. Id. at 802. Subsequently, the motion justice declined to make the
stay indefinite, instead extending it to July 10, 2003. The court later stayed
the judgment pending further order. Id.
19. Id.
20. R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-17.1.
21. 867 A.2d at 810-12.
22. Id. at 818.
23. Id. at 802.
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apply 'the law and effect at the time of the appeal,' even when the
Statute was not in effect when judgment was entered in the trial
court."
24
The court stated that:
Statutes are given retroactive effect only when the
Legislature clearly expresses such an application...
Section 34-28-17.1 applies, not only to all future
mechanics' liens, but also to all pending "mechanics' liens,
petitions or lien substitutions" as of July 17, 2003 ....
This language clearly intends to apply §34-28-17.1 both
prospectively to future mechanics' liens and
retrospectively to pending mechanics' liens. Based on the
clear language of the statute and our case law, we are
required to apply the Mechanics' Lien Law as amended
by §34-28-17.1 to this appeal.25
Having concluded that the propriety of the motion justice's
ruling would be analyzed using the amended statute, the court
then turned its attention to ascertaining the nature of the Rossis'
property interest.26 The court stated:
At the time of the motion justice's judgment on May 30,
2003, and before the amendment to the statute, the
Rossis had precious few avenues for relief from a
perfected lien. Pursuant to § 34-28-17, property owners
could deposit a bond (or cash) equivalent to the total
amount of the notice of intention (plus associated costs)
into the court registry and then petition the Superior
Court ex parte to discharge the notice of intention and lis
pendens, thereby clearing title to the property. Under §
34-28-17, this option is available to the property owner at
any time after the recording of the notice of intention or,
alternatively, after the filing of a petition to enforce. Of
course, the property owner, as respondent to the petition
in Superior Court, may contest both the lien itself and the
amount claimed on their merits, although the statute is
unclear as to exactly when that contest shall be heard. §
24. Id. (citing O'Reilly v. Town of Gloucester, 621 A.2d 697, 704-05 (R.I.
1993)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 804.
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34-28-20. Finally, a property owner prevailing on the
merits may be entitled to costs, and, in the court's
discretion, attorneys' fees.27
The enactment of the amendment to the Statute changed the
"playing field" of the lien holder and the owner of the property.28
The court noted:
However, P.L. 2003, ch. 269, section 1 (codified as §34-28-
17.1) enacted on July 17, 2003, significantly enhanced the
rights of a property owner facing mechanics' lien. In
relevant part, § 34-28-17.1(a) provides that any owner,
contractor, or other interested party who alleges:
"(1) that any person who has provided labor, materials or
equipment or has agreed to provide funding, financing or
payment for labor or materials or equipment refuses to continue
to provide such funding, financing or payment for labor
materials [sic] solely because of the filing or recording of a notice
of intention; or (2) it appears from the notice of intention that
the claimant has no valid lien by reason of the character of or
the contract for the labor, materials or equipment and for which
a lien is claimed; or (3) that a notice or other instrument has not
been filed or recorded in accordance with the applicable
provisions of § 34-28-1 et seq.; or (4) that for any other reason a
claimed lien is invalid by reason or [sic] failure to comply with
the provisions of § 34-28-1 et seq., then in such event, such
person may apply forthwith to the superior court for the county
where the land lies for an order to show cause why the lien in
question is invalid, or otherwise void, or the basis of the lien is
without probability of a judgment rendered in favor of the
lienor." Section 34-28-17.1(b) provides that such a show-cause
order "shall be served upon the necessary parties no later than
one week prior to the date of the scheduled hearing."29
The court then reviewed the United States Supreme Court's
most recent analysis and treatment of procedural due process
considerations as applied to prejudgment remedies. 30 In those
cases, the United States Supreme Court deemed that the lack of
an immediate post-deprivation property rights hearing rendered
27. Id. at 805.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 805-08 (citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bayview, 395
U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974)).
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the particular statutes at issue unconstitutional.31
The court then examined the Supreme Court's most recent
procedural due process case addressing prejudgment remedies,
Connecticut v. Doehr.32 In Doehr, the claimant, who was the
plaintiff in an assault and battery civil action, sought to attach the
defendant's home to secure the potential judgment.33  The
Connecticut attachment statute in Doehr permitted the
attachment of another's real property without prior notice or
hearing, after judicial review of an affidavit demonstrating
probable cause to believe the plaintiff would win the underlying
civil action 34 The Doehr court, while recognizing the effect of the
attachment of real property was not a "complete, physical, or
permanent deprivation of real property," and therefore, was "less
than the perhaps temporary total deprivation" found in earlier
cases, nonetheless held that the effects of the attachment,
primarily the clouding of title, deprived the property owner of a
"significant" property interest.35 The Doehr court then applied a
balancing test and concluded that the ex parte judicial review of
the affidavit, along with the post-deprivation hearing, were
insufficient to offset the property owner's significant property
interest.36 As such, the Supreme Court held that the Connecticut
attachment statute was unconstitutional as it violated the Due
Process Clause.37
The Rhode Island Supreme Court applied the Doehr analysis
to Gem's argument that mechanics' liens do not involve state
action and are therefore not subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment. 38 The court concluded that:
Government officials provide "overt, significant
assistance" in almost every step of the mechanics' lien
process. A town official records the notice of intention
perfecting the lien. A town official records the notice of lis
31. Id.
32. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
33. See id.
34. Id. at 5-7. "Though the claimant was not required to post a bond, the
property owner could avail himself of a post-deprivation hearing to challenge
the attachment." Id.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 24.
38. 867 A.2d at 808-09.
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pendens. Prior to the show-cause hearing to determine
whether the lien should be enforced for the amount
claimed, a superior court clerk has a newspaper
advertisement published giving notice to "all persons
having a lien, by virtue of this chapter, or any title, claim,
lease, mortgage, attachment, or other lien or
encumbrance, or any unrecorded claim on all or any part
of the same property" and issues direct citations to each
person listed on the petition to enforce the lien. Finally,
the court registry holds the cash payment or bond in the
event that the property owner wishes to discharge the
lien. Thus, the operation of our Mechanics' Lien Law
qualifies as state action within the broad sweep of
Doehr.3 9
Having concluded that a mechanics' lien involves state action,
the court then turned to whether the amendment to the Statute
violated the Rossis' procedural due process rights. 40 It stated that:
To determine whether a particular state statute complies
with due process, we apply a balancing test first
announced in Matthews v. Eldridge.... We balance: (1)
the "consideration of the private interest that will be
affected by the prejudgment measure"; (2) "an
examination of the risk of erroneous deprivation through
the procedures under attack and the probable value of
additional or alternative safeguards"; and (3) giving
"principal attention to the interest of the party seeking
the prejudgment remedy, with, nonetheless, due regard
for any ancillary interest the government may have in
providing the procedure or foregoing the added burden of
providing greater protections. "41
As to the first prong in the Matthews-Doehr analysis, the
39. Id. at 809 (internal citations omitted).
40. Id. at 809-18. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prevents states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Article 1,
section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution similarly provides "[no] person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." R.I.
CONST. art 1, § 2.
41. Id. at 809 (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11).
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court concluded that the effect of the filing of the mechanics' lien
was to cloud the Rossis' title to their property.42 As to the second
prong in the Matthews-Doehr analysis, the court analyzed the risk
of erroneous deprivation under the amended statute and found
that, as amended, the Statute offers several procedures to limit
the risk of erroneous deprivations including: "a prompt post-
deprivation hearing; a detailed sworn affidavit; the property
owner's ability to pay cash or post a bond to clear title; and the
payment of costs and fees to the prevailing party."43
The court stated that a swift post-deprivation hearing is an
important factor in determining whether the procedural
safeguards in place adequately limit the possibility of erroneous
deprivation in that it allows the property owner to immediately
challenge the deprivation.44 The court found that "the language of
§ 34-28-17.1 clearly affords a property owner a hearing "for an
order to show cause why the lien in question is invalid, or
otherwise void, or the basis of the lien is without probability of a
judgment rendered in favor of the lienor."' 45 The court continued
that "It]he question of when that hearing is to take place is critical
in limiting the risk of erroneous deprivation: the more prompt the
hearing, the less the risk of erroneous deprivation."46 The court
concluded that even if and when the notice of intention is both
mailed and recorded in the town's land evidence records on the
very same day, a property owner's right to a prompt post-
deprivation hearing, as under § 34-28-17.1, provides him or her
with adequate due process protection. 47
As to the third prong of the Matthews-Doehr analysis, the
court examined Gem's interest, accounting for any ancillary
interest the government may have in providing or choosing to
forego additional protections. 48 The court stated that the Rhode
Island Mechanics' Lien Law does recognize a preexisting interest
for claimants whose work and materials have increased the value
of an owner's property.49 "§ 34-28-1(a) makes any improvement
42. Id. at 810.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 810-11.
45. Id. at 811.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 812.
48. Id. at 815.
49. Id. at 816.
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and the land upon which the improvement sits 'liable and...
subject to liens for all the work done by any person ... [as well as]
for the materials used' in the doing of any such improvement."50
The court also discussed the state's additional interest in "putting
potential purchasers on notice of all claims to prevent the type of
complex third-party disputes that inevitably would result from
transfers of such property."51
Finally, the court indicated that the state also had to consider
the propriety of other statutory prejudgment liens.52 The court
noted that the state also has an interest in the constitutionality of
the Mechanics' Lien Law to the extent that a "holding to the
contrary would render other statutory prejudgment liens
constitutionally suspect - a situation that arguably might lead to
chaos in the market place."
COMMENTARY
In Gem Plumbing, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
articulated three major points that address constitutional, debtor-
creditor and property law. First, the court followed precedent in
holding that retroactive provisions of statutes are enforceable.
Second, under Gem, property owners have now been accorded
enhanced due process rights previously unavailable to them.
Third, the court determined that § 34-28-17.1, which provides a
post-deprivation hearing to the owner of real estate, is
constitutional and follows the prevailing law in the area; it
provides the owner adequate procedural due process rights. 53
While the court did suggest that the legislature amend § 34-28-
17.1 to provide a specific timeframe for the scheduling of the post-
deprivation hearing, nevertheless, the court deemed that the
amendment to the Statute was sufficient in providing the owner
the necessary constitutional safeguards. 54
50. Id.
51. Id. at 817.
52. Id. at 817 n.32.
53. Id. at 818.
54. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Legislature's enactment of § 34-28-17.1 of the Rhode
Island Mechanics' Lien Law is constitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1,
section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution in that it establishes
adequate procedural due process safeguards for property owners.
William J. Delaney*
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Roger William University School of Law.
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Constitutional Law. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of
Representatives (Casino II), 885 A.2d 698 (R.I. 2005). At the
request of the House of Representatives of the State of Rhode
Island, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued an advisory
opinion regarding the constitutionality of pending legislation,
titled "Establishment and Extension of Gambling Activities and
Other Facilities" (the proposed Casino Act). The court found that
the important constitutional questions posed by the House of
Representatives warranted consideration. After examining Rhode
Island's constitutional requirement that the state must operate all
casino gaming facilities, the court indicated that the proposed
Casino Act did not comport with the constitutional provision.
However, the court found that the proposed Casino Act complied
with the state constitutional mandate requiring a statewide and
municipal referendum. Finally, the court declined to answer the
remaining two questions concerning the constitutionality of the
proposed legislation on either federal or state constitutional equal
protection grounds.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Rhode Island Supreme Court delivered this advisory
opinion during an ongoing political tug-of-war. In 2004, both
houses of the General Assembly passed a bill entitled The Rhode
Island Gaming Control and Revenue Act (Casino Act).' However,
Donald L. Carcieri, the Governor of Rhode Island, vetoed the
legislation. 2 Governor Carcieri subsequently sent a request to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, seeking an advisory opinion
concerning the constitutionality of the 2004 Casino Act.3
Meanwhile, three-fifths of the legislature voted to override the
Governor's veto.4 The court then issued an advisory opinion,5
1. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives (Casino II),




5. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino I), 856 A.2d 320 (R.I.
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which determined that the 2004 Casino Act violated the state
constitution, because the casino would not be abiding by article
VI, section 15.6 In 2005, the House of Representatives introduced
legislation which sought to revise chapter 9.1 of title 41, the
proposed Casino Act.7 The enactment, entitled "Establishment
and Extension of Gambling Activities and Other Facilities" would
have amended the 2004 Casino Act.8 Rather than vote on this
newly proposed Casino Act, the House of Representatives
submitted the following four questions to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court for an advisory opinion: 9
(1)Would the proposed act, if duly enacted into law and
approved by the electors of the state and town of West
Warwick, comply with the requirement of Article VI,
Section 15 of the Constitution of the State of Rhode
Island and Providence Plantations that all lotteries
permitted in Rhode Island be operated by the state?
(2) Would the proposed act, if duly enacted into law and
approved by the majority of the electors of the state and
the majority of the electors of the town of West Warwick
at the special election provided for by the proposed act,
comply with the provisions of Article VI, Section 22 of the
Constitution of the State of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations requiring a statewide and municipal
referendum to become effective?
(3) Would the proposed act, if duly enacted into law and
approved by the electors of the state and the town of West
Warwick, violate the equal protection clause of Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island
and Providence Plantations, in (a) granting to the
Narragansett Indian Tribe and its chosen partner the
right to enter into an exclusive contract as casino service
provider; or (b) in providing that the state retain a share
2004).
6. See generally Casino I, 856 A.2d 320 (citing R.I. CONST. art VI, § 15).
7. Casino 11, 885 A.2d at 700.
8. Id. at 699-700.
9. Chief Justice Williams, Justice Suttell, and Justice Robinson signed
the advisory opinion, while Justices Goldberg and Flaherty did not
participate. Id. at 715.
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of net casino gaming income that is different from the
share of net income that the state retains from other
gambling facilities in the state?
(4) Would the proposed act, if duly enacted into law and
approved by the electors of the state and the town of West
Warwick, be violative of the equal protection clause of
Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the
United States, in (a) granting to the Narragansett Indian
Tribe and its chosen partner the right to enter into an
exclusive contract as casino service provider; or (b) in
providing that the state receive a share of net casino
gaming income that is different from the share of net
income that the state receives from other gambling
facilities in the state[?]10
After the House of Representatives submitted these
questions, the court issued In re Request for Advisory Opinion
from the House of Representatives,11 which created an expedited
briefing and oral argument period. 12  The House of
Representatives, Governor Carcieri, and the Attorney General
submitted briefs explaining their positions. 13 Lincoln Park, Inc.
(Lincoln Park), Newport Grand Jai Alai, LLC (Newport Grand),
the Town of West Warwick, and, jointly, Harrah's Entertainment,
Inc. (Harrah's), and the Narragansett Indian Tribe (Tribe) each
filed amicus curiae briefs. 14
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Before issuing this advisory opinion, the court explained that
when a court issues an advisory opinion, the justices are speaking
in their "individual capacities as legal experts" rather than as
justices of the court. 15 Because of this distinct role, the justices
shall not exercise any fact-finding power.16 As such, the court
established that the advisory opinion had no force of law and was
10. Id. at 700.
11. 875 A.2d 445 (R.I. 2005) (mem).
12. Casino 11, 885 A.2d at 700.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 701 (quoting Casino I, 856 A.2d at 323).
16. Id. (citing Casino I, 856 A.2d at 323).
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not binding. 17
Prior to discussing the constitutionality of the proposed
Casino Act, the court initially determined whether to issue an
advisory opinion in response to the House of Representatives'
questions.18 Article X, section 3 of the Rhode Island Constitution
obligates the Supreme Court judges to issue a written opinion
"upon any question of law whenever requested by the governor or
by either house of the general assembly."19 In other words, if the
General Assembly has a question concerning the constitutionality
of pending legislation, or if the Governor has a question
concerning the constitutionality of existing statutes, the Supreme
Court must issue an advisory opinion on the matter.20
The court acknowledged its obligation to render an advisory
opinion, but also expressed concern about issuing the opinion.21
The court evinced hesitation because of the legislation's "largely
undeveloped and inchoate state" and noted several concerns. 22
One necessary technical revision for the proposed Casino Act was
that the Lottery Commission, the original entity designated to
operate the proposed casino, had been abolished and subsequently
replaced by the State Lottery Division of the Department of
Administration (Division).23  While this technicality did not
change the court's analysis, the court nonetheless suggested this
modification to the House of Representatives. 24  A second
complication involved a sunset clause, contained in the proposed
legislation, which nullified the entire statute on November 8,
2005, if there was no "majority statewide and local approval of the
statute at a special election."25 Given the approaching deadline,
the court acknowledged its late receipt of this request as well as
the court's timely response. 26 Furthermore, the proposed Casino
Act directed the Division to enter into a master casino service
17. Id. (citing Casino I, 856 A.2d at 323).
18. Id. at 701-02.
18. Id. at 701.
19. Id. (citing Casino I, 856 A.2d at 323 (quoting R.I. CONST. art 10 § 3)).
20. See id. at 701-02.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 701.
24. Id. at 701-02.
25. Id. at 702.
26. Id.
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contract with the casino provider.27  Therefore, the proposed
Casino Act would not be the final statement of the rights and
responsibilities of the parties. 28 Yet, despite the proposed Casino
Act's flaws and ambiguities, the Supreme Court adhered to its
constitutional obligation to issue the advisory opinion. 29
Question One: State Operation
The Rhode Island Constitution prohibits all lotteries except
those operated by the state.30 The first question under review was
whether the proposed Casino Act complied with this mandate. 31
While the General Assembly has plenary power to legislate on all
matters relating to gambling, the Supreme Court interprets the
statutes which determine the constitutionality of the legislation.32
Thus, the court would uphold proposed legislation that vested
operational control of the casino in the Division.33
The court first examined the issue of non-slot games, or table
games.34 The proposed Casino Act appeared to grant the Division
total control in determining and approving the type of table
games. 35 However, the Division's powers were overcome by the
requirement that the Division "shall permit the casino service
provider to conduct.. .any [table game] that is regularly conducted
at any other casino gaming facility."36 The court opined that as a
result, the Division would have no control over what table games
would be played at the casino.37 The court found that this was
inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that the state





30. Id. at 703 (citing R.I. CONST. art. 6 § 15).
31. Id. at 700.
32. Id. at 703 (citing Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 77 A. 145
(R.I. 1910)).
33. See id.
34. Id. at 703-04.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 704 (quoting H.R. 41-9.2-8(a)(19)(ii), 119th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (R.I. 2005) (proposed) (emphasis added)).
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Casino 1, 856 A.2d at 331).
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Second, the court examined the extension of credit to patrons
of the proposed casino.39 The proposed Casino Act permitted the
casino service provider to tender credit to patrons as a cash
advance, in return for a "negotiable instrument of the same
value."40 The plain language of the provision did not extend any
control over credit to the Division.41 Rather, control of credit
would belong strictly to the casino service provider.42 As such, the
court decided that the extension-of-credit provision did not satisfy
the constitutional requirement that every aspect of the casino's
operation must be vested in the state.43
Moreover, the enforceability of the proposed agreement
between the Division and the casino service provider troubled the
court.44 Tribes are generally immune from suits on contracts,
regardless of whether they involve governmental activity. 45 Thus,
sovereign immunity threatened to undermine all state operational
control of the proposed casino. 46 Although the Tribe expressly
stated at oral argument that the Tribe would be willing to waive
sovereign immunity from the master casino service contract, the
court noted that it was uncertain whether this waiver would
become part of the written contract.47 The court highlighted, in a
footnote, that this uncertainty served as an additional example of
the inchoate nature of the legislation.48 Hence, the issue of
sovereign immunity threatened to undermine every aspect of the
state's control of the casino.49
Fourth, the proposed Casino Act directed the Division to enter
into a master casino contract with the casino provider, and therein
defined the casino service provider as "an entity composed of the
Narragansett Indian Tribe and its chosen partner."50 The court
39. Id. at 704-05.




43. Id. at 704-05.
44. Id. at 705.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing Kiowa Tribe of Ok. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 705 n.6.
49. Id. at 706.
50. Id. (quoting H.R. 41-9.2-2(1), 119th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I.
2005) (proposed) (emphasis added)).
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reasoned that this provision bestowed only regulatory power,
rather than operational power, over the most fundamental aspects
of the casino, namely choosing the casino service provider.51 Thus,
the Division would retain the equivalent of a veto power over the
Tribe. 52 This veto power amounted to significantly less than
complete operational control of all aspects of the casino, and, in
turn, was violative of the state constitution. 53
Furthermore, the court discussed the relationship of the
operational issues to the nondelegation doctrine, as the issues
were inexorably intertwined.5 4 The nondelegation doctrine serves
two purposes: it ensures that the public is protected from
discriminatory and arbitrary actions of public officials, and it
assures that politically accountable officials make fundamental
policy decisions.5 5 In this instance, particularly concerning the
table games issue, the proposed Casino Act would violate the
nondelegation doctrine.5 6 The court reasoned that the standard to
approve any table game that already exists in another casino
amounted to no standard at all, and consequently, lacked all
protection against potentially arbitrary or discriminatory actions
by the casino provider.57
In addition, the court found it important to highlight that the
proposed Casino Act would impart greater control to the Division
than the 2004 Casino Act would have. 5 The court acknowledged
express grants of authority: for example, that the casino would
collect money on behalf of the Division, which would then be
transferred into the state's bank account, whereupon the state
would distribute the funds accordingly.5 9  The court also
acknowledged a catch-all provision, in which the proposed Casino
Act bestowed all other necessary and proper powers to the
Division for effective administration of the casino.60 However, this
51. Id. at 706-07.
52. Id. at 706.
53. Id. at 706-07.
54. Id. at 707.
55. Id. at 708 (citing Kaveny v. Cumberland Zoning Bd. of Review, 875
A.2d 1, 11 (R.I. 2005) (citing R.I. CONST. art 6, § 15)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 708-09.
59. Id. at 709.
60. Id. at 711.
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broad necessary and proper provision could not override the
express limitations contained in the proposed Casino Act that
restricted the Division's power. 61 Thus, the court concluded that
the necessary and proper clause could not cure all of the
constitutional defects discussed above. 62
Finally, the court recognized the arguments in the briefs that
distinguished the proposed Casino Act from Lincoln Park and
Newport Grand, two constitutionally operated casino gaming
facilities in Rhode Island.63  Accordingly, the court expressly
stated that any prior reference by the court regarding Lincoln
Park or Newport Grand was not intended to establish a
"constitutional baseline."64  In other words, newly proposed
casinos need not imitate these two contemporary casinos in order
to achieve constitutionality. 65
Therefore, in response to the House's first question, and while
giving a reasonable presumption of constitutionality to the
proposed legislation, the court ultimately found that the state
could not completely operate a casino gaming facility if it could not
control the type of non-slot table games, control or deny the
extension of credit, choose a casino service contract provider, and
protect its contractual rights by requiring the Tribe's absolute
waiver of sovereign immunity.66
Question Two: The Referendum
The court then reviewed the second question, concerning the
constitutionality of the proposed referendum. 67 Article VI, section
22 of the state constitution prohibits gambling within a state or
municipality unless the gambling activity has been approved by
the "majority of those electors voting in a statewide referendum
and by the majority of those electors voting in a referendum in the
municipality in which the proposed gambling would be allowed." 68
The proposed Casino Act had two requirements: It would require a
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 711-12.
64. Id. at 711.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 712.
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting R.I. CONST. art. 6, § 22).
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statewide special election of a referendum that would ask whether
the state should operate a casino gaming facility in West
Warwick 69 and it would require that, prior to this statewide
referendum, the Lottery Division would certify to the Secretary of
State a "statement of intent" filed by the casino service provider,
stating, in essence, that the West Warwick Town Council had
agreed to place the question on the special election ballot. 70 The
court answered that if both requirements were carried out, and
both statewide and local approval was gained, then article VI,
section 22 of the state constitution would be satisfied. 71
Additionally, the court responded in the affirmative to the
question of whether the requirement may be met by a referendum
at a special election instead of a general election.72 The court
concluded that it was of no constitutional significance whether the
question was posed in a special election or as part of a general
election.73
Questions Three and Four: Equal Protection
The court declined to answer the third and fourth questions in
the context of an advisory opinion.74 First, the proposed statute
failed to comport with the constitutional requirement that the
casino must be operated by the state. 75  Second, to properly
analyze the equal protection issues, the court requires a factual
record, which is unavailable in an advisory opinion.76 As a result,
the court respectfully declined to answer the constitutionality of
the proposed Casino Act in either the federal or state equal
protection constitutional frameworks. 77 The court remarked that
it was not violating its constitutional duty to issue an advisory
opinion when asked, but instead was acquiescing to the reality




72. Id. at 713.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 713-14.
75. Id. at 713.
76. Id. at 713-14.
77. Id. at 714.
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accompanying facts. 78
COMMENTARY
The proposed legislation in question contained a series of
flaws due to its largely undeveloped state. Before proceeding, the
court noted several of these oversights to provide guidance to the
legislature. Yet, notwithstanding the imperfect condition of the
legislation, the court heeded its constitutional duty and properly
issued an advisory opinion. Some may consider the court's action
an unjust interference with the population's right to vote on an
important statewide issue. However, had the court allowed the
legislation to be placed before the voters in a statewide
referendum, a constitutional emergency may have ensued.
The majority of the voters could have voted in favor of an
unconstitutional casino. Had they voted in this manner,
opponents of the casino would have ultimately challenged the
constitutionality of the "yes" vote. At this point, the court would
be faced with the same questions presented initially during the
House of Representatives' request for an advisory opinion. Had
the court waited, it not only would have had to decide the
constitutional merits of the proposed Casino Act, it also would
have been faced with overturning a decision made by the people of
Rhode Island in their election booths. At this later date, the court
would be forced to finally determine that the proposed Casino Act
violated the constitutional mandate that all lotteries, including
casino gaming facilities, be operated fully by the state. It is fair to
assume that if the legislation had made it to the voting booths,
both opponents and proponents of the proposed Casino Act would
be up in arms, because each group would likely have devoted
significant time and money toward the casino campaign in vain.
Furthermore, although the resultant advisory opinion may
seem like a victory for Governor Carcieri and other casino
opponents, the court's ruling has little practical effect on the
casino effort. Regardless of the court's decision, the legislature
would have had to redraft the legislation in any case. For
instance, any chance of having a special election in November,
2005, was lost when the House waited until May to seek an
78. Id.
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advisory opinion, and the court could not hear arguments until
August.79  Nonetheless, the court understood its judicial
responsibility to respond to constitutional questions posed by the
House of Representatives, as well as to prevent any ensuing
equivocation that the state might have otherwise experienced, and
properly issued an advisory opinion explaining how the legislature
failed to meet constitutional requirements.
CONCLUSION
Despite the emergent state of the proposed legislation, as well
as the court's initial hesitance upon taking up these issues in the
form of an advisory opinion, the proposed Casino Act and the
debate surrounding its constitutionality called for judicial
intervention. For the second time in two years, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court found the General Assembly's effort to construct a
bill enabling a casino referendum to go before voters
unconstitutional. After noting, in 2004, that the word "operate"
means the power to make decisions about all aspects of the casino
gaming facility, the court found that the 2005 legislation failed to
meet this constitutional requirement.80  Under the proposed
Casino Act, the new legislation left too much power with the
casino service provider, and did not grant the state exclusive
operating authority over the casino.81 However, the court found
that a special election would meet the constitutional requirement
for a referendum.8 2 Finally, the court declined to answer two
other questions, regarding whether it was permissible to treat a
casino different from slot machine parlors already in place in the
state, because these questions would require fact-finding, which is
an impermissible court function during an advisory opinion.8 3
Margreta Vellucci
79. See id. at 700-01.
80. Id. at 703-04.
81. Id. at 703-10.
82. Id. at 712-13.
83. Id. at 713-14.
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State Constitutional Law. McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d
217 (R.I. 2005). An attorney and his law practice lacked standing
to maintain an action to remove a public official from office. An
action to remove a public official from office was a petition in
equity in the nature of quo warranto over which the Superior
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction without the intervention
of the Attorney General. Rhode Island's constitutional prohibition
against state officials holding dual offices did not apply to an
appointed member of the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 21, 2004, Chief Justice Frank Williams, of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, was sworn in as a member of a
military review panel, a federal position with the United States
Department of Defense.1 Attorney Keven A. McKenna and his law
practice, Keven A. McKenna, P.C., filed suit in the Providence
County Superior Court under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act (R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-30-1 et seq.), (1) alleging that the Chief
Justice had vacated his seat on the Rhode Island-Supreme Court
by accepting appointment to the military review panel; (2) seeking
a declaratory judgment to that effect; and (3) requesting
preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining the Chief
Justice from occupying his seat on the court.2 Additionally, the
plaintiffs sought injunctions restraining the Governor "from not
notifying the R.I. Judicial Nominating Commission of the vacancy
in the Office of the Chief Justice," restraining the Chair of the
Rhode Island Judicial Nominating Commission "from not
submitting eligible names of nominees to the office of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court to the Governor of the State of
Rhode Island," and restraining the State Treasurer "from issuing
salary checks to [the Chief Justice] ."3
787
1. McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 221 (R.I. 2005).
2. Id. at 220-21.
3. Id. at 221.
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On April 26, 2005, the Presiding Justice of the Superior
Court, pursuant to the provisions of Rhode Island General Laws
§§ 8-2-4 and 8-2-23, appointed three members of that court "to be
a quorum for the purpose of presiding over the preliminary
motions and trial" of the case. 4 The defendants moved to dismiss
pursuant to the Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). 5 Additionally, the defendants sought a stay of
all proceedings pending a determination by the Superior Court
that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims. 6
On May 11, 2005, the three-justice panel of the Superior
Court reasoned that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
"provides that the Superior Court, upon petition, shall have power
to declare rights, status and other legal relations, whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed," and that "[flurther, § 9-30-12
declares the act to be remedial and to be liberally construed and
administered in order to afford relief from uncertainty and
insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations."7
Based on this reasoning, the panel found that the plaintiffs did,
indeed, have standing.8
The defendants petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme Court
for certiorari, which the court granted on May 13, 2005. 9 The
defendants argued: (1) that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring
their claims; (2) that the Superior Court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims; and (3) that article 3,
section 6 of the state constitution did not apply to the Chief
Justice.10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The court held: (1) that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
maintain an action to remove the Chief Justice from office; (2) that
the plaintiffs' action to remove the Chief Justice was a petition in
equity in the nature of quo warranto over which the Superior
Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction without the intervention
4. Id. at 221-22.
5. Id. at 222 (citing R.I. Sup. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 223-24.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 224.
10. Id. at 224-25.
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of the Attorney General; and (3) that Rhode Island's constitutional
prohibition against state officials holding dual offices did not apply
to the Chief Justice, an appointed member of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.11
A. Standing
The court held that the plaintiffs, Keven A. McKenna, Esq.
and his law practice, Keven A. McKenna, P.C., lacked the
requisite standing to bring an action to remove the Chief Justice
from office. 12  An analysis of standing should focus on the
claimant, not the claim.1 3  Thus, the court focused on the
plaintiffs, not on the issues sought to be determined.1 4 In Rhode
Island Opthalmological Society v. Cannon,15 the court articulated
the notion that standing requires a plaintiff to allege that "the
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise."1 6 In Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 7 the Court explained
that the injury in fact must be "concrete and particularized...
actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' 8
Furthermore, "[t]he line is not between a substantial injury and
an insubstantial injury. The line is between injury and no
injury."1
Standing is a prerequisite for actions at law, actions in equity,
and claims for declaratory relief.20 The Superior Court "is without
jurisdiction under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act unless
it is confronted with an actual justiciable controversy,"21 which
requires a plaintiff to have (1) standing and (2) an entitlement to
real and articulable relief.22 The court held that the plaintiffs
11. Id. at 238-39.
12. Id. at 228.
13. Id. at 225-26.
14. Id.
15. 317 A.2d 124 (R.I. 1974).
16. Id. at 128.
17. 699 A.2d 856 (R.I. 1997).
18. Id. at 862.
19. Id. (quoting Matunuck Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Sheldon, 399 A.2d 489,
494 (1979)).
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failed to meet either element of justiciability. 23
The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to "articulate[] a
stake in the outcome of this controversy ... distinguishable from
that of other members of the bar or the public."24 The court
reasoned:
[The Plaintiffs'] subjective enthusiasm does not overcome
the glaring jurisdictional deficiencies in this case. Nor
are we persuaded that plaintiffs' stated fear of an entirely
speculative and hypothetical malpractice claim that
might be brought if he did not pursue this action supplied
the standing component of justiciability. Unfounded
anxiety or a vague fear based on utterly speculative
hypothesis is simply not enough. 25
The court concluded by citing several cases for the proposition
that the Attorney General is the appropriate party to bring an
action to remove a public official from office.26  The court
continued: McKenna "is neither a roving prosecutor nor an
Attorney General without portfolio, but a lawyer engaged in the
private practice of law .... "27 Consequently, the court held, the
plaintiffs were without standing to maintain an action to remove
the Chief Justice from office. 28
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The court next addressed the Superior Court's subject matter
jurisdiction, holding that the Superior Court had lacked the
requisite subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs'
action "[blecause an action to test one's title to office is an action
in quo warranto and the Superior Court's jurisdiction to entertain
the claim is limited .... The Superior Court's jurisdiction to
entertain an action in quo warranto is strictly limited to actions
brought by the Attorney General...."29
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 227.
26. Id. at 227-28 (citing Marshall v. Hill, 93 A.2d 524, 526 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1952); Brush v. City of Mount Vernon, 20 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1940); Jones v. Talley, 230 S.W.2d 968, 970-71 (Tenn. 1950)).




Rhode Island General Law § 8-2-16 vests the Superior Court
with concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court "to hear any
proceeding upon a writ of quo warranto or an information in the
nature of quo warranto";30 however, because "such claims seek to
enforce a public right and the relief it affords is the ouster of the
incumbent from office[,] ... those claims may only be brought by
the Attorney General on behalf of the state.. . "31 The court
explained:
A private citizen who questions the right of an incumbent
to hold office may employ only a petition in equity in the
nature of quo warranto, and jurisdiction over such
petitions is exclusively vested in the Supreme Court....
A petition in equity in the nature of quo warranto may be
brought by a private individual who asserts that he or she
has a right to the office at issue; and pursuant to G.L.
1956 § 10-14-1, the Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain such a claim.32
Thus, only a plaintiff claiming title to the challenged office
may proceed without intervention from the Attorney General, and
only in the Supreme Court.33
In order to reach its result, the court reclassified the
plaintiffs' petition for a declaratory judgment as a petition in
equity in the nature of quo warranto "over which the Superior
Court has no subject matter jurisdiction."34 The court reasoned
that it "has consistently rejected claims that sounded in quo
warranto but were otherwise disguised."35 The court concluded by
holding that the plaintiffs could not maintain their action in the
Superior Court without the Attorney General's intervention; nor
could the plaintiffs bring a petition in equity in the nature of quo




34. Id. at 229-30.
35. Id. (citing Brennan v. Butler, 47 A. 320, 320 (R.I. 1900) (writ of
mandamus); Fargnoli v. Cianci, 397 A.2d 68, 71 (R.I. 1979) (class action for
injunctive relief); State ex rel. Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1194-95 (R.I.
1991) (information in the nature of quo warranto by a private citizen); State
v. Storms, 311 A.2d at 567, 570-71 (R.I. 1973) (action by defendants in a
criminal case)).
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warranto in the Supreme Court because neither plaintiff claimed
a right to the office of the Chief Justice. 36
C. Article 3, Section 6 of the State Constitution
Although noting that its holdings as to standing and subject-
matter jurisdiction were determinative of the case, the court
stated that the public importance of "a direct challenge to an
official's title to office" compelled it to address the merits of the
case.37 The court framed the issue before it as "whether, in the
context of this case, as an appointed (and not elected) member of
this court, Chief Justice Williams falls within"38 the provisions of
the state constitution providing that "if any ... judge [shall,]
after... election and engagement, [have] accepted any
appointment under any other government, then his office shall be
immediately vacated."39
Giving the words of the constitution their ordinary meaning,
the court concluded that "article 3, section 6, no longer applies to
the justices of [the] court because [they] are no longer elected to
[their] positions .... [B]y its clear language, article 3, section 6, is
restricted to those enumerated state officials who, 'after election
and engagement, accept any appointment under any other
government... "'40
In 1994, article 10, section 4 of the Rhode Island Constitution
was amended so that, rather than being elected, the justices of the
Supreme Court would be appointed.41 The court found "[t]he
contrast between the former election provision and the current
appointment provision of the state constitution ... determinative
of the issue before [the] Court."42  The court reached the
"inescapable conclusion that, as appointed justices to the Supreme
Court, the prohibition against dual office holding in article 3,
section 6, no longer applies to the members of [the Supreme]
Court."43
36. Id. at 230.
37. Id. at 230-31.
38. Id. at 231.
39. R.I. CONST. art. 3, § 6.
40. McKenna, 874 A.2d at 232.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 232-33.
43. Id. at 235.
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COMMENTARY
Although acknowledging that its holding regarding the
plaintiffs' standing and the Superior Court's subject-matter
jurisdiction were determinative of the plaintiffs' case, the court
chose to address the merits of the plaintiffs' claim as well, because
of the "public importance that attaches to such a direct challenge
to an official's title to office." 44 Although twice stating the "public
importance"45 of the issue presented, the court did not detail the
reasons for addressing the merits of the plaintiffs' claim beyond
agreeing with the amici curiae that it should do so "'for reasons of
equity and judicial efficiency."' 46 Beyond settling any doubt as to
the office of the Chief Justice, there are two likely reasons for the
court addressing the merits of the plaintiffs' claim: first, the
possibility that the court would have to address the issue in the
future; and second, a failure of the court to adjudicate the matter
could have left determination of the issue to the military
commission.47
The court's holdings as to standing and subject matter
jurisdiction, without addressing the merits of the plaintiffs' claim,
would have left open the possibility, albeit limited, of a future
attack on the office of the Chief Justice. After the court's holdings
as to standing and subject-matter jurisdiction, even a private
individual with the requisite standing would be unable to bring a
claim in the Superior Court for want of that court's subject matter
jurisdiction. The only way for a private individual to challenge
the office of the Chief Justice would be to bring a claim in the
Rhode Island Supreme Court by claiming a right to that office.
Thus, the ability of the state's "approximately 6,500 attorneys who
can bring cases before the R.I. Supreme Court involving the same
constitutional and ethical dilemma facing the Plaintiffs,"48 even
44. Id. at 230.
45. Id. 230-31.
46. Id. at 231 n.12.
47. Brief for Salim Ahmed Hamden, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 4-7, McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217 (R.I. 2005) (No. 05-
144).
48. Memo in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 3, McKenna v.
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those suffering an adverse decision from Chief Justice Williams,
would be severely limited, but not impossible. The court's decision
to address the merits of the plaintiffs' claims thus eliminated any
possibility of having to do so in the future, and at the same time,
eliminated any doubt as to the status of the office of the Chief
Justice.
The court did not address whether its failure to adjudicate the
matter could have left determination of the issue to the military
commission. The amici curiae did, however, address this issue in
their brief,49 stating that "[an adjudication of whether Chief
Justice Williams violated the Rhode Island dual officeholding ban
is inevitable .... A challenge to Chief Justice Williams' fitness to
serve could be filed by any of the military commission defendants
as a pre-trial motion."50 Such a pre-trial motion would place the
military commission, of which two of three commissioners are not
lawyers, 51 in the position of "consider[ing] the Rhode Island dual-
officeholding question":52 whether Chief Justice Williams was
properly "qualified"5 3 and whether Chief Justice Williams violated
the Rhode Island Constitution.54 The court's failure to address the
merits of plaintiffs' claim would, in such circumstances, leave the
military commission in Cuba to decide this issue of Rhode Island
constitutional law without guidance because "[u]nfortunately, no
certification procedure is available from a military commission" 55
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, "the body with the greatest
expertise and ability to answer it."56
The court's treatment of the merits rests on the statutory
construction of state constitutions, a topic which has received
varying degrees of academic and judicial treatment over the years,
from Justice Brennan's impassioned plea for independent
Williams, 874 A.2d 217 (R.I. 2005) (No. 05-144).
49. Brief for Salim Ahmed Hamden, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 4-7, McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217 (R.I. 2005) (No. 05-
144).
50. Id. at 4-5.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 6 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 2 (2004);
R.I. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2.A. (2000)).
55. Id. at 7 (citing R.I. SuP. R. 6 (limiting certification to requests from
the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Courts of Appeal, and U.S. District Courts)).
56. Id.
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construction,57 through interceding years when many state courts
generally marched in lockstep with the United States Supreme
Court,58 to a relatively recent resurgence in individual state
identity and more individualized interpretations by state courts.5 9
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has had a number of
opportunities to interpret various provisions of the Rhode Island
Constitution, but to date no clear pattern of interpretation has
emerged. 60 In McKenna, the Rhode Island Supreme Court dealt
with the Rhode Island Constitution's dual office holding
provision. 61
The court's holding that the two provisions at issue in its
analysis, article 3, section 6 (the dual office holding provision) and
article 10, section 4 (changing the selection method of judges from
election to appointment), could be harmonized is accurate; the
manner in which the court did harmonize them is arguably
inaccurate. The "inescapable" conclusion to which the court comes
- namely, that justices of the state's Supreme Court are no longer
held to the constitutional prohibition against dual office holding,62
is entirely escapable, and tends to violate a fairly entrenched rule
57. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
58. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,
90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 788-92 (1994).
59. See generally, e.g., Michael Schwaiger, Understanding the
Unoriginal: Indeterminate Originalism and Independent Interpretation of the
Alaska Constitution, 22 ALAsKA L. REV. 293 (2005); Thomas R. Bender,
Toward a More Vigorous State Constitutionalism, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 621 (2005).
60. There are three generally accepted methods of state constitutional
interpretation. The first is lockstep, in which a state court generally
interprets the provisions in its constitution to be coterminous with its federal
counterparts. An interstitial approach favors looking first at the federal
constitution unless some reason, such as a particularly unique provision or
state culture or history, demands an independent look. Finally, a primacy
approach favors looking first to the state constitution and looking only to the
federal constitution for persuasive authority in interpreting issues of state
law. See Bender, supra note 59, at 628-32.
61. The dual office holding provision of article 3, section 6 is not unique
to Rhode Island. While the provision does not appear in the United States
Constitution, it has counterparts in forty-one other state constitutions.
Steven G. Calabresi and Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation
of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1151-52
(1994).
62. McKenna, 874 A.2d at 235.
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of statutory construction - that repeals by implication are
disfavored. 63 Retired Associate Justice Robert Flanders, in an
interview given after the court issued its opinion, stated that
"'[the general rule is that repeals by implication are disfavored.
The notion that when the legislature changed the way of selecting
judges it intended to change the dual office holding ban is, in my
judgment, a real stretch."'64 McKenna does not, however, mark the
first time that such a repeal by implication has been effected, nor
is the practice unique to the judicial branch of Rhode Island's
government.
During the latter months of 2003, an apparent state
constitutional inconsistency faced Rhode Island's legislature.
Operation Clean Government filed an ethics complaint against
House Majority Leader Gordon Fox after he voted on legislation
affecting a company with which Fox's law firm did business. 65 At
issue was article 6, section 4, a provision of the Rhode Island state
constitution which provides: "No member of the General Assembly
shall take any fee, or be of counsel in any case pending before
either house of the General Assembly under penalty of forfeiture
of seat, upon proof thereof to the satisfaction of the house in which
the member sits."66 Because Fox had billed hours as a private
attorney in a matter pending before the General Assembly, the
ethics complaint alleged that Fox had forfeited his seat in the
House of Representatives. 67 House Speaker William Murphy
opposed seeking an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court on
the constitutional question,68 though he had sought just such an
opinion when controversy had erupted during the reign of the
previous speaker.69  Instead, he sought the opinion of local
63. Id. at 241-42 (citing Berthiaume v. School Comm. of Woonsocket, 397
A.2d 889, 893 (R.I. 1979).
64. Edward Fitzpatrick, Retired Justice Criticizes Williams Ruling,
PROJO.COM, June 8, 2005, http://www.projo.com/news/contentprojo-
20050608_chief8.26lf8af.html.
65. See Katherine Gregg, Speaker Seeks "Expert" Advice on Ethics
Controversy, PROJO.COM, Nov. 7, 2003, http://www.projo.com/news/ content]
projo_20031107_gopO7.blc7a.html.
66. R.I. CONST. art 6, § 4.
67. See Gregg, supra note 65.
68. Katherine Gregg, Speaker Satisfied with Fox Opinion, PROJO.cOM,
Nov. 25, 2003, http://www.projo.com/news/content/projo-20031125_fox25.
10a7cl.html.
69. See Katherine Gregg and Edward Fitzpatrick, At the Assembly:
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constitutional scholar and academic Patrick Conley.70
In his written opinion to the General Assembly, Professor
Conley opined that the plain meaning of the word "case" in article
6, section 4 was also its constitutional meaning.71 In discerning
the plain meaning, Professor Conley looked no further than
Black's Law Dictionary, which defines the word "case" as, in
relevant part, "a question contested before a court of justice."72
Because the General Assembly did, at one point, have the power to
exercise appellate judicial review, the use of the word has a loaded
meaning. 73 In Professor Conley's opinion, the word "case" was
dispositive in deciding the controversy: Because the General
Assembly no longer sat in a judicial role, and because article 6,
section 4 had been considered, but remained unchanged in
succeeding Rhode Island constitutional conventions, the provision
had slid into obsolescence and had no applicability to the situation
in which Representative Fox found himself.7 4
In his response to Professor Conley's opinion to the General
Assembly, James Marusak raised the issue of constitutional
construction, suggesting that well-worn methods of construction
had been left to the wayside by Professor Conley in the course of
his opinion. 75 He made the oft-repeated point that considering
Ethics Exclusion for Lawyer-Politicians Delayed in Face of Heavy Opposition,
PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 14, 2001, at 1A.
70. Id. See also James P. Marusak, Article VI, Section 4: Still Alive and
Well, 53 R.I. BAR J., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 11 (2004).
71. Patrick T. Conley, Article VI, Section 4: A Case Study in
Constitutional Obsolescence, 53 R.I. BAR J., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 9-11 (2004).
72. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 206 (7th ed. 1999)). James
Marusak suggests that this was the wrong place to look for the plain meaning
of a word, and that a regular dictionary should have been consulted rather
then a legal one.
"Plain and common meanings should be ascertained by consulting
Webster's Dictionary of the American Language, rather than Black's
Dictionary of the Lawyer's Language. Using a legal dictionary to primarily
define the word 'case' dictates the answer. One probably should not use
Dorland's Medical Dictionary to define 'seizures' in its constitutional
context either." Marusak, supra note 70, at 11.
73. See Conley, supra note 71. Professor Conley goes on to provide an
historical analysis of article 6, section 4, concluding that, "[t]he use of the
word 'case' in all three versions of this section was clearly intended to apply
only to court cases in which a lawyer/legislator might use the existing
petition process to win a legislative verdict for his client." Id. at 9-10.
74. Id. at 11.
75. Marusak, supra note 70, at 11.
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constitutional provisions overruled by implication is disfavored. 76
Despite Marusak's analysis of the use of the word "case" in Rhode
Island's constitutional history, an analysis which suggests that a
more expansive meaning might have been appropriate, Speaker
Murphy chose to accept Professor Conley's opinion, never calling
for an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court.77
While the fact that "[nio word or phrase in the Constitution
may be construed a nullity if any other construction can give it
meaning,"78 the legislature allowed the entire section of article 6
dealing with lawyer-legislators to be read right out of the state
constitution. If Professor Conley's interpretation is to be accepted,
there is an absolutely meaningless provision in the state
constitution, one to which no construction can give meaning.
Similarly, in McKenna, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
interpreted a provision of the Rhode Island Constitution dealing
with dual office holding, despite its reference to judges, as not
applying to justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court,79 thereby
violating the maxim that "no word or section can be assumed to be
unnecessarily used, needlessly added or unnecessarily omitted."8 0
By applying the plain meaning of the words of the provision,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the provision no longer
applied to judges, as they were no longer elected, but instead
appointed on the basis of merit.8 ' Because, at one point, judges
did take office after being elected, as opposed to just being
engaged, the court ascribed to both of those words a loaded
meaning, precluding continued application of article 3, section 6 to
the judiciary. McKenna renders article 3, section 6, as it applies to
the Rhode Island judiciary, like article 6, section 4, before it,
obsolete and meaningless.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing provides two recent examples of the Rhode
76. Id.
77. Id. See also Gregg, supra note 69.
78. Marusak, supra note 70, at 11 (quoting City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun,
662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I. 1995)).
79. McKenna, 874 A.2d at 231.
80. Marusak, supra note 70, at 11 (quoting Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d
580, 590 (R.I. 1998)).
81. McKenna, 874 A.2d at 232.
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Island Constitution being overruled by implication, despite the
fact that doing so is disfavored. After McKenna, not only do an
attorney and his law practice lack standing to maintain an action
to remove a public official from office, but any action to remove a
public official from office is a petition in equity in the nature of
quo warranto, over which the Superior Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction without the intervention of the Attorney General.
Furthermore, Rhode Island's constitutional prohibition against
state officials holding dual offices does not apply to appointed
members of the Rhode Island judiciary.
Aaron R. Baker & Bridget N. Longridge

Constitutional Law. Young v. City of Providence, 396
F.Supp. 2d 125 (D. R.I. 2005). The Federal District Court for the
District of Rhode Island denied all of the City of Providence
Officers' motions for summary judgment as put forth based on the
defense of qualified immunity, finding that for all three of the
defendants, under a three-prong qualified immunity analysis,
there existed material factual disputes as to supervisory liability.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On January 28, 2000, Cornell Young Jr., an off-duty
Providence police officer, was shot and killed by two fellow on-duty
Providence police officers, Carlos Saraiva and Michael Solitro. 1
Young was shot by the other Providence officers responding while
off duty to an altercation occurring within city limits, and as such,
was in plainclothes and not in uniform. 2 Providence police
regulations at the time of the incident required that off-duty
officers be armed at all times and prepared to act in their official
capacity, despite being off duty. In addition, Young had his gun
out while shot at the scene of the altercation.3 Complicating this
already complex tragedy was the fact that Young was African-
American and both of the other officers were not.4
Young's mother, Leisa Young, subsequently brought suit in
Rhode Island Federal District Court against both the individual
officers involved in the tragedy, on Fourth Amendment
unreasonable use of force grounds,5 and against the City of
Providence, for its alleged "failure to properly screen, hire, train,
discipline and supervise the City's police officers." 6 In 2003, Judge
Mary Lisi presided over a bifurcated trial in which the jury was
1. Young v. City of Providence, 301 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166 (D. R.I. 2004).
2. Id. at 166.
3. Young v. City of Providence, 396 F. Supp. 2d 125, 129 (D. R.I. 2005).
See also Edward Fitzpatrick, Young Drops Appeal to End Five-Year Battle,
PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 4, 2006 at A3-4.
4. Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at A3.
5. Young, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 168.
6. Id. at 166.
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first asked to determine if the two on-duty officers had violated
Young's Fourth Amendment rights; the jury found that one officer
had violated Young's rights, but that the other officer had not.7 At
that time, Judge Lisi granted summary judgment on all other
grounds and appeals soon followed.8
On April 25, 2005, the First Circuit Court of Appeals issued
its decision, affirming the jury's finding that one officer violated
Young's rights and also affirming Judge Lisi's summary judgment
as to one charge against the City, but reversing Lisi's summary
judgment for the City "on a claim that it is responsible for
inadequately training [Officer] Solitro on how to avoid on-duty/off-
duty misidentification in light of the department's policy that
officers are always armed and always on-duty."9 The District
Court's grant of summary judgment for the City on supervisory
claims was also vacated and remanded, as it had been based on
the grant of summary judgment for the City on the other
municipal claims. 10
The issues as remanded for trial before the District Court for
resolution were based on the supervisory and training claims.'1
On remand, the relevant supervisory officials (Urbano Prignano,
the then Providence Chief of Police; John Ryan; and Kenneth
Cohen) moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds.12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In this case, the plaintiff, Leisa Young, sought to hold the
defendants (Prignano as the then Chief of the Providence Police,
and Ryan and Cohen for their roles in training Officer Solitro) as
liable for her son's death in their supervisory capacities. 3 All of
these three officials moved for summary judgment as to Young's
claims based on the defense of qualified immunity.14
In addressing the city officials' motion for summary judgment
based on the status of qualified immunity, District Court Judge
7. Young, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 129 (citing Young, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 169).
8. Id. at 129-30.
9. Young, 404 F.3d 4, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2005).
10. Id. at 10.
11. See Young, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 131-41.
14. Id. at 130.
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Smith utilized a three-prong approach, in which each prong must
be analyzed in a specific order: 15 first, in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, if the facts alleged show that the official's conduct
violated a constitutional right;16 second, if the first prong is
answered in the affirmative, whether the right claimed to have
been violated can be said to have been "clearly established" by
law at the time of the alleged violation; 17 third, if the right was
established at the time of the violation, whether "a reasonable
official, situated similarly to the defendant(s), would have
understood that the conduct at issue contravened the clearly
established law."' 8
As to the first prong of the inquiry, the District Court found
that Young had easily exceeded her burden in showing these
officers violated the decedent's constitutional rights.Aas in phase
one of the first trial, the jury returned a verdict saying that
Cornell Young's rights had been violated by Officer Solitro, a
verdict which the First Circuit subsequently upheld. 19
As to the second prong of whether or not the law creating the
constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation of Young's rights, the District Court cited the
case of Tennesee v. Garner,20 in which the United States Supreme
Court stated that "[w]henever an officer restrains the freedom of a
person to walk away, he has seized that person ... [Tihere can be
no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a
seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment,"21 and as such Young's rights were violated in this
instance. 22
The District Court next inquired whether these defendants
would be liable in their supervisory capacities for the violations
15. Id. at 131. (citing Savard v. R.I., 338 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2003)).
16. Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
17. Id. (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004)).
18. Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205).
19. Id. at 132-33 (citing Young, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 169; Young, 404 F.3d
at 25).
20. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
21. Young, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 1 (quoting
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perpetrated by the subordinate officer, Solitro.23 Here again, the
court answered its own inquiry in the affirmative by finding that
police supervisors may be held liable for the actions of their
subordinates, as well as for the failure to properly train
subordinates, in circumstances involving friendly fire.24 In
denying the defendants' arguments as to this prong, the District
Court cited the Circuit Court's finding that "[alithough there was
no evidence of a prior friendly fire shooting, a jury could find...
that the department knew there was a high risk.., that friendly
fire shootings were likely to occur"25 as support for a finding of
supervisory liability and as "clearly establish[ing] that supervisors
may be held liable for fail[urel to adequately train officers." 26
As to the third and final prong of the qualified immunity
analysis, the District Court stated that the plaintiff "face[d] a
fairly tall order: she must demonstrate that there are material
factual disputes regarding whether each individual defendant was
deliberately indifferent to the risk" of harm that might result from
their failure to provide constitutionally adequate training of the
subordinate officers and that these actions were objectively
unreasonable.27
Here, the court found that there were material factual
disputes as to each of the three defendants.28 In the case of
Prignano, the defendant himself acknowledged that he was
"ultimately responsible for ensuring proper training of the PPD
[and that as to the "always armed, always on duty" policy,] ...
that failure to follow it could lead to someone being killed."29 The
court found that there were numerous factual disputes
surrounding training and that "[a]lthough Prignano did not
provide direct instruction to Solitro, he may nevertheless be liable
as a supervisor."30 As to the defendant Ryan, the court found that
not only was he responsible as Director of Administration for the
Providence Police Department at the time of Young's death for
officer training, but also noting that the plaintiff claimed that he
23. Id. at 134-35.
24. Id. at 135.
25. Young, 404 F.3d at 28-29.
26. Young, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
27. Id. at 137.
28. Id. at 137- 41.
29. Id. at 137.
30. Id. at 138.
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"actually conducted training that was inconsistent with ... PPD
policy," and that there existed disputed issues of material fact as
to Ryan's involvement in the officers' training. 31  As to the
defendant Cohen, who was the Director of the Training Academy
that Solitro attended, the court similarly found that there existed
issues of material fact as to whether Cohen was "deliberately
indifferent to the known risks associated with the always
armed/always on-duty policy by failing to provide training" around
this policy. 32 As such, the court found that there were sufficient
factual disputes as to each defendant so as to deny summary
judgment based on supervisory qualified immunity in all three
instances. 33
Additionally, the court denied two other motions for summary
judgment put forth: Prignano moved for summary judgment as to
the plaintiff Leisa Young's Monel134 claim against him, and Ryan
moved for summary judgment claiming he could not be liable in a
supervisory capacity, as the officer he had trained was found not
to have violated the decedent's constitutional rights. 35
COMMENTARY
Five weeks after Judge Smith issued the opinion denying all
of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, a federal jury
decided that the city of Providence and its officers were not liable
for the violation of Cornell Young's constitutional rights as
perpetrated by Officer Solitro. 36 The plaintiff Leisa Young (the
deceased officer's mother) had filed an appeal to this verdict in the
First Circuit Court of Appeals on Januray 18, 2006, but later
dropped her appeal on February 3, 2006. 31 What began as a
national news-making tragedy that once included legal counsel
Johnnie Cochran, ended with little legal consolation for the
deceased officer's family and loved ones.38
31. Id. at 140.
32. Id. at 141.
33. Id.
34. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
35. Young, 396 F.Supp. 2d at 141-46 (D. R.I. 2005).
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CONCLUSION
The Federal District Court for the District of Rhode Island
denied all motions for summary judgment as put forth by
supervisory officers of the City of Providence under the defense of
qualified immunity.39
Esme Noelle DeVault
39. Young, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
Contract. D'Amico v. Johnston Partners, 866 A.2d 1222 (R.I.
2005). A party seeking substitution of an insurer will not be
required to meet additional conditions when those conditions are
not clearly included in the pertinent statute. The language of
Rhode Island General Law § 27-7-2.4 is clear and unambiguous.
Therefore, a party seeking substitution of an insurer under § 27-7-
2.4 is not statutorily required to assert a claim against the insurer
prior to the confirmation and discharge of the debtor's Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1990, Mary D'Amico filed a civil action claiming that she
had suffered damage to her real property, allegedly caused by a
construction company, Johnston Partners (Johnston).' D'Amico
claimed that Johnston both wrongfully encroached upon her
property and caused surface water to run onto her property during
a construction project on Johnston's land, which was adjacent to
D'Amico's own property.2
In 1992, D'Amico amended her complaint, adding Garofalo &
Associates, Inc. (Garofalo) as a defendant.3 Garofalo performed
engineering design services for Johnston during the construction
project. 4 D'Amico claimed that Garofalo was negligent in its
design and thereby proximately caused her damages.5
Approximately four years later, and prior to the completion of
D'Amico's case, Garofalo filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11
bankruptcy. 6 The United States Bankruptcy Court confirmed
Garofalo's reorganization plan in June of 1997. The Bankruptcy
Court entered a final decree closing the case on November 14,





6. Id. Garofalo & Associates, Inc. filed a voluntary petition for Chapter
11 bankruptcy on March 20, 1996. Id.
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1997. 7
Almost six years later, Garofalo moved for summary judgment
in the action brought by D'Amico.8 Garofalo claimed that approval
of its reorganization plan discharged all debts incurred before
June 1997 and therefore extinguished D'Amico's claim. 9 In
response, D'Amico filed a motion to substitute Garofalo's
insurance carrier, Evanston Insurance Co. (Evanston), for
Garofalo.10
The trial court granted Garofalo's motion for summary
judgment, but did not grant D'Amico's motion for substitution.1
The court focused on the fact that a claimant cannot simply sit on
her rights and lose a claim in bankruptcy court, and then attempt
to join the insurer after the fact. 12 The trial court determined that
having lost her claim in bankruptcy court, D'Amico no longer had
a claim that would qualify under the relevant statute, 13 and
therefore could not proceed against the insurer. 14 D'Amico
subsequently appealed. 15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, D'Amico contested only the denial of her motion to
substitute the insurance carrier (Evanston) for the bankrupt
tortfeasor (Garofalo) under § 27-7-2.4.16 This presented the Rhode
Island Supreme Court with a question of first impression:
Whether a party seeking substitution of an insurer under § 27-7-
2.4 is required by statute to assert a claim against the insurer
prior to the confirmation and discharge of the debtor's Chapter 11
reorganization plan.17  The court held that the "clear and






12. Id. at 1224.
13. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.4 (2000) (defining the scope of claims for a
direct action against an insurer upon filing for bankruptcy).
14. 866 A.2d at 1224.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1227.
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condition prior to substituting an insurer under § 27-7-2.4.18 The
court recognized that the legislature, not the court, could properly
add additional statutory requirements. 19  This holding was
consistent with the Rhode Island Supreme Court's previous
decisions on this and similar statutes. 20
First, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the
plaintiffs appeal was moot.2' The court stated that, although
summary judgment had been granted in favor of Garofalo, the
plaintiff retained a continuing stake in the case.22 If the basis for
summary judgment had been that Garofalo owed no duty of care
to the plaintiff, then the plaintiffs appeal might be moot due to
Garofalo's lack of liability toward the plaintiff.23 However, in this
case, the motion justice based the summary judgment on the belief
that Garogalo's bankruptcy extinguished any claim the plaintiff
could bring against the insurance company.24
Clear and Unambiguous Language - Substitution of Insurer
Permitted
The court then reviewed a series of prior cases addressing this
and similar statutes. 25 The first of these cases was Giroux v.
Purlington Building Systems, Inc.,26 in which the court concluded
that § 27-7-2.4 "clearly and unambiguously allows the injured
party to substitute the tort-feasor's liability insurer as defendant
after the tort-feasor files for bankruptcy."27  In Giroux, the
plaintiff was injured when a piece of prefabricated roof decking
struck him while he was working for a subcontractor. 28 The
plaintiff sued both the subcontractor and the manufacturer of the
roof components for negligence. 29  However, when the
manufacturer was granted protection under Chapter 11 of the
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1228-29.
20. Id. at 1229.
21. Id. at 1224.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1224 n.2.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1225-27.
26. 670 A.2d 1227 (R.I. 1996).
27. Id. at 1229.
28. Id. at 1228.
29. Id.
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Bankruptcy Code, the plaintiff moved to substitute the
manufacturer's insurer under § 27-7-2.4.30 The court rejected the
insurer's argument that relief from the automatic stay was
required as a condition precedent to substitution. 31 The insurer
also argued that the Superior Court had discretion under the
statute to "protect Aetna from the substantial prejudice created by
its substitution as defendant."32 The court rejected this argument
stating that the clear and unambiguous language of the statute
did not allow additional conditions to be imposed before an injured
party could substitute an insurer as a defendant.33
In Maczuga v. American Universal Insurance Co.,34 the court
interpreted a similar statute, R.I. General Law § 27-7-2, which
allows for substitution of the defendant's insurer when the process
against the defendant is returned non est inventus due to the fact
that the defendant has not been located. 35  In Maczuga, a
complaint was issued against the defendant's insurer because the
complaint against the defendant was returned non est inventus.36
However, several months later the defendant was located.37 At
trial, the defendant's insurer argued that the plaintiffs direct
action against the insurer should be dismissed because the
defendant had been located.38 The court held that the clear and
unambiguous language of the statute did not include this extra
requirement after the direct action had begun against an
insurer.39
The Gnys40 case also involved interpretation of R.I. General
Law § 27-7-2. 41 In Gnys, the defendant could not be located, but
the defendant's insurer entered an appearance on his behalf.42
The insurer argued that the general appearance on behalf of the
defendant was the "functional equivalent of service," thus
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1228-29.
33. Id. at 1229.
34. 166 A.2d 227 (R.I. 1960).
35. See id.
36. Id. at 228.
37. Id. at 229.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 229-30.
40. Gnys v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 396 A.2d 107 (R.I. 1979).
41. See id.
42. Id. at 108.
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rendering the non est inentus ineffective. 43 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court disagreed and reaffirmed that § 27-7-2
"unconditionally authorizes suit against an insurer upon a non est
inventus return."44 Once the non est inventus return occurs, there
are no additional requirements to be met under the statute.45
Finally, the court discussed Markham v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,46 in which the defendant died after service and the plaintiff
moved to substitute the defendant's insurer.47 However, in that
case, the defendant's wife was available as the personal
representative of the defendant's estate.48 The insurer, therefore,
argued that the plaintiff could not sue the insurer under § 27-7-2
unless the defendant died during the suit and there was no
personal representative available to represent his estate.49 The
court rejected this argument and stated that the "crystal clear and
unambiguous language of the statute" adds no conditions beyond
death or non est invent-s. 50
Application to Facts of D'Amico - Case of First Impression
Here, the insurer (Evanston) argued that the plaintiff
(D'Amico) could not assert a § 27-7-2.4 claim against Evanston
because the conclusion of Garofalo's bankruptcy proceedings
extinguished D'Amico's claim.51 The court rejected this claim by
citing Giroux, where the court held that substitution of an insurer
under § 27-7-2.4 may not frustrate the goals of federal bankruptcy
law.52 In Giroux, the court found substitution in bankruptcy cases
to be proper as long as the substitution works no harm to other
creditors that would otherwise be entitled to proceeds from the
defendant's insurance policy. 53 Applying that holding to D'Amico,
the court found no evidence that other claimants or creditors
43. Id.
44. 866 A.2d at 1226 (citing generally Gnys, 396 A.2d 107 (R.I. 1979)).
45. Gnys, 396 A.2d at 109.
46. 362 A.2d 651 (R.I. 1976).
47. 866 A.2d at 1226-27 (discussing Markham, 362 A.2d 651 (R.I. 1976)).
48. Markham, 362 A.2d at 652.
49. Id. at 653.
50. Id. at 654.
51. 866 A.2d. at 1227.
52. Id. (citing Giroux v. Purington Bldg. Sys., Inc., 670 A.2d 1227, 1231
(R.I. 1996)).
53. Giroux, 670 A.2d at 1231.
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existed. 54 Additionally, the court noted that Evanston had not met
its burden in proving it would be unfairly prejudiced by the
substitution, as evidenced in part by the fact that the insurer had
provided a defense to Garofalo throughout the litigation process.55
Next, the court addressed Evanston's argument that
Garofalo's bankruptcy extinguished D'Amico's entire claim.5 6 The
court noted that the Bankruptcy Code provides that discharge of a
debt affects only the liability of the debtor.57 Thus, the court went
on to find that bankruptcy proceedings do not affect the liability
of any other entity regarding that debt.58 Consequently, the court
held that, even if Garofalo's liability was extinguished by his
bankruptcy, his insurer's liability for the debt was not.59
Justice Goldberg's Dissent - Resurrection of a Lifeless Claim
First, the dissent noted that this case should be remanded for
a decision of whether, as an engineer doing work for a landowner,
the defendant owed a duty of care to the adjacent landowner. 60
Whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff is a question of
law, and, according to Justice Goldberg, the trial court should
have already addressed the issue of duty.61
Second, Justice Goldberg suggested that before bringing a
claim against the defendant's insurer, the plaintiff must have a
viable claim against the defendant.62 By way of comparison, the
dissent analogizes the use of a statute of limitations
requirement. 63 Just as a litigant cannot be held liable after an
applicable statute of limitations has run, the defendant (and his
insurer) in this case should not have been held liable after the
bankruptcy court extinguished the defendant's liability.6 4
Third, the dissent focused on the timing of the plaintiffs
54. 866 A.2d at 1227.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1228 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(e)(2000)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1229.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1229-30.
63. Id. at 1230.
64. Id.
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request for substitution.65 Justice Goldberg noted that while the
text of § 27-7-2.4 does not include a time limit, the legislature
chose to use present tense to describe who may bring a claim.66
Specifically, the statute states that "any person, having a claim
because of damages... may file a compliant directly against the
liability insurer of the alleged tortfeasor."67 Therefore, the dissent
opined that the use of present tense created an implicit
requirement that the suit must be timely when brought against
the insurer.68  Justice Goldberg stressed that this condition
precedent was found within the plain meaning of the statute and
furthered its legislative purpose. 69
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was justified in its previous
holdings when it asserted that additional conditions may not be
imposed if those conditions were not expressly intended by the
legislature. Otherwise, defendants would be able to add
requirements incrementally that plaintiffs would then have to
meet before qualifying for substitution under this and similar
statutes. If the Rhode Island legislature wished (then or now) to
attach additional requirements or conditions prior to a plaintiff
being eligible to substitute under these statutes, the legislature
could revise or supplement the statute accordingly.
The court appears to adhere to strict interpretation of
statutes, placing much focus on the "clear and ambiguous
language," as well as the intent of the legislature in creating the
statute. However, Justice Goldberg's dissent points out the fact
that the majority overlooks certain aspects of the legislative intent
and the statute's language. Specifically, the majority glosses over
the fact that the plaintiff did not assert her right to substitute the
insurer until approximately six years after the bankruptcy
proceedings were confirmed and closed.
By rejecting the fact that a claim must be timely, the majority
ignores that the plaintiff in this case sat on her rights until well
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-7-2.4 (2004) (emphasis added).
68. 866 A.2d 1230.
69. Id.
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after her claim was extinguished in bankruptcy court. While the
court claimed that it kept the intent of the Rhode Island
legislature in mind, this holding seems at odds with the
legislature's true intent. Surely, the Rhode Island legislature
meant only to empower persons with current claims against a
party, not to create an entirely new method to revive previously
extinguished claims.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the clear and
unambiguous language of § 27-7-2.4 does not support the addition
of conditions on a plaintiffs right to proceed against an insurer.70
Therefore, the court held that "a party seeking substitution of an
insurer under § 27-7-2.4 is not statutorily obligated to assert its
claim against the insurer prior to the confirmation of the debtor's
Chapter 11 reorganization plan."71 In coming to this conclusion,
the court relied on the "clear and unambiguous" language of the
statute and the legislative purpose behind § 27-7-2.4, in addition
to the court's previous decisions regarding this and similar
statutes.72 For these reasons, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case to the Superior Court.73
Leah J. Donaldson
70. Id. at 1229.
71. Id. at 1228.
72. Id. at 1225-29.
73. Id. at 1229.
Contract/Insurance Law. Sanzi v. Shetty, 864 A.2d 614
(R.I. 2005). Medical malpractice liability insurer had no duty to
defend or indemnify a pediatric neurologist for injuries arising
from alleged sexual assaults of former child-patient because of the
"inferred intent doctrine," which provides that, as a matter of law,
there is an inferred intent to harm in cases of sexual abuse of
children. The intentional acts of sexual abuse were outside the
scope of the insured's policies, which provided coverage in the
event of accidental "occurrences." The liability insurer also had no
duty to defend or indemnify because the alleged acts were not
sufficiently connected to "professional services," and thus fell
outside the scope of policy coverage.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In December 1999, Rebecca Caldarone, a former patient of
pediatric neurologist Dr. Taranath M. Shetty, committed suicide.'
In 2000, Caldarone's parents and husband (as parent and next
friend of her minor children) brought a wrongful death action
against Dr. Shetty and Taranath M. Shetty, M.D., Inc.2 The
plaintiffs alleged that Shetty sexually abused and battered Mrs.
Caldarone for eight years, from 1979 until 1987, beginning when
she was his fourteen-year-old patient.3 They claimed that Shetty
deceived Caldarone's parents into believing that it would benefit
their daughter's health if she worked at his office on Saturdays,
and that Dr. Shetty sexually abused her on those Saturday
workdays and during her regular medical visits. 4 The plaintiffs
claimed that this alleged sexual abuse ultimately caused Rebecca
Caldarone's death by suicide. 5
Since 1978, Dr. Shetty was covered by malpractice liability
insurance policies issued by The Medical Malpractice Joint
1. Sanzi v. Shetty, 864 A.2d 614, 615 (R.I. 2005).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 617.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 615.
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Underwriting Association of Rhode Island (JUA).6 The JUA
policies provided that the company would provide liability
coverage for "injury arising out of the rendering of or failure to
render.. .professional services by the individual insured
... performed in the practice of the individual's profession .... ,,7
The policies provided for protection in the event of an
"occurrence," with "occurrence" defined in the policy as "an
accident... which results in bodily injury or property damage
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured."8 Beginning in 1980, Shetty's policies also contained a
criminal-act exclusion: "This insurance does not apply.., to
injury arising out of the performance by the insured of a criminal
act."9
When Shetty was sued, he contacted JUA seeking defense and
indemnification coverage. 10 JUA denied coverage." They claimed
that, under the insurance policies, neither Dr. Shetty, nor Shetty,
Inc., was entitled to defense or indemnity for the claims asserted
by the plaintiffs.' 2  Dr. Shetty filed a third-party complaint
against JUA, seeking "a determination that JUA ha[d] a duty to
defend and/or indemnify both himself and Shetty, Inc., and
demanding judgment against JUA for all sums potentially
adjudged against [him]." 13
JUA filed a motion for summary judgment; the hearing justice
found that JUA was under no duty to defend or indemnify Dr.
Shetty and that therefore JUA was entitled to summary
judgment. 14 The defendants appealed.' 5
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal the defendant argued that: (1) the plaintiffs
complaint passed the pleadings test, thus obligating JUA to
6. Id. at 617.
7. Id. (quoting defendants' JUA policies JUA-7301 and 8809) (emphasis
omitted).
8. Id.
9. Id. (quoting defendants' JUA policy issued on Form JUA-20).







defend and indemnify the defendant; and (2) that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policies in place
between 1978 and 1980 covered injuries arising out of sexual
misconduct.16 The central question presented to the court was
whether the JUA had any duty to defend and potentially
indemnify the defendant, based on the terms of the defendants'
liability insurance policies and the facts alleged in the complaint
against them.17
The court's analysis began with the question of whether the
complaint against Shetty satisfied the pleadings test. 8 The
pleadings test provides that "an insurer's duty to defend is a
function of the allegations in the complaint filed against the
insured, and that if the allegations bring the case within the scope
of the risks covered by the policy, the insurer must defend
regardless of whether the allegations are groundless, false, or
fraudulent."19 Whether the pleadings test was satisfied turned on
the question of whether sexual abuse was an injury that arose out
of the rendering of "professional services."20 This was because,
according to the defendant's insurance policy, JUA would provide
liability coverage for injuries "arising out of the rendering of or
failure to render ... professional services"21 by the individual
insured. Since Shetty's policies covered risks arising out of the
rendering of professional services, the pleadings test would be
satisfied if the sexual abuse arose out of the rendering of
professional services.22
The court found that the pleadings test was not met because
sexual abuse was not a claim within the sphere of professional
services covered under the policy. 23 The court observed that most
American courts follow the rule that "intentional sexual abuse
does not fall within the rendering of professional services for the
purposes of insurance coverage unless the acts are so inextricably
intertwined with medical treatment that coverage must be
16. Id.
17. Id. at 616-17.
18. Id. at 618.
19. Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Craven
v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. 693 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 1997)).
20. See id. at 618-19.
21. Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
22. See id.
23. Id. at 618.
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afforded." 24 The Rhode Island Supreme Court had not previously
considered "the issue of insurance coverage in a case involving a
medical professional accused of sexual misconduct."25 The court
decided to adopt the test for determining whether an act was
"professional" in nature from the 1968 Nebraska case Marx v.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 26 the leading case in this
area.27 According to the Marx case, "[iun determining whether a
particular act is of a professional nature or a 'professional service'
we must look not to the title or character of the party performing
the act, but to the act itself."28 In addition, "something more than
an act flowing from mere employment is essential. The act or
service must be such as exacts the use or application of special
learning or attainments of some kind."29
In applying the Marx reasoning, the court focused on "the acts
and circumstances surrounding the alleged assaults."30 In the
court's view, the connections between Shetty's professional status
and the alleged abuse were de minimis.31 The only connections
between Shetty's professional activities and the alleged abuse
were that his professional status allowed him access to the victim
and that the alleged abuse occurred at his office. 32 These minimal
connections to Shetty's professional services as a pediatric
neurologist were "remotely incidental" to the allegations of the
complaint. 33 Because the "alleged sexual abuse.., was so distinct
from [Shetty's] medical skills, training, and practice in pediatric
neurology.., the alleged abuse clearly [fell] outside the scope of
'professional services."' 34 Thus, the court held that the allegations
of sexual abuse fell outside of the "professional services" coverage
of JUA's liability insurance.35
The court did not end the analysis with the finding that the
24. Id.
25. Id. at 619.
26. 157 N.W.2d 870 (Neb. 1968).
27. 864A.2d at 619.
28. Marx, 157 N.W.2d at 872.
29. Id. at 871-72.
30. Shetty, 614 A.2d at 619.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 619.
34. Id. at 619.
35. Id. at 619-20.
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pleadings test had not been met. The opinion went on to explain
that, even if the distinction between the defendant's professional
services and the alleged sexual misconduct were less clear, the
outcome would be the same. 36 This was because Rhode Island
Supreme Court precedent established "an exception to [the
pleadings test] in cases involving civil actions for damages flowing
from an alleged sexual molestation."37
In Peerless Insurance Co. v. Viegas,38 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court adopted the inferred intent doctrine. 39 According
to that doctrine, "because injury always ensues [from the sexual
molestation of children], the offender is deemed to intend any
injury resulting from the act as a matter of law."40 The Peerless
court applied the inferred intent doctrine to reach the holding that
"in civil actions for damages that result from an act of child
molestation, an insurer will be relieved from its duty to defend
and to indemnify its insured if the perpetrator is insured under a
policy in which there is contained an intentional act provision."41
In a subsequent case, Craven v. Metropolitan Property &
Casualty Insurance Co., 42 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
extended the Peerless rationale to an insurance policy that did not
contain a specific intentional act exclusion provision. 43 The policy
at issue in Craven would cover an injury arising out of an
"occurrence" with "occurrence" defined as an "accident...
resulting in bodily injury."44 The Craven court held that when
allegations are made as to intentional acts, there is no accident,
and therefore can be no "occurrence" to fall inside of the policy's
coverage. 45
In nearly identical terms as the policy at issue in Craven, the
happening of an accidental occurrence would trigger coverage
36. Id. at 620.
37. Id. (quoting Am. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185, 1190
(R.I. 2002)).
38. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1995).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 788.
41. Id.
42. Craven v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 693 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 1997)
(mem).
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under Shetty's policies. 46 Following the principles set forth in
Peerless and Craven, the court found that the inferred intent
doctrine applied and relieved JUA from its duty to defend or
indemnify the defendant for injuries arising from the alleged
sexual assaults.47
The defendant's final argument before the court was that
there was an ambiguity in the insurance policies that were in
effect during the period from 1978 to 1980 that was sufficient to
create an issue of material fact.48 The defendant's argument was
that there was no explicit criminal act exclusion clause in the
policy during that period, and that it could be implied that
coverage for injuries arising out of criminal acts was included in
those policies.49 The court determined that this argument was
without merit because there was nothing in the policies that
would lead an "ordinary reader to conclude that criminal-acts or
sexual-abuse coverage was included."50 The mere fact that an
explicit criminal acts exclusion was included in policies after 1980
did not imply inclusion of criminal acts coverage in earlier
policies.51
Because the court found that the JUA had no duty to defend
or indemnify the defendant Dr. Shetty, it concluded that summary
judgment was appropriate and affirmed the judgment of the
Superior Court.52
COMMENTARY
This case is significant because it represents the first time
that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
liability insurance coverage of a medical professional accused of
sexual misconduct.53 The test that the court has adopted for
determining whether a particular act is a "professional service" or
of a professional nature for the purposes of liability insurance
makes sense. The court will focus on the circumstances




50. Id. at 621.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 619.
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surrounding the alleged act in order to determine whether it falls
within the scope of "professional services" as that term is used in
the relevant liability policies. It is reasonable to focus on the act
itself, and not the defendant's title or vocation, when determining
whether the act was connected to the rendering of professional
services. The holding that in these circumstances the intentional
sexual abuse of a child was not sufficiently related to the
rendering of professional services to come within the scope of a
liability insurance policy seems correct.
Applying the inferred intent rule to reach the conclusion that,
as a matter of law, sexual molestation of a child is not an
accidental occurrence within the terms of a liability insurance
policy also makes sense. Liability insurance is intended to offer
protection in the event of alleged negligence on the part of the
insured. When a policy protects against liability arising from
accidental occurrences, it seems fair to deny coverage for
intentional misconduct.
The significance of this case for medical professionals is that,
in the event of allegations of sexual abuse, it is very unlikely that
they will be covered under their liability insurance policies.
CONCLUSION
In this case of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that sexual molestation falls outside the scope of
coverage under a medical liability insurance policy that provides
coverage for injuries arising out of the rendering of professional
services. The court also held that, according to the inferred intent
doctrine, sexual abuse of a child is not an accidental "occurrence"
under a medical liability insurance policy, and therefore is not
covered under an accident liability coverage policy in any event.
The liability insurance company therefore had no duty to defend
or indemnify the defendant pediatric neurologist against liability
arising out of accidental occurrences that took place in the




Criminal Law. State v. Luanglath, 863 A.2d 631 (R.I. 2005).
When a deadlocked jury reveals its numerical split to a trial
justice, the trial justice must then convey the numerical split to
counsel. Knowledge of a jury's numerical split allows counsel to
adequately consider trial strategy. A trial justice's supplemental
Allen instructions, which suggest to the deadlocked jury that the
failure to reach a unanimous verdict will result in an imminent
retrial, "at great expense to the State and great expense to the
defendants," are unduly coercive, when the lone holdout knows
that the trial justice and the remaining jurors share knowledge of
the numerical split.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On March 16, 1990, after 11:00 p.m., three men entered the
Providence home of the Souvannaleuth family and robbed the
family at gunpoint.1 Six members of the family were present at
the time of the robbery: the parents (Mr. and Mrs.
Souvannaleuth); their three daughters (Malaythong, Southavong,
and Kongseng); and one son (Somsamay).2 The robbers took U.S.
currency, gold, and jewelry valued at between $39,000 and
$78,000. 3
Soon after the robbery, the Souvannaleuths described their
observations to the police.4 None of the family members could
identify the robbers that evening, but Kongseng told police that
she recognized two of the perpetrators as people she encountered
within the Laotian community. 5 Later that night, the family
members discussed the possible identity of the robbers and
mentioned the defendants, brothers Sythongsay and Soukky
Luanglath. 6 In the days following the robbery, family members
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reported seeing the perpetrators in the community. 7  After
Kongseng, Malaythong, and Southavong attended a party in
Foxboro, Massachusetts, which featured a performance by the
defendants' band, Kongseng reported the sighting to the police.8
The State of Rhode Island prosecuted the defendants for burglary
and robbery. 9
During the defendants' April and May 1993 trial, the jury
process was characterized by irregularities. 10 Difficulties ensued
when, after the jury retired for deliberations, one of the twelve
jurors refused to vote based on his religious beliefs." At that
point, the trial justice asked the defendants if they needed an
English-language interpreter and then set forth four options
available to the defendants: (1) she could call the dissident juror in
and "read him the riot act;" (2) she could substitute the alternate
juror; (3) the trial could proceed with eleven jurors; or (4) the court
could declare a mistrial. 12  The defendants considered their
options and agreed to allow the eleven-person jury to proceed.' 3
The eleven jurors then continued to deliberate, but after only
a few hours, the jury notified the trial justice that it was unable to
agree.' 4 The eleven jurors presented a note to the trial justice,
informing her that "[a]t the moment it is 10 to 1 and it seems that
neither are willing to change their opinion. Can you provide any
insight as to how to deal with the decision[?] " 5 The trial justice
then met with the prosecution and defense counsel to discuss the
supplemental jury instructions that she planned to issue, but she
did not disclose her knowledge that the jury was deadlocked ten to
one.16
The trial justice then instructed the jury with essentially the
same instructions she discussed with counsel, but went on to
comment that "[i]f there is no decision by this jury, this case will
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 633 (citing State v. Luanglath (Luanglath I), 749 A.2d 1 (R.I.
2000)).
10. Id. at 634.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 640.
13. Id.




be tried all over again" and that "if it has to be retried, it will be
retried at great expense to the state and great expense to the
defendants."'17 At the time that the trial justice issued the
instructions, neither the prosecution nor the defense counsel knew
of the jury's numerical split.' 8 Neither party objected to the
instructions; however, the defendants moved to pass the case due
to the deadlock.' 9 After one more hour of deliberations, the jury
returned a unanimous guilty verdict against both of the
defendants on all counts. 20
17. Id. at 635 (emphasis omitted). The trial justice's full instructions
were as follows:
I'm somewhat surprised that with the jury deliberating such a
short time, there is an apparent deadlock. . . . You know, of course,
that jurors have a duty, really, to consult with one another and to
deliberate and to discuss with a view to reaching an agreement, if it
can be done without violence to your individual judgment.
Naturally, each of you must decide this case for yourselves, but you
do that only after you have impartially considered the evidence in a
discussion with all of the other jurors. Although the verdict, as I
said, must be the verdict of each individual juror and not just
acquiescence in the conclusion of others, the issues submitted to you
in this case should be examined with proper regard and deference to
the opinions of others. Jurors should not be obstinate for the sake of
being obstinate. And a juror should consider it desirable that this
case be decided. If there is no decision by this jury, this case will be
tried all over again. It seems to me that no other jury is going to be
more qualified than you are. It isn't that on the next go-round better
jurors are going to sit.
You are qualified ... And I should tell you that there's no
reason for any juror to think that if this case is retried, more
evidence or clearer evidence is going to be presented. And, if it has
to be retried, it will be retried at great expense to the state and great
expense to the defendants.
As I've told you, it is your duty to decide the case if you can
conscientiously do so. And as I said before, don't hesitate to re-
examine your views and change your position if you are convinced it
is erroneous. I will remind you, of course, that you should never
surrender an honestly arrived at conviction as to the weight or effect
of the evidence only because of the opinion of other jurors, or only for
the sake of returning a verdict. I don't want that to happen either.
It appears to me that more time ought to be spent upstairs by this
jury. And in an hour or so I will send a note asking if there has been
any progress.
Id. at 634-35.
18. Id. at 634.
19. Id. at 635.
20. Id.
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After the jury departed, the trial justice met with the
prosecution and the defense counsel in her chambers. 21 She
questioned her decision not to reveal the deadlocked jury's
numerical split, noting that the information "may have affected
your strategy."22 She conceded that if the defense had known the
full content of the jury's note, it might have pressed harder for a
mistrial.23
Following their 1993 conviction, the brothers appealed to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, arguing several issues, including
that the trial justice had improperly denied their motion for a new
trial based on the unreliability of the prosecution's witnesses.24
The case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to
reexamine the witness reliability issue.25  Because the trial
justice's first decision suggested that the witness reliability issue
might be dispositive, the court declined to reach the remaining
issues proffered by the defendants. 26 In 2001, the trial justice
issued a written opinion that resolved the witness reliability
issue.27
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On November 9, 2004, the defendants appealed to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court again, rearguing the witness reliability
issue, as well as the remaining two issues that the court did not
21. Id.
22. The trial justice's complete remarks were as follows:
I thought it best not to talk numbers to you when I told you
about this note and told you that I wanted to re-instruct the jury. It
may very well have been I should have. I don't know how you would
have read it. Either side. It may have affected your strategy, and I
will not ask you to discuss it with me, but just to think about it. You
may have had stronger objections to the so-called Allen charge which
I gave. If you knew about the ten to one breakout, you may have
indeed pressed for a mistrial, or at least a decision from me, and I
didn't give you a decision on the motion for mistrial. And I may very









reach in the prior appeal.28 On the weight of the evidence issue,
the court affirmed the trial justice's denial of the defendants'
motion for a new trial.29 Next, the court affirmed the trial justice's
ruling that the decision to proceed with eleven jurors followed
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waivers from both
defendants. 30 The court then reached the two remaining issues
from Luanglath .31
Supplemental Allen Instructions
First, the defendants argued that the trial justice's
supplemental Allen 32 instructions to the deadlocked jury were
improper for three reasons: (1) the instructions placed too much
emphasis on the possibility and cost of a retrial; (2) the nature of
the instructions was too coercive given the fact that only one juror
was dissenting from the majority; (3) the trial judge should have
conveyed the numerical split of the deadlocked jury to counsel. 33
The court held that the trial justice's failure to reveal the entire
contents of the jury's note and her supplemental Allen instruction,
informing the jury that a retrial was imminent and costly,
constituted reversible error.34 The court vacated the defendants'
convictions and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new
trial.35
In State v. Patriarca,36 the Rhode Island Supreme Court set
forth guidelines for analyzing Allen and instructing a deadlocked
jury:
[B]efore deliberation the court may instruct the jury: (1)
that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree
thereto; (2) that jurors have a duty to consult with one
another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 641.
31. See State v. Luanglath, 749 A.2d 1 (R.I. 2000).
32. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896) (upholding jury
instructions delivered to a deadlocked jury, even though the instructions
urged the jurors in the minority to think about the majority's views).
33. Luanglath II, 863 A.2d at 641-42.
34. Id. at 644.
35. Id.
36. State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d 300 (R.I. 1973).
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agreement, if that can be done without violence to the
individual judgment; (3) that each juror must decide the
case for himself, but only after an impartial consideration
of the evidence with his fellow jurors; (4) that in the
course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to
reexamine his own views and change his opinion if
convinced it is erroneous; and (5) that no juror should
surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect
of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.37
The Supreme Court reasoned that the trial justice's
instructions to the deadlocked jury covered, in almost the same
words, the guidelines suggested by Patriarca, but then added the
following additional instructions, upon which the defendants'
appeal is based:
It seems to me that no other jury is going to be more
qualified than you are. It isn't that on the next go-round
better jurors are going to sit. You are qualified. ... And,
if it has to be retried, it will be retried at great expense to
the state and defendants. As I've told you, it is your duty
to decide the case if you can conscientiously do So. 38
In considering a challenge to a trial justice's Allen
instructions, the Rhode Island Supreme Court applies a totality-
of-the-circumstances test.39  The court distinguished the
Luanglath I jury instructions from those upheld in a prior case,
State v. Rodriguez,40 which were not found coercive, in part
because "the instructions were not addressed to either the
majority or minority; it still took the jury an hour after the
instructions were issued to reach a verdict. . . and the trial justice
did not tell the jury that the case would have to be retried if they
failed to reach a unanimous conclusion."41 By contrast, the trial
justice's instructions in Luanglath I emphasized the imminence
and cost of a retrial when it was:
inescapable that the only holdout juror knew that the
37. Id. at 322.
38. Luanglath H, 863 A.2d at 642.
39. Id.
40. State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894 (R.I. 2003).
41. Luanglath II, 863 A.2d at 643 (citing Rodriguez, 822 A.2d at 902-04).
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trial justice was aware of the numerical split, and that
the remaining ten jurors knew of the split and knew that
the trial justice was aware of the split ... even if the
trial justice did not specifically single out the only
dissenter, her instructions, coupled with the knowledge of
the single holdout, took on a new meaning.42
Considering both the statements regarding the cost and
imminence of a retrial, as well as the likely effect of the
circumstances on the lone dissenter, the court held that the trial
justice's supplemental Allen instructions violated the boundaries
set forth in Patriarca.43
Trial Justice's Failure to Inform Counsel of the Entire Contents of
the Jury's Note
The defendants also presented the Rhode Island Supreme
Court with a question of first impression: must a trial justice
disclose to defense counsel the numerical split revealed to the
justice in a jury note?44
The court looked to State v. Sciarra,45 in which it held that a
trial justice erred when he responded to a jury's note outside of
defense counsel's presence, because the defense counsel had a
right to be heard "before a response was given to the note."46 The
Supreme Court reasoned that the facts in the present* case
demonstrated the problems that can arise when defense counsel is
unaware of the information available to the trial justice. 47 The
court reasoned that, as the trial justice conceded, had defense
counsel been aware that the jury was deadlocked all-against-one
in favor of a guilty verdict, the defendant would have objected to
the court's supplemental Allen instructions and moved for a
mistrial.48 Therefore, "it is imperative that the entire contents of
a note be revealed."49
42. Id. at 644.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 643.
45. State v. Sciarra, 448 A.2d 1215 (R.I. 1982).
46. Id. at 1220.
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COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Luanglath I
affirms the value and sanctity of jury deliberation. Additionally,
Luanglath II illustrates how a deviation from the Patriarca
guidelines can lead to precisely the end that the trial justice
sought to prevent: additional litigation "at great expense to the
State and great expense to the defendants."50
A trial justice's Allen instructions urge jurors to persevere and
to engage themselves in the type of vigorous debate that
characterizes the American jury system. The Patriarca guidelines
express high ideals for jurors, including the responsibility to
impartially consider the evidence and to refuse to sacrifice an
honest conviction solely for the purpose of reaching an
agreement. 5 1 While the Patriarca guidelines provide a means for
trial justices to forestall Allen litigation, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court noted in 2003 that the guidelines "were not
intended to limit the trial justice's discretion in instructing jurors
concerning their obligations and responsibilities."5 2
In Luanglath H, the trial justice's supplemental Allen
instructions suggested the imminence and cost of a retrial when
both the trial justice and the jurors, including the holdout, knew of
the jury's numerical split.53 The court emphasized the importance
of the fact that the trial justice was aware of the jury's numerical
split when she issued the supplemental instructions, and held
that the instructions were coercive considering the totality of the
circumstances. 54
A jury allows citizens to engage in thoughtful deliberation to
determine whether the prosecution has satisfied its burden of
proof against the defendants. The Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution provides that a criminal defendant is entitled to a
jury trial.55 Any insinuation that jurors should rush to agreement
in order to save tax dollars represents a failure of the system. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court established the Patriarca guidelines
50. Id. at 642.
51. See Patriarca, 308 A.2d at 322.
52. State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 900 (R.I. 2003) (citing State v.
Souza, 425 A.2d 893, 900 (R.I. 1981)).
53. Luanglath H, 863 A.2d at 644.
54. Id. at 643-44.
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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as a means for the court to guide a deadlocked jury without
encouraging agreement for its own sake.56 While a trial justice
has the discretion to give instructions beyond the Patriarca
guidelines, supplemental instructions can be subject to challenge,
as Luanglath II illustrates. In Luanglath H, the additional time
and money that the defendants expended in challenging the trial
justice's supplemental instructions were well spent.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a trial justice
must reveal the entire contents of a jury's note to counsel. In this
case, knowledge of the jury's numerical split, which included a
holdout juror, would have enabled defense counsel to better
consider its trial strategy and to object to supplemental Allen
instructions that suggested that the failure to agree would result
in an imminent retrial at great cost to the State and to the
defendants.5 7 Under the totality of the circumstances, the court
held that the trial justice's instructions were unduly coercive. 58
Jessica Bosworth
56. See generally Patriarca, 308 A.2d 300.
57. Luanglath H, 863 A.2d at 643.
58. Id. at 643-44.
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Criminal Law. State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574 (R.I. 2005). A
trial court does not abuse its discretion when it denies a
defendant's motion to sequester the State's essential expert
psychiatric witness during the defendant's testimony. Further,
the trial court has not abused its discretion when it allows the
State's psychiatric witness to testify that the defendant suffered
from a particular disorder, even though the State had failed to
inform the defense of this diagnosis as required by Rhode Island's
discovery rules, so long as the defense is familiar with the
particular disorder, and any potential prejudice from the
undisclosed information can be successfully mitigated. In the
absence of overreaching, compulsion, or threats, a defendant who
indicates his understanding of the circumstances and is found to
be clear-headed when appraised of his Miranda rights, knowingly
and voluntarily waives those rights when he subsequently makes
a statement to police. However, even if an involuntary statement
is erroneously admitted, if the statement merely constitutes
cumulative evidence, the error is harmless. Finally, a delay of
more than twelve months between a defendant's arrest and trial
on a charge does not violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial
when the defendant bears the primary responsibility for the delay,
the defendant's actions are not consistent with "banging on the
courthouse doors," and the defendant has not suffered prejudice.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Victor Perez lived with his mother, Rosa Perez, and her
friend, Lolo, in an apartment in Providence.1 On August 13, 1998,
Victor smoked a combination of crack and marijuana, continued to
smoke marijuana throughout the day, and although it had been
days since he had consumed any LSD, began to feel like he was
"tripping."2
While smoking marijuana in the living room, Victor
testified that he heard his mother and Lolo arguing in the
1. State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574, 578 (R.I. 2005).
2. Id.
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bedroom, so he took a knife from the kitchen counter, hid it in his
waistband, and proceeded to the bedroom to tell Lolo to leave his
mother alone.3 Lolo continued to scream at Rosa even after she
exited the bedroom and went into the kitchen.4
Rosa soon realized that the knife was missing from the
counter and insisted that Victor give it back, but Victor denied
having the knife.5 Lolo came out of the bedroom and went to hug
Rosa before leaving, but Victor believed Lolo was trying to
physically harm his mother. 6 Victor jumped up and rushed
toward Lolo while grabbing for the knife in his waistband.7
However, Lolo exited the apartment before Victor reached the
kitchen.8 In the struggle to free the knife from his waistband, the
blade broke loose from the handle and fell to the floor.9 Rosa
attempted to confiscate the knife before Victor regained control.lo
According to Victor, when Rosa reached for the knife, he
believed she was trying to assault him and a struggle developed."
Rosa successfully grabbed the blade, but in response, Victor
swiped another knife and began slashing at Rosa. 12 Victor
claimed that he formed the belief that his mother was "the devil"
and he had to protect himself. 3 Rosa died as a result of the
injuries she sustained. 14
A witness testified that he saw Victor run from the apartment
and that Victor was "running like he was crazy, up and down,
everywhere."' 5 Victor looked "all confused" and "[h]e didn't know
where he wanted to go." 16
When police arrived on the scene they observed "dozens
upon dozens of bloody footprints throughout the building, up and
3. Id.
4. Id.










15. Id. at 580.
16. Id.
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down various stairwells and various floors of the building."17 The
officers tracked the footprints to the apartment of Luis Rivera on
the second floor.'8 According to Rivera, Victor was acting crazy
and he "had never seen [Victor] like that."19 Rivera testified that
Victor told him that he "had a problem downtown." 20 Unsatisfied
with Victor's explanation of his behavior, Rivera asked Victor
whether he had killed his mother. 21 In response, Victor went to
the kitchen, got a knife, wrapped it in a towel and sat down on the
bed next to Rivera when the police knocked on Rivera's door.22
After receiving permission from Rivera to enter the
apartment, officers began searching for Victor.23 They found him
in the bathroom wielding a knife at "an attack point."24 When
ordered to drop the knife and exit the bathroom, Victor complied
and surrendered to police. 25  Officer Deschamps loudly read
Miranda warnings from a preprinted card in both Spanish and
English.26
When asked where his mother was and when he saw her
last, Victor responded, that he "didn't do anything."27 In response
to questions about the injuries to his leg and hand, Victor told
police that he had been in "a fight in the downtown area."28
Officer Deschamps also testified that Victor was acting "extremely
angry" and "cocky" and that he had to tell Victor to calm down
numerous times.29
At trial, Victor did not refute that he had killed his mother,
but argued that he suffered from diminished capacity. 30 To rebut
the defense expert's testimony supporting diminished capacity,
the state presented its own expert witness, Dr. Kelly.31 The jury
17. Id.
18. Id. at 580-81.
19. Id. at 581 n.6.






26. Id. at 581 n.10.
27. Id. at 582.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 582 n.11.
30. Id. at 582.
31. Id.
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found Victor guilty of first-degree murder for the killing of his
mother, Rosa Perez, and sentenced him to life imprisonment.32
The defendant subsequently appealed to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.33
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice had
committed reversible error: (1) in allowing the state's expert to be
present in the courtroom to observe the defendant testify before he
gave his expert testimony about the defendant;34 (2) in permitting
the state's expert to give a medical opinion in violation of
discovery provisions of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure; 35 (3) in denying his motion to suppress
statements made to police in violation of his Miranda36 rights;37
and, (4) denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
state violated his right to a speedy trial.38 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court unanimously found no reversible error and
affirmed the defendant's conviction. 39
Presence of the State's Expert in the Courtroom
The defendant contended that the trial justice's denial of his
motion to sequester Dr. Kelly, the state's expert, was in error.40
He argued that this testimony constituted impermissible vouching
or bolstering because of the jury's knowledge of Dr. Kelly's
presence during Victor's testimony.41
In finding that the trial justice was acting within his
inherent discretionary power42 when he chose not to sequester Dr.
Kelly, the court focused on Dr. Kelly's essential role in the state's
32. Id. at 578.
33. Id. at 582.
34. Id. at 578.
35. Id. (referencing R.I. SuP. R. CRIM. P. 16).




40. Id. at 583.
41. See id.
42. Id. A trial justice retains the inherent power to sequester witnesses
in order to prevent a witness from corresponding his testimony to that of
other witnesses. See id. This decision is discretionary and should only be
overturned in the face of a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
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presentation of its rebuttal.43 The court reasoned that because the
state carried the burden of proving murder beyond a reasonable
doubt, it was essential for the state to invalidate Victor's defense
by showing that he in fact was not suffering from diminished
capacity when he killed his mother.44  Because Dr. Kelly's
opportunity to examine the defendant before trial had been
restricted, it was necessary to the presentation of the state's
rebuttal that he be permitted to remain in the courtroom during
Victor's testimony. 45 The court further noted that in light of the
finding of necessity, Rule 615 of the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence explicitly forbid the sequestration of "a person whose
presence is shown ... to be essential to the presentation of [the
case]," and thus, they did not need to comment on the defendant's
impermissible bolstering argument. 46
The State Expert's Medical Opinion and Compliance with
Discovery Provisions of Rule 16
The defendant next asserted that the trial justice should
have limited the scope of Dr. Kelly's testimony and that he erred
when he allowed Dr. Kelly to testify that the defendant suffered
from "antisocial personality disorder."47 The defendant based his
assertion on the state's failure to act in accord with Rule 16 of the
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure48 and inform the
defense of Dr. Kelly's intent to testify on this subject.49
In holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion
in allowing Dr. Kelly to testify about his belief that Victor suffered
from "antisocial personality disorder," the court relied heavily on
the fact that the defense's own documents made reference to the
43. Id. at 584.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 583.
46. Id. at 583-84 & n.14 (quoting R.I. R. EVID. 615(3)).
47. Id. at 584.
48. Id. at 584 n.16 (quoting R.I. SUP. R. CRIM. P. 16).
49. 882 A.2d at 584. A trial justice's ruling on noncompliance with Rule
16 should not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. The trial
justice should evaluate the following factors before deciding whether
sanctions are appropriate under Rule 16: "(1) the reason for nondisclosure,
(2) the extent of prejudice to the opposing party, (3) the feasibility of
rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and (4) any other relevant factors."
Id. at 585.
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disorder. 50 In addition, there was no evidence that the state's
nondisclosure was a "deliberate act of misconduct."51 Further,
because it was obvious that defense counsel was familiar with the
characteristics of the disorder, defense counsel was sufficiently
able to cross-examine Dr. Kelly regarding "antisocial personality
disorder."52 Thus, the extent of prejudice was, at the most,
minimal.5 3 The court further noted that any potential prejudice
was lessened by the trial justice's grant of a continuance.54
Motion to Suppress the Defendant's Statements
The defendant also argued reversible error in the trial
justice's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress two statements
he made to police shortly after being taken into custody.55 The
first statement challenged was the defendant's response to Officer
Deschamp's inquiry into the last time the defendant had seen his
mother.5 6 The second statement contested was the defendant's
explanation about the injuries to his hand and leg.57  The
defendant asserted that the confusing circumstances of his arrest
interfered with his ability to understand his Miranda rights, and
thus voluntarily waive those rights.58
The trial justice focused on the fact that the defendant was
not disoriented, his injuries were not serious, and his cocky
behavior indicated that Victor understood the circumstances. 59 In
addition, the trial justice did not find any overreaching,
compulsion, or threats.60 The court, giving due deference to the
50. Id. at 586-87.




55. Id. at 587-88. Review of a trial justice's decision on a motion to
suppress a confession involves a two-step analysis: (1) review of the trial
justice's finding of facts relevant to the voluntariness of the contested
statement, and (2) application of those facts and review of the trial justice's
conclusion as to the voluntariness of the contested statement. Id. at 588.
(citing State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1973 (R.I. 1998)).
56. Id. Victor replied that he had not done anything to her. Id.
57. Id. at 588. Victor indicated that he had been in an altercation in
downtown Providence. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 589.
60. Id. at 589 n.23.
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trial justice, found that his findings of fact relevant to the
voluntariness of the contested confession were not clearly
erroneous.
61
The court next conducted an independent review to
determine whether the defendant's statement, taking into
consideration the totality of the circumstances, was a product of
his own free will.62 The court noted that waiver of an individual's
Miranda rights cannot be presumed from either silence or the fact
that the accused actually makes a statement. 63 However, the
court concluded that Victor was informed of his Miranda rights
and that he knowingly and voluntarily made the challenged
statements to the police after being informed of those rights.64 In
addition, the court went on to conclude that, even if the challenged
statements were erroneously admitted, because they merely
constituted cumulative evidence, the error was harmless.65
Right to a Speedy Trial
The defendant's final contention was that he was denied his
constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial and that the trial
justice erred in his refusal to grant the defendant's pre-trial
motion to dismiss on these grounds.66 The court conducted a de
novo review of the trial justice's determination that the
defendant's right had not been violated. 67  In conducting its
review, the court considered the following factors: "[the l]ength of
the delay; the reason for the delay; defendant's assertion of his
right; and [the] prejudice to the defendant."68 Because a delay of
more than twelve months is "presumptively prejudicial,"69 the
court proceeded to examine the remaining factors and concluded
that Victor's right to a speedy trial had not been violated and,
therefore, the trial justice properly denied the defendant's motion




65. Id. at 590.
66. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; R.I. CONsT. art. I, § 10).
67. Id. at 590-91.
68. Id. at 591 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).
69. Id. (quoting State v. Crocker, 7667 A.2d 88, 91 (R.I. 2001)).
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to dismiss.70
The court based its rationale on a number of findings.
First, the great bulk of the delay was due to defense counsel's need
to prepare Victor's defense and, thus, the defendant bore the
primary responsibility for the delay7 1 Second, the defendant's
assertion of his right to a speedy trial did not constitute the
equivalent of "banging on the courthouse doors."72 Third, the sole
fact that the defendant was held without bail prior to his trial did
not, by itself, constitute prejudice.73 Rather, the court reasoned
that "to the extent that incarceration disrupts one's freedom,
employment, and familial associations, . . . this disruption merely
constitutes a prejudice inherent in being held while awaiting
trial."74
COMMENTARY
Perez was generally an application of existing law and did
not significantly alter Rhode Island's legal landscape. In fact, the
court did not seem to have any difficulty in reaching its
conclusion. However, some of the court's comments are worth
noting.
First, in finding Dr. Kelly's presence in the courtroom
essential to the prosecution's rebuttal, the court declined to
comment on the defendant's impermissible bolstering argument.7 5
This holding implies that in the absence of the express language of
Rule 615(3), the court might have entertained such an argument.
However, even without the prohibition on the sequestration of an
essential person, it is likely that the court would have reached the
same result, because, upon closer investigation of the language of
Rule 615, one discovers that it is materially different from that of
Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Unlike the Federal
Rule, which imposes mandatory exclusion of witnesses at the
request of a party and only forbids sequestration in a limited
70. Id. at 591-93. Victor Perez was arrested in the early morning of
August 13, 1998, and did not go to trial until June of 2001. Id. at 591.
71. Id. at 592.
72. Id. (quoting State v. Powers, 643 A.2d 827, 833 (R.I. 1994) (stating
the test for assessing the defendant's assertion of his right to speedy trial)).
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting State v. Austin, 643 A.2d 798, 801 (R.I. 1994)).
75. Id. at 583 n.14.
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number of circumstances, 6 Rhode Island's Rule 615, by use of the
word "may" in the first sentence, makes exclusion entirely
discretionary. 77  Thus, even if Dr. Kelly's presence in the
courtroom was not essential, the trial justice's decision to allow
Dr. Kelly to remain could only be disturbed if it was a clear abuse
of discretion.
Second, in evaluating the trial justice's discretion to permit
Dr. Kelly's testimony regarding his diagnosis of the defendant, the
court did not address the reasons for the prosecution's
nondisclosure. 78 The purpose behind Rhode Island Rule 16 is "to
eliminate surprise and procedural prejudice," through mandatory
compliance with broad discovery rules.79  In the case of
nondisclosure by either party, the reason for such nondisclosure is
a key factor in considering whether the violating party should
incur sanctions.8 0  Yet, in Perez, the prosecution gave no
explanation for its failure to disclose Dr. Kelly's diagnosis of the
defendant.81 In fact, in a supplemental discovery response, filed
hours before Dr. Kelly's testimony, when it seemed apparent that
the prosecution would have known the content of this testimony,
the prosecution made no mention of Dr. Kelly's intent to testify
that Victor suffered from "antisocial personality disorder."8 2 The
prosecution's nondisclosure seems potentially suspect and should
have been inspected more thoroughly.8 3
Finally, the court disposed of the defendant's motion to
suppress without much comment. While it is proper to give great
deference to the trial justice's findings of historical fact, step two
of the analysis requires a de novo review of the voluntariness
issue.8 4 Yet, in Perez, the court appeard to rely entirely on the
76. FED. R. EVID. 615.
77. R.I. R. EVID. 615 (stating "At the request of a party the court may
order witnesses excluded so that they may not hear the testimony of other
witnesses") (emphasis added).
78. 882 A.2d at 582-84.
79. R.I. Sup. R. CRIM. P. 16 (comment); See also State v. Coelho, 454 A.2d
241, 244 (R.I. 1983).
80. R.I. Sup. R. CRIM. P. 16 (comment).
81. 882 A.2d at 585.
82. Id. at 585 n.17.
83. If nondisclosure is found to be a deliberate act of misconduct, a new
trial should be granted "without inquiry into the degree of harm produced by
the misconduct." Id. (quoting State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180, 187 (R.I. 1994)).
84. Id. at 589.
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trial justice's examination of the totality of the circumstances in
reaching its conclusion.8 5 In addition, the court noted that "[a]
valid waiver of Miranda rights cannot be presumed from the...
fact that the accused has actually made a confession or a
statement."86 But, in Perez, the court seemed to make this
forbidden presumption. However, as the court pointed out,
because the defendant's statements were merely cumulative
evidence, even if his Miranda rights had been violated, the
decision to admit the statements amounted to harmless error.87
CONCLUSION
Although Perez did not significantly depart from existing law,
a close examination of the court's ruling reveals some interesting
questions and leaves open the possibility that, had a few critical
factors been absent, the outcome may have been quite different.
For example, had Dr. Kelly's presence not been essential to the
prosecution's case, would the substitution of the word "may" in
Rule 615 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence88 in place of the
word "shall" in the Federal Rules of Evidence8 9 have been
significant? Further, had the trial justice and the court
thoroughly investigated the prosecution's reasons for
nondisclosure, would the scope of Dr. Kelly's testimony have been
narrowed? If so, would this have materially altered the outcome
of the case? Finally, what if Victor's statements were not merely
cumulative evidence? Should those statements still have been
admitted? The court declined to comment on these issues.
Christina Middleton Senno
85. See id.
86. Id. (citing State v. Amado, 424 A.2d 1057, 1062 (R.I. 1981)).
87. Id. at 590.
88. R.I. R. EVID. 615.
89. FED. R. EVID. 615.
Criminal Law. In re Tavares, 885 A.2d 139 (R.I. 2005). The
forensic commitment of a criminal defendant found incompetent to
stand trial pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §§ 40.1-5.3-1
to 40.1-5.3-18 (the forensic statutes) may be continued by the
court even after competency has been restored. The court affirmed
the lower court's decision, which had continued the criminal
defendant's commitment throughout trial, despite the literal
reading of the forensic statutes that the defendant "shall" be
released once found competent.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On November 10, 2001, twenty-one-year-old Anthony Tavares
was arrested for the murder of his social worker and substance
abuse counselor, Glen Hayes.' The court observed that Tavares'
entire life had been affected by mental illness. 2 His family history
included an abusive sister, who suffered from mental illness
herself, and a schizophrenic father, who was incarcerated for
murdering a man with an ice pick. 3 Tavares began to show signs
of mental illness at the early age of four.4 By six, he was admitted
into his first psychiatric treatment program, and by first grade he
was expelled from mainstream education. 5 During childhood he
was continuously shuffled between special schools, residential
care facilities, juvenile detention facilities, and hospitals. 6 He was
diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, but he did
not take the prescribed medication, and by eleven he was suffering
from paranoid and delusional symptoms. 7 His teenage years
included acts of assault, arson, suicide attempts, violent threats to
kill, and several psychiatric hospitalizations.8  By nineteen, he
1. In re Tavares, 885 A.2d 139, 141 (R.I. 2005).
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was diagnosed with schizophrenia; in early 2000, he was
involuntarily hospitalized due to audio and visual hallucinations. 9
His condition improved with medication and he was released with
a diagnosis of chronic paranoid schizophrenia. 10 A year later, he
was once again hospitalized for having hallucinations. Again
medication improved his symptoms and he was discharged."
In the weeks preceding the murder of Glen Hayes, Tavares
had stopped taking his medication and his mental health was
notably declining.' 2 On November 9, 2001, Glen Hayes and Victor
Moniz, two mental health professionals from Johnston Mental
Health Services, visited Tavares at his mother's apartment in
Cranston, where Tavares lived.' 3 Tavares took his medication
from the two men and told them that he only took the pills when
he felt he needed to.1 4 In the apartment the conversation became
increasingly bizarre and Hayes and Moniz got up to leave. 5 At
this point Tavares jumped up, shouted "where do you think you're
going?" and stabbed Hayes just above the eyebrow with an eight-
inch serrated knife. 16 The knife was lodged seven inches into
Hayes skull, and he died from the wound. 7 Tavares' mother
rushed in and began screaming, allowing Moniz to run away and
call 911 for help.'8
Initially held without bail at the Adult Correctional
Institution (ACI), Tavares was soon placed in a psychiatric cell for
having religious and paranoid hallucinations. 9 On November 14,
9. Id. These hallucinations included animals killing each other, feelings
of paranoia, and a belief that the devil was stalking him. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Tavares had reported to his doctor that the television was talking
to him, that he knew how to clone people, and that people were trying to
genetically alter him. He also told another doctor that he "was being raped
and mugged by God, the mob and doctors," that "the devil invaded his body,"
and that his thoughts and feelings were being reported over the radio. Id.
12. Id. at 143-44.
13. Id. at 141-42.
14. Id. at 142.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 142 n.3.
18. Id. at 142.
19. Id. at 144. Tavares claimed to be possessed by the devil, that the
government had taken and killed his child on Halloween, that the child was
replaced with an exact opposite or duplicate, and that he talked to Carl Jung
through osmosis. Id.
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2001, Dr. Barry Wall evaluated Tavares and reported that he was
incompetent to stand trial.20 Tavares was committed to the
custody of the Department of Mental Health, Retardation and
Hospitals (MHRH), and was immediately transferred to the
forensic unit at Eleanor Slater Hospital (ESH).21 Upon arrival to
ESH, Tavares assaulted a social worker and was subsequently put
on a four-point physical restraint and chemical restraints.22
Tavares continued to refuse medication and on November 16,
2001, Dr. Mustafa Surti successfully petitioned the court for
instructions to treat Tavares with psychotropic drugs without his
consent.23 Under this treatment, Tavares' condition improved. 24
Although he still saw hallucinations, he was no longer acting upon
them.25 The lower court accepted a stipulation by the parties that
Tavares was competent, on the condition that his commitment
would continue throughout trial.26 MHRH objected to Tavares
being continuously hospitalized at ESH, claiming the forensic
statute demanded his release from commitment.27 A hearing
justice later held that, although competent, Tavares needed to
stay at ESH throughout the trial so as to maintain competency. 28
MHRH appealed, claiming that once the hearing justice
determined Tavares was competent to stand trial, he should have
been statutorily released from ESH.29 Notably, Tavares was
subsequently found not guilty by reason of insanity at his trial for
the murder of Glen Hayes. 30
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, MHRH argued
that section 40.1-5.3-3 (i)(3)(i) of the forensic statutes foreclosed
discretion of the hearing justice to order Tavares, as a competent










29. Id. at 145-46.
30. Id. at 146.
2006] 845
846 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.11:843
the legislature's use of the words "shall terminate."31 The court
held that the legislative intent and purpose of the statute
supported the interpretation that discretion was necessary on the
part of the hearing justice to extend commitment.32
Mootness
Because Tavares' murder proceeding had carried forward and
he was found not guilty by reason of insanity by the time the
Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the issue, and he was
committed to the custody of MHRH under a different provision of
the forensic statute, the statutory question became moot.33
Despite the normal rule that deciding moot questions is not the
role of the court, the Rhode Island Supreme Court chose to review
the issue because it was a question of "great public importance
that, although technically moot, [was] capable of repetition yet
evading [their] review."34
Holistic and Purposeful Statutory Construction
The court emphasized that, in statutory construction, the
court's ultimate goal was "to give effect to the purpose of the act as
intended by the legislature."35  Furthermore, statutory
construction was a "holistic enterprise" and when the language
was clear and unambiguous, the court would adopt the plain and
ordinary meaning.36 However, it would not interpret a statute
literally if it led to an "absurd result" that was at odds with the
legislative purpose. 37
The disputed provision, "Competency to Stand Trial" (§ 40.1-
5.3-3), provides that a commitment shall terminate when the court
determines that the committed defendant is competent.38 The
court determined that the legislative scheme was remedial in
31. Id. at 145-46 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3(i)(3)(i) (2005)).
32. Id. at 151.
33. Id. at 146.
34. Id. at 147.
35. Id. at 146 (quoting Oliviera v. Lombardi, 794 A.2d 453, 457 (R.I.
2002)).
36. Id. (quoting Park v. Ford Motor Co., 844 A.2d 687, 692 (R.I. 2004)).
37. Id. (quoting Ellis v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth., 586 A.2d 1055, 1057 (R.I.
1991)).
38. Id. at 148 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 40.1-5.3-3(i)(3) (2005)).
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nature and construed the statute liberally to effectuate that
purpose. 39
Legislative Intent is to Try Competent Defendants
Based on its holistic and purposeful approach, the court
determined that the word "shall" did not prevent the court from
exercising its discretion and extending commitment despite the
occurrence of competency.40  Revisiting the whole scheme of
forensic commitment, the court reasoned that generally the
provisions sought to govern the relationship of individuals who
were committed under the care of MHRH to ensure those
individuals were provided "general rights," including the right to
necessary and appropriate treatment, based on their particular
needs. 4' MHRH argued that the statute also sought to prevent a
drain on the department's resources; however, the court found
that was only an incidental benefit to the paramount goal of
protecting the criminal defendant's rights. 42 The court reasoned
that the statutes had a dual purpose in balancing the interests of
a criminal defendant to be competent during trial (and not be
indefinitely detained) with the public's interest in prosecuting
crimes.43 The court determined that the intent of the legislature
was to restore defendant's competency so that he could be tried.44
Competency throughout Trial
Despite the clear and unambiguous language of the statute,
the court reasoned that competency is more than a momentary
condition, and there is a judicial responsibility to ensure that the
defendant is competent throughout trial.45 The court found this
concept to be supported by §40.1-5.3-3(a)(2), which defines
competency as a mental condition, that is, the ability of the
criminal defendant to understand "the character and
consequences of the proceedings against him or her" and an ability
39. Id. at 146.
40. Id. at 151.
41. Id. at 149.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 149.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 149-50.
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to properly assist in the defense. 46
The court emphasized the importance of the judge's role in
determining and ensuring a defendant's competency.47  The
forensic statutes grant the court the authority to raise the issue of
competency at any time throughout trial and give the judge the
final determination about the defendant's condition.48 The court
stated that competency is a legal condition, not a medical
condition, and although the judge may rely heavily on the advice
from medical health professionals, the final determination of
competency belongs to the court.49 Furthermore, because the
court can raise its own motion to question the defendant's
competency at any point throughout the trial, judicial discretion is
already a necessary and integral part of determining
competency. 50  Tavares' competency was fleeting and was
dependent upon the special treatment he received at ESH.51 If he
was remanded to the ACI, where he would no longer receive
special treatment and would probably again refuse his medication,
he could have begun to rapidly decompensate. 2 Dr. Surti noted
that Tavares' condition would not simply have declined to his
prior state of incompetence, but Tavares could have suffered a
worse decline and medication would likely have been unable to
restore any competency at all.53 The court found that such a
result would be unfair to all and possibly raise serious due process
concerns for Tavares. 54
A literal reading would also prevent the court from being
proactive, especially when competency was obviously fleeting, and
would instead require the much more difficult task of determining
when the defendant had actually lost competency again during the
proceeding.55 Once competency had been lost, the court would
either have had to grant a new trial, or allow the first trial to
46. Id. at 149.




51. Id. at 151.
52. Id. at 149.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 151.
55. Id.
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simply pause until competency was restored.5 6 The court stated
that either situation would threaten the "economy of justice and
waste the resources of the parties, the courts, and ESH alike."57
Furthermore, allowing the court to ignore legitimate concerns
regarding a defendant's competency would frustrate the remedial
goals of the forensic statutes.58 Allowing Tavares to decompensate
to such a degree that he would be unable to retain his competency
at all would mean that the prosecution would be unable to proceed
to trial.59 Such a result would have been absurd because the state,
Tavares, and the family of Glen Hayes each had an interest in
seeing Tavares tried.60 Preventing the hearing justice from taking
steps to ensure the competency of a defendant throughout trial
would be manifestly unfair to Tavares, the people of the state, and
the victim's family.6 1
COMMENTARY
The practical need for flexibility in situations dealing with a
criminal defendant's fleeting competency mandate the rejection of
the MHRH's formalistic and strict approach. A literal reading
that would essentially terminate the special treatment Tavares
was receiving under MHRH custody could potentially have caused
more damage to the defendant, and therefore would have raised
serious due process concerns. This is readily apparent because
Tavares, a chronic paranoid schizophrenic who refused his
medication, was competent solely by order of the court, which
allowed his medication to be administered without consent. It was
more than likely that he would not have taken his medication once
removed from MHRH's custody and it was questionable whether
his competency could be restored afterwards. MHRH's ability to
terminate their custody of Tavares would have been short-lived,
because if Tavares once again became incompetent, he would still
have been committed to the care of MHRH; but then he might
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restoration might not have been possible.
The court's recognition that the strict language of the statute
was intended to protect a criminal defendant from potentially
indefinite detention without trial does little to actually provide
guidelines for when this power should be properly exercised. A
rule allowing courts to extend forensic commitment of a competent
defendant may have far-reaching consequences if the rule is not
narrowly applied to proper cases.62 The benefits of extending
commitment for a defendant would be that he would continue to
receive medical treatment during his trial proceeding; however,
such commitment may also prevent him from being released on
bail, and subject him to unwanted treatment and chemical
restraints.
With proper guidelines to help lower courts determine when it
is appropriate to exercise this discretion, the dual legislative
purposes of concern for defendants' rights and the public's interest
in prosecution would be realized. The court claims that the power
to extend commitment is justified if a mentally fragile defendant
is likely to decompensate during trial.63 This does not afford very
much protection against the government to the newly competent
criminal defendant. Although the court correctly states that
competency is a legal condition to be decided by the judge at his
discretion, the court overlooks the fact that the determination of
whether such competency is "fleeting" and likely to decline during
trial is not a traditional part of the province of a judicial
determination of competency.64
Here, Tavares had murdered his social worker, unprovoked
and based entirely on his delusional thinking.65 Tavares' behavior
prior to the act, apart from a few strange comments, indicated
nothing to those around him, and as such, the murder was
essentially an unpredictable act.66 Tavares continued to attack
others while in custody and it was because of the fear of this
violent and unpredictable behavior that the court ordered forced
treatment.67 It would be overly risky, bordering on recklessness,
62. See id. at 151.
63. See id. at 150.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 142.
66. See id. at 141-42.
67. Id. at 144.
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to allow an already unpredictable murderer the opportunity to fall
deeper into delusion and wait until someone else is harmed.
Therefore, the degree of dangerousness is an important factor in
determining the need to extend the commitment of a criminal
defendant after competency has been restored.
The court also noted Tavares' long history of mental illness
and that his particular illness, chronic paranoid schizophrenia,
required constant treatment.68 It was significant that Tavares
could not live in society without treatment and medication, and he
was wholly dependent upon this treatment to maintain
competency. This is an important policy concern because as
medical advancements improve, previously incompetent
defendants are going to be afforded the opportunity to be
competent through medication and treatment. Therefore, the
severity of the defendant's illness and the ability of the defendant
to live in society are also important factors in determining the
need for court extension of commitment.
Additionally, the court focused on the circumstances
surrounding Tavares' restored competency and the likelihood that
he would decompensate during the trial. 69 Because Tavares
continually refused his medication, the court had ordered his
treatment without his consent. 70 It was only because of this
treatment that he was deemed competent enough for the criminal
proceedings to carry forward; the doctors admitted that once the
medication stopped being administered, his competency would
decline and once again he would be at the mercy of his delusions
and paranoia. 71 Tavares was incapable of being responsible
enough to take his medicine. Therefore, the defendant's ability to
maintain his own competency by taking medication and getting
treatment outside of being in direct custody of MHRH, may also be
a significant factor in determining whether extending
commitment is necessary.
By emphasizing the duty on the hearing justice to ensure that
the criminal defendant remains competent, the court protects the
due process rights of defendants to be competent during trial, and
68. See id. at 143-46.
69. Id. at 144-46.
70. Id. at 144.
71. Id.
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prevents having to re-commit them again at a later time.
Allowing judicial discretion to extend forensic commitment
prevented Tavares from becoming permanently incompetent,
saved him from being inhumanely subjected to the mercy of his
paranoid delusions and hallucinations, provided closure for the
victim's family, and gave the state the opportunity to prosecute
Hayes' murder. The literal construction of the statute would have
caused so much damage that the court had no other choice but to
permit flexibility, with the hope that the lower courts would not at
a later time abuse their discretion.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a hearing justice
has discretion to extend the commitment of a criminal defendant
under the forensic statutes, §§ 40.1-5.3-1 to 40.1-5.3-18, despite a
finding that the criminal defendant is competent to stand trial.72
In this case, the hearing justice properly extended the
commitment of the criminal defendant in the custody of MHRH, to
ensure his competency would last throughout the entire trial
proceeding. 73
Hinna Mirza Upal
72. Id. at 151.
73. Id.
Criminal Procedure. Raso v. Wall, 884 A.2d 391 (R.I. 2005).
In a case of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that the doctrine of laches (unreasonable delay in pursuing a
claim) could apply as an affirmative state defense to an
application for postconviction relief.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 19, 1973, after three days of trial, Edward
Raso pled guilty to kidnapping and as an accessory before the fact
to rape, sodomy, and robbery, as related to an incident that
involved the kidnapping and rape of a teenaged girl on August 15,
1972.1 During the subsequent sentencing hearing on November
28, 1973, Raso attempted to make an oral motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.2 Raso claimed that "at the time he pleaded guilty '[he]
didn't get too much sleep and [he] didn't understand it'... [and]
that he desired 'another chance to have a trial by [j]ury.' 3 After
hearing from Raso, the trial court instructed him that his attorney
would need to file a motion and only then would he get a hearing
on the issue of withdrawal; the court then proceeded, over
counsel's request for a continuance of the sentencing hearing, to
sentence Raso to twenty-eight years for kidnapping and
concurrent sentences of thirty-five years each for each of the other
charges. 4
Twenty-eight years later, Raso filed an appeal with the Rhode
Island Superior Court for postconviction relief,5 requesting either




5. Id. at 393. Raso filed his application for post-conviction relief
pursuant to Rhode Island General Law §§ 10-9.1-1 through 10-9.1-9, which
allows for post-conviction relief for: convictions or sentences that are
violative of the United States Constitution; convictions made by a court
without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; convictions that exceed or are
otherwise not in accordance with the maximum authorized sentence;
convictions in instances when evidence of new material facts that require
vacation of the prior conviction come to light; cases when the defendant's
sentence has expired or parole or probation been unlawfully revoked; and for
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that his guilty plea be vacated, or, alternatively, that specific
performance of the prosecution's original sentencing
recommendation be ordered. 6 Raso's argument that the trial
justice had abused her discretion in not allowing him to withdraw
his guilty plea was denied; the court chose "not to reach the issue
of whether the state's assertion of the doctrine of laches"
prevented Raso's application for relief altogether. 7 On appeal to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Raso again argued that the trial
justice erred in refusing to hear his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea prior to sentencing him, basing his argument on Rule 32(d) of
the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.8 Raso also
argued that the Superior Court erred in denying his application
for postconviction relief based entirely on the ground of laches.9
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the affirmative
defense of laches may be properly invoked by the state against
defendants praying for postconviction relief.'0 The court held that
although an application for postconviction relief may indeed be
made at anytime, that "to read 'at anytime' as constituting a
limitless 'Open Sesame' would be absurd and that rather, the
statutory term means "at any reasonable time."" The court
adopted the criteria from its prior application of laches in civil
cases that require "a showing of 'negligence to assert a known
right, seasonably coupled with prejudice to an adverse party,"' 12 in
light of the circumstances of the particular facts of the case at
issue.' 3 The court then remanded the case to the Rhode Island
Superior Court so that the necessary factual findings and
conclusions of law could be made as to the laches issue.14
convictions that are subject to collateral attack. Id. at 393 n.2 (quoting R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 10-9.1-1 through 10-9.1-9 (2000)).
6. Id. at 393.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 394 (citing R.I. Sup. R. CRIM. P. 32 (D))
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 395.
12. Id. (quoting Rodrigues v. Santos, 466 A.2d 306, 311 (R.I. 1983)).




In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court follows some
other jurisdictions that allow for the application of laches in
criminal cases. 15 In cases such as this one, the trial court on
remand will face a weighty balance of interests. It will have to
choose between an individual defendant's right to seek potentially
legitimate postconviction relief, of the utmost importance at any
time to the individual, and the state's right not to be forced to
retry such a stale case.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the affirmative
defense of laches, or unreasonable delay, may be used in cases
involving application for postconviction relief.16
Esme Noelle DeVault
15. See, e.g., Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384 (Colo. 2005); Wright v.
State, 711 So. 2d 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Walker v. State, 769 N.E.2d
1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
16. 889 A.2d at 394-96.
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Disability/Insurance Law. Marques v. Harvard Pilgrim
Healthcare of New England, 883 A.2d 742 (R.I. 2005). An
insurance company is considered a "place of public
accommodation" under the meaning of the American with
Disabilities Act (ADA), which the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held was not limited to physical structures. Additionally, the
court held that the ADA "specifically relates" to the business of
insurance, which subsequently resulted in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act being inapplicable to insurance coverage cases in
Rhode Island. As such, insurance companies are subject to the
restrictions of the ADA until it can be shown that a decision to
deny coverage was based on either sound actuarial principles or
reasonably anticipated experience, which would place the
insurance company under the safe harbor provision of the ADA.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In August, 1995, Thomas Seymour requested and received an
application for health-care coverage from Harvard Pilgrim
Healthcare of New England, Inc. (HPHC-NE), which he submitted
to HPHC-NE later that same month.1 A determination was made
by the HPHC-NE underwriting department that the application
was incomplete; as a result, HPHC-NE promptly returned the
application to Mr. Seymour requesting the missing information. 2
On September 30, 1995, HPHC-NE notified Mr. Seymour that in
order to proceed with the application process, Mr. Seymour would
have to submit a completed application within two weeks.3 Due to
Mr. Seymour's failure to comply with this deadline, HPHC-NE
voided the partial application on October 15, 1995. 4
In December 1995, the Rhode Island Department of Human
Services (DHS) issued a "Ten-Day Notice" to Mr. Seymour due to
his failure to cooperate with the terms of his Medicaid benefits,
1. Marques v. Harvard Pilgrim Healthcare of New England, 883 A.2d
742, 744 (R.I. 2005).
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which required him to notify the DHS regarding any change in his
financial status.5 The notice allowed him the opportunity to
appeal the termination of his Medicaid benefits through a hearing;
Mr. Seymour, however, did not request such a hearing.6 As a
result of his noncompliance, Mr. Seymour's Medicaid benefits
were terminated as of December 26, 1995. 7
On February 12, 1996, Mr. Seymour contacted HPHC-NE to
inquire about his original application for insurance coverage from
August, 1995.8 At this time, Mr. Seymour was informed that due
to his failure to provide a complete application in 1995, he would
now need to restart the application process, the first step of which
would be to submit a completed application. 9 Mr. Seymour
complied with this process and resubmitted an application, which
was denied because "he did not meet [HPHC-NE's] eligibility
guidelines." 10  HPHC-NE determined that, as a result of Mr.
Seymour's Arthrogryposis and Crohn's Disease, he "presented an
unacceptably high risk of loss."11 This denial prompted Mr.
Seymour to file a complaint with the Department of Business
Regulation (DBR), which subsequently contacted HPHC-NE and
ultimately resulted in the DBR being appointed as rehabilitator of
HPHC-NE 12 under the "Insurers' Rehabilitation and Liquidation
Act."13  Due to the imminent liquidation of HPHC-NE, the
Superior Court enjoined further action regarding Mr. Seymour's
discrimination claim.1 4 Mr. Seymour subsequently filed a petition
with the Superior Court claiming the denial of his appeal violated
not only his constitutional rights, but also his civil rights; the
liquidator filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.1 5 The
Superior Court granted summary judgment to the liquidator; Mr
Seymour appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 6
5. Id. at 744-45 & n.6.
6. Id. at 744-45.






13. R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-14.3 (2000).





The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that: (1) with respect
to the facts of this case, Rhode Island General Law § 27-41-4217
(subsequently repealed) was superseded by Title III of the
American with Disabilities Act (ADA);18 (2) an insurance company
is a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the
ADA;19 and (3) Mr. Seymour had established a prima facie case
under the ADA.20
Place of Public Accommodation
The court begins the analysis of whether HPHC-NE is a
"place of public accommodation" by pointing out that an
"insurance office" is specifically listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) as a
public accommodation under the meaning of Title III of the ADA.21
The court looked to precedent and pointed out that the term
"public accommodation" need not be limited to physical places. 22
Additionally, the First Circuit, in ruling that public
accommodations should not be limited to physical structures, also
noted that many service establishments which choose to conduct
business by phone or mail are unlikely to maintain a building
which the public may enter.23 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
adopted the First Circuit ruling that "public accommodation"
should not be limited physical structures. 24
Denial on Basis of Disability
The court next looked to whether Mr. Seymour was in fact
denied services by HPHC-NE on the basis of his disability. 25 Due
to HPHC-NE's concession that Mr. Seymour was denied insurance
coverage because, as an individual who suffered from
17. R.I. GEN. LAws § 27- 41- 42 (2003).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
19. 883 A.2d at 748-49.
20. Id. at 749-50.
21. Id. at 748 (citing 42 U.S.C. §12181(7)(2000)).
22. Id. at 749 (citing Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's
Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1994)).
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Arthrogryposis and Crohn's Disease, his application created an
unacceptably high risk, the court determined that it was in fact
Mr. Seymour's disabilities which cost him the opportunity to
obtain insurance coverage from HPHC-NE.26
Applicability of the ADA
The court then turned its analysis to whether HPHC-NE fell
under the "safe harbor" provision found in § 501(c) of Title V of the
ADA.2 7 If certain conditions are met, the "safe harbor" provision
specifically excludes insurance underwriters from Title I through
III of the ADA.28 The "safe harbor" provision also provides a
"subterfuge clause," which prohibits the use of the safe harbor
provision to purposefully evade Titles I through III of the ADA by
insurance providers.29 If an insurance company can show that a
decision was based on either "sound actuarial principles or
reasonably anticipated experience," then it is subsequently
sheltered from the reach of the ADA and can take pre-existing
conditions and disabilities into consideration. 30 The court then
shifted the burden of proof to HPHC-NE, due to HPHC-NE's
ability to access pertinent information regarding its own denial of
coverage to Mr. Seymour, and the difficulty that Mr. Seymour
would likely meet in attaining this information. 31 HPHC-NE
therefore had the burden of showing that it denied Mr. Seymour
for either "sound actuarial principles or reasonably anticipated
experience." 32 If HPHC-NE was successful in this showing, then
Mr. Seymour would bear the burden of proving that HPHC-NE's
reasons for denial were "in fact a subterfuge to evade the purposes
of Title III of the ADA."33
The majority then turned its discussion to the "decision tree"
used by HPHC-NE to make the ultimate eligibility determination
26. Id.
27. Id. at 750.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 750 n.17 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12202(c)(2000)).
30. Id. at 750 (citing Doukas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 950 F.Supp. 422, 429
(D. N.H. 1996)).
31. Id. at 750-5 1.
32. Id. at 751 (citing Doukas, 750 F. Supp. at 429).
33. Id. at 751 n.7, 752 n.8 (citing Nicolae v. Miriam Hosp., 847 A.2d 856
(R.I. 2004)).
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in Mr. Seymour's case.34 The decision tree, titled "Decision Tree
for Rhode Island Pre-Existing Condition Legislation," is a
flowchart which guides the underwriters in the decision-making
process. 35 Because Mr. Seymour suffered from a pre-existing
condition and did not have continuous coverage for the twelve
months preceding the application, HPHC-NE guidelines allowed
the underwriter to deny or limit the coverage. 36 Here, coverage
was denied altogether; the court reasoned that because HPHC-NE
failed to put forward specific evidence to justify the complete
denial of coverage to Mr. Seymour, summary judgment should not
have been granted in favor of HPHC-NE. 37
The court concluded that HPHC-NE had not satisfied the
burden of proving that its decision to completely deny Mr.
Seymour insurance coverage was based on either "sound actuarial
principles or was related to HPHC-NE's actual or reasonably
anticipated experience." 38  Without having made the above
showing, HPHC-NE had yet to establish that it fell under the
"safe harbor" provision of the ADA and, thus, it could be subjected
to Title III. 39 The court ultimately held that unless HPHC-NE
met the above burden, Mr. Seymour had established a prima facie
case under the ADA.40 The court remanded to the Superior Court
where HPHC-NE will be given the opportunity to show that its
decision was based either on "sound actuarial principles or
reasonably anticipated experience." 41
Dissent - Justice Robinson
Justice Robinson argued in his dissent that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act rendered the ADA inapplicable to Mr. Seymour's
case. 42 He stated: "(1) that Congress has spoken quite definitively
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act; (2) that said Act bars the
application of the ADA to insurance coverage cases like this one;
34. Id. at 751-52.
35. Id. at 751.
36. Id. at 752.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 752.
39. Id. at 750-52.
40. Id. at 752.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 753.
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and (3) that there is no legally defensible way to circumvent that
clear congressional directive." The McCarran-Ferguson Act reads
in pertinent part: "No Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . .,43
Justice Robinson pointed to case law which set the precedent that
"federal laws should not be construed to supersede state laws
'regulating the business of insurance."'44
Justice Robinson argued that there was a presumption that
Congress left the regulation of the business of insurance to the
states and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is a strong example of
this presumption. 45 Therefore, unless the federal law "specifically
relates" to the business of insurance, regulation of such businesses
is to be left to the state.46 Justice Robinson further contended
that, due to the particularly wide scope of issues covered by the
ADA, it cannot be said to "specifically relate" to the business of
insurance. 47 Therefore, he stated that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act renders the ADA inapplicable to insurance coverage issues
such as the one presented here.48 Although Justice Robinson
conceded that there was some mention of insurance in the ADA,
he stated that the law was in fact "general" and unlikely to be
"read as relating specifically to the business of insurance."49 Due
to the reverse preemptive effect made possible by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, when a federal statute is "general in character," the
ADA is inapplicable to issues of insurance coverage. 50
Regarding the "safe harbor" language in the ADA, Justice
Robinson argued that it in fact offers protection to the traditional
practices of the insurance industry.51  This being said, the
provision does not constitute an attempt to specifically regulate
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (b)(2000).
44. 883 A.2d at 754 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 736 (1985) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)(2000))).
45. Id.
46. Id.






the business of insurance.5 2 In fact, as Justice Robinson pointed
out, the purpose of the safe harbor provision appeard to be to
protect the insurance industry from the scope of the ADA, not to
subject it to specific regulation. 53  In his conclusion, Justice
Robinson reiterated his belief that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
was a clear congressional statute that plainly precluded
application of the ADA to insurance coverage cases.54
COMMENTARY
The major disagreement between the dissent and the majority
was whether the ADA specifically related to the business of
insurance. The majority opinion argued that the ADA does
specifically relate to the business of insurance because it "contains
two fundamental provisions that specifically relate to the business
of insurance."55 Conversely, Justice Robinson pointed out in his
dissent that the ADA has a broad focus and thus cannot be
considered to specifically relate to the business of insurance. 56
The dissent went on to cite Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth,57 in which
the United States Supreme Court pointed to Section 2(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, noting that "federal legislation general
in character shall not be 'construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance.' 58
Although the ADA, as the majority points out, makes two
references to insurance, Justice Robinson's argument is not
without merit. In fact, the ADA's "safe harbor" provision provides
the insurance industry with further insulation from claims under
Title III. The ADA therefore does not appear to regulate the
business of insurance; rather its language provides the industry a
path to circumvent the ADA's proscription of discrimination. In
addition to the safe harbor provision, the ADA defines an
insurance office as a place of public accommodation under the
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 756.
55. Id. at 747 n.13.
56. Id. at 755.
57. 525 U.S. 299, 306 (1999).
58. 883 A.2d at 755 (quoting Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 306
(1999) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)(2000))).
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meaning of the ADA.59 It is unlikely that Congress intended this
list of private entities to specifically relate to the business of
insurance. This provision merely points out that an insurance
office is a place of public accommodation; it does not attempt to
regulate the means by which the industry should determine
eligibility for insurance coverage.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed by Congress for the
purpose of leaving the business of regulating the insurance
industry to the states.60 A legislative directive as clear as the
McCarran-Ferguson Act should only be circumvented where there
is no question as to the specific regulation of insurance by the
federal Act. Here, the majority found that the ADA specifically
relates to the business of insurance.61 In so doing, it effectively
took the control of the regulation of the Rhode Island insurance
industry in determining its eligibility requirements away from the
state. Instead, the insurance industry must now satisfy the safe
harbor provision of the ADA in order to make an eligibility
determination involving a pre-existing condition. This appears to
be what Congress sought to avoid by the enactment of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The decision here had the effect of nullifying § 27-41-42 (since
repealed) of the Rhode Island General Laws, which gave insurance
providers the option to deny or limit the coverage offered to
individuals with a pre-existing condition who had failed to
maintain continuous coverage for the twelve months preceding
their application. 62  The majority argued that § 27-41-42
effectively denied equal access to health insurance because that
provision had an adverse impact only on those individuals with a
pre-existing condition.63 Ultimately, the majority determined that
application of the ADA was appropriate and, as such, the
insurance company retained the right to show that it made its
denial decision for a valid reason under the safe harbor
provision.6
59. See 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(2000).
60. Marques, 883 A.2d at 753 n.22 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co., v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)).
61. Id. at 747 n.13.
62. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-41-42 (repealed 2000).
63. See 883 A.2d at 747 n.13.
64. See id. at 747-50.
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Under the safe harbor provision, the insurance company must
show that its decisions are based on "actuarial data or on the
company's actual or reasonably anticipated experience relating to
the risk involved."65  Given the likelihood that insurance
companies have data and experience with the risks involved in
providing coverage to clients with pre-existing conditions, they
will likely satisfy these requirements with ease. As a result, it is
likely that most insurance providers will meet this exception to
the ADA and will continue with their normal course of eligibility
determinations, an outcome which bears a striking resemblance to
the now repealed § 27-41-42 of the Rhode Island General Laws.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an insurance
provider falls within the meaning of a public accommodation
under the meaning of the ADA66 and that the ADA specifically
relates to the business of insurance making it applicable to the
present case.6 7
Kimberly A. Tracey
65. Id. at 750 (citing Doukas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 950 F.Supp. 422, 429
(D. N.H. 1996)).
66. Id. at 749.
67. Id. at 747.
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Employment Law. DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, 875 A.2d
13 (R.I. 2005). A gender-based disparate treatment discrimination
claim does not depend upon a prima facie showing of hostile work
environment, and a gender-based hostile work environment claim
does not involve a burden-shifting framework. Additionally, when
the major life activity under consideration to establish a disability
is working itself, the statutory requirement that the disability
"substantially limits" the major life activity requires that the
employee allege she is unable to work in a broad class of jobs. In
the context of work-related depression or anxiety, if an employee's
doctor states that the employee cannot return to work for that
particular employer, then that fact supports the legal conclusion
that the employee is no longer qualified to do the job and no
accommodation exists to allow her to return to work, which
precludes the employee from establishing a prima facie case of
disability discrimination.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff Maria L. DeCamp was hired by Dollar Tree as a
store manager in May of 2000, and the defendant, Mr. Braz, was
her direct supervisor.1 Braz was a Dollar Tree district manager
and was investigated and counseled in 1999 regarding his
treatment of women. 2 In December of 2000, DeCamp sought
medical treatment and was diagnosed with major depression,
which in the opinion of her psychiatrist, was "related to a
demanding, abusive and deteriorating relationship with her
immediate supervisor."3 DeCamp was treated with therapy and
medication and was cleared to return to work for an employer
other than Dollar Tree on June 14, 2001. 4 While in treatment,
DeCamp contacted human resources at Dollar Tree, who
conducted an investigation of Braz, finding some negative
1. DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13, 18 (R.I. 2005).
2. Id. at 17.
3. Id. at 19.
4. Id.
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comments regarding his treatment of associates, but nothing
related to mistreatment of females.5 Although the investigation
did not involve treatment of DeCamp specifically, following the
investigation, Braz attended antidiscrimination training.6
DeCamp was granted six weeks of medical leave by Dollar
Tree, during which time her future employment was discussed.7
Plaintiff claimed in her deposition that she suggested different
solutions that would have allowed her to return to work, but she
was informed that her leave would expire on February 2, 2001,
and she would have to return to work for Braz.8 DeCamp followed
her doctor's instructions and did not return to work; subsequently,
on February 6, 2001, Dollar Tree sent DeCamp a letter stating
that her failure to return to work constituted a voluntary
resignation. 9 DeCamp then filed a discrimination claim with the
Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, and after waiting
the requisite time, filed an employment discrimination suit
against defendants in Superior Court. 10 DeCamp alleged that
Braz's treatment of her met the requirements of gender
discrimination and that Dollar Tree's decision to terminate her
while on medical leave constituted disability discrimination."
Defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted as to all
claims and DeCamp subsequently appealed. 2
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, DeCamp argued that the trial justice erred in
granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment.13 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the plaintiffs case based
on two distinct theories of gender-based employment
discrimination: gender-based disparate treatment and gender-
based hostile work environment. 4 The court found that the







11. Id. at 19-20.
12. Id. at 20.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 21.
SURVEY SECTION
disparate treatment and hostile work environment. 15 The court
stated that the disparate treatment theory does not depend on a
prima facie showing of hostile work environment, and that hostile
work environment claims do not utilize a burden-shifting
framework.16 As a result, the court held that the motion justice
erred by failing to require defendants to offer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff as is
required to overcome a prima facie showing of gender-based
disparate treatment. 17 The court also held that the summary
judgment granted as to the hostile work environment claim was a
reversible error as the plaintiff created a genuine issue of material
fact as to each element of that claim.18
The court next held that summary judgment was correct as to
the disability discrimination claim, finding that if an employee's
doctor states that the employee cannot return to work for that
particular employer, then that fact alone supports a legal
conclusion that the employee no longer is qualified to do the job
and no accommodation exists to allow her to return to work,
making it impossible to meet the second element of disability-
based disparate treatment. 9
Employment Discrimination in Rhode Island
Employment discrimination in Rhode Island is prohibited by
several statutes. 20 The State Fair Employment Practices Act
(FEPA) prohibits employer discrimination based on gender or
disability with respect to "terms, conditions or privileges of
employment."21 The Civil Rights Act of 1990 (RICRA) provides
that all persons should have the equal benefit of the laws
regardless of sex or disability and defers to FEPA for definitions of
such.22 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has adopted a multitude
of tests that are used to determine employment discrimination,
15. Id. at 21 n.6.
16. Id. (citing Lewis v. Forest Pharm., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 638 (D. Md.
2002)).
17. Id. at 22.
18. Id. at 24.
19. Id. at 26.
20. Id. at 20.
21. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(1)(i),(ii) (Supp. 2004).
22. R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-112-1(a),(d) (Supp. 2004).
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several of which were addressed in by the court in DeCamp.
Gender-Based Disparate Treatment
Gender-based disparate treatment involves a three-step
burden-shifting analysis as established by the United States
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 23 The
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that: she is
a member of the protected. class; she was performing the job at a
level sufficient to rule out inadequate job performance; she
suffered adverse job action by the employer; and that the employer
sought a replacement with equivalent qualifications. 24 The second
step requires the employer "offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action," and the third step
shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to show that the professed
reason is pretext. 25 The court characterized the requirements for
a prima facie case as "modest" and stated that the plaintiff, as a
female, was a member of a protected class and was in good
standing prior to the dismissal.26 The court also stated that the
termination was an adverse event regardless of its
characterization as a "voluntary resignation" by the employer, and
that since there was no corporate downsizing, it could be assumed
that the position would be filled with an individual with roughly
equal qualifications.27
More significantly, the court found that the motion justice, in
combining the theories of disparate treatment and hostile work
environment, failed to identify the defendants' legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the incident.28 In order to overcome
a prima facie finding of disparate treatment, the defendants had
to meet the second requirement of the burden-shifting framework,
which they failed to do.29 The court held that summary judgment
was reversible error and that the case had to be remanded to the
trial court for proper application of the burden-shifting
23. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
24. DeCamp, 875 A.2d at 21 (citing Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40
F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 1994)).






framework, as a reviewing court cannot search the record for that
reasoning.30
Gender-Based Hostile Work Environment
A claim of gender-based hostile work environment mandates
that the court look at the record as a whole, with regard to the
totality of the circumstances. 31 Looking at the record as a whole,
the court stated that the following elements must be met:
(1) the employee is a member of a protected class; (2) the
employee was subjected to unwanted harassment; (3) that
harassment was based upon his or her sex; (4) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to
alter the conditions of plaintiffs employment and create
an abusive work environment; (5) that harassment was
both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a
reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and the
victim in fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some
basis for employer liability has been established. 32
The court found that in DeCamp, the first two elements were
met, as the plaintiff was a member of a protected class and
considered the conduct unwelcome. 33 As to the third element, the
court held that although none of the incidents involving Braz and
plaintiff involved express references to gender, Braz's recorded
past history of treating women poorly was the "nexus between
Braz's treatment of plaintiff and [the] conclusion that he
mistreated her because of her gender."4
Next, the court stated that finding an abusive work
environment under the fourth element requires that FEPA and
RICRA are violated when "the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.., that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working
30. Id.
31. Id. at 22 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67
(1986)).
32. Id. at 22-23 (quoting O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713,
728 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
33. Id. at 23.
34. Id.
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environment"35 The court observed that at least seven incidents of
direct mistreatment of the plaintiff occurred, ranging from violent
actions to verbally abusive comments; thus a reasonable juror
could find an abusive work environment given these facts.36
Next, the court discussed the fifth element of a hostile work
environment claim: subjective and objective offense.3 7 The court
stated that this element is based upon all the surrounding
discriminatory incidents including frequency, severity, physical
threats, humiliation, offensive utterances, and whether or not it
all unreasonably interferes with performance of work.38
Objectively, the court stated, conduct such as kicking over a
register and screaming at workers could clearly be considered
offensive by a reasonable person.39 The court also found subjective
evidence in the plaintiffs tears and depression.40 Finally, the
court reasoned that employer liability could be found through
Dollar Tree's knowledge of Braz's mistreatment of employees in
general, and of women in particular, thus satisfying the sixth and
final element. 41 The court held that given the factual variances
involved in all of the elements, the plaintiff created a genuine
issue of material fact and thus summary judgment was
improper.42
Disability Discrimination
The court stated that disability discrimination can be
established through the use of the disparate treatment theory and
its burden-shifting framework. 43  The court stated that an
employee must first prove a prima facie case of disability
discrimination by showing that: he or she was disabled within the
meaning of FEPA and RICRA; that the employee was qualified, or
35. Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)
(internal quotations omitted)).
36. See id. at 23-24.
37. Id. at 24.






43. Id. at 24-25 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 141 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997)).
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stated differently, that with or without reasonable accommodation
was able to perform the essential functions of the job; and that the
discharge was in whole or in part a result of the disability.44 If a
prima facie case is established, the employer must rebut with a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharge, at which time
the employee must respond with proof that the reason offered by
the employer is pretext.45 The court held that, in DeCamp, the
plaintiff failed to meet the elements required to establish a prima
facie case of disability discrimination.46
The court noted that disability is defined as "any physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major
life activities."47 As extrapolated from FEPA and RICRA, major
life activities include "functions such as caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."48  The court held that,
although depression qualifies as a mental impairment,49 the
plaintiffs injury did not substantially limit major life activities. 50
The plaintiff had claimed that the major life activity in question
was her ability to work, and the court held that, in such a case,
the phrase "substantially limits" requires at minimum an inability
to work a broad class of jobs.51 Thus, when the major life activity
that is substantially limited is work, a conflict between an
employee and a supervisor, "even one that triggers the employee's
depression[,] is not enough to establish that the employee is
disabled, so long as the employee could still perform the job under
a different supervisor."52 The court pointed out that much of the
plaintiffs testimony showed that her condition prevented her from
working for Braz, but not from working in general; the plaintiff in
44. Id. at 25 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 110 F.3d at
141 n.2).
45. Id. at 25 (citing Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 n.3
(2003)).
46. Id. at 25-26.
47. Id. at 25.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 25 (citing Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 20
(1st Cir. 2004)).
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)).
52. Id. (quoting Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1062 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
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fact stated that she would return to work for Dollar Tree if they
fired Braz, and may have even returned if he apologized and
acknowledged his mistreatment. 53 As a result, the court held that
even in the most favorable light, the plaintiffs depression did not
substantially limit her ability to work a broad range of jobs.5 4
The plaintiff challenged the lower court's finding that she was
not disabled by stating that, despite her testimony regarding her
ability to return to work, her psychiatrist's statement that she
could not in fact return to work until June 14, 2001 created a
genuine issue of fact regarding her ability to work a broad range of
jobs. 55 In addressing this argument, the court stated that given
the plaintiffs burden of proving every element, a conflict existed
between proving the first and second element as a result of the
psychiatrist's statement.5 6 This conflict occurred as a result of the
requirement that the employee be "qualified" or able to perform
the essential job functions with or without reasonable
accommodation and the requirement that the plaintiff must still
possess the ability to function competently and productively in the
employment situation with or without modification of that
situation.57 With depression specifically, "if an employee's doctor
states that the employee cannot return to work for that particular
employer, then that fact supports a legal conclusion that the
employee no longer is qualified to do the job and no
accommodation exists to allow him or her to return to work."58
The doctor's statement thus created an insurmountable dilemma
for the plaintiff; although the statement introduced a question of
material fact as to the disability element, the very same evidence
resulted in the plaintiffs inability to meet the "qualified"
element.5 9 Thus the psychiatrist's claim that the plaintiff could
never return to work for Dollar Tree established that no
reasonable accommodation existed that would permit her to do her
job.60 As a result, the court held that the plaintiff could not










establish a prima facie case of disability-based disparate
treatment. 61
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court did an excellent job of
clarifying the rules of law as to gender-based employment
discrimination. Similarities in establishing a prima facie case for
both disparate treatment and hostile work environment led the
lower court to intertwine the rules. The court clarified the
necessary steps for a disparate treatment claim and reinforced the
use of the burden-shifting framework, separately laying out the
elements for a hostile work environment claim. As to gender-
based disparate treatment, the court had no choice but to remand
for a determination based on the employer's legitimate non-
discriminatory basis for dismissal, as the lower court never
reached this issue, given their misinterpretation of the rule. As to
gender-based hostile work environment, the lower court was too
quick to dismiss the plaintiffs claim, as Braz had a clear history of
poor treatment of women, as documented by Dollar Tree, and it
would be an injustice if the plaintiff were denied a claim, given the
factual leeway present in each element. The court was correct in
looking to Braz's acknowledged history of poor treatment of
women and establishing it as the nexus between his offensive
treatment of the plaintiff and gender discrimination; to hold
otherwise would be to reward Braz for treating women poorly so
long as he did not reference gender.
The court's decision regarding disability discrimination,
although technically sufficient, presents several alarming issues.
By holding that the evidence that established a genuine issue of
fact as to the plaintiffs disability also precluded satisfaction of the
qualified element, the court failed to logically consider the
complexity of the circumstances. The psychiatrist's findings
showed that the depression caused by Braz prohibited the plaintiff
from working a broad range of jobs. Although the statement of the
psychiatrist concluded that the plaintiff could not work for Dollar
Tree, this was clearly the result of the plaintiffs relationship with
Braz and nothing else. This evidence, taken in conjunction with
plaintiffs testimony that she could work at Dollar Tree if not for
61. Id. at 27.
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Braz, showed that the plaintiff was qualified to do the job, but
could not as a result of Braz. In other words, the plaintiff was
qualified for the position of Dollar Tree manager. There was
likely enough evidence to overcome summary judgment on the
issue of disability discrimination, and as such, perhaps the court
should have allowed the issue to go to a jury.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court made several important
holdings in regard to employment discrimination based on gender
and disability. The court reestablished the burden-shifting
framework for gender-based disparate treatment claims.6 2 Also,
the court allowed the use of an employer's knowledge of past
mistreatment of women to assist in satisfying the elements in a
gender-based hostile work environment claim, even in the absence
of specific gender references.6 3 Most significantly, in the context of
work-related depression or anxiety, the court held that if an
employee's doctor stated that the employee could not return to
work for that particular employer, then that fact alone supports a
legal conclusion that the employee is no longer qualified to do the
job. As a result, no accommodation exists to allow him or her to
return to work, which paradoxically precludes that employee from
establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination.6 4
Matthew Jill
62. Id. at 22.
63. Id. at 22-24.
64. Id. at 26.
Family Law. Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 (R.I. 2005).
Family court judges are barred from exercising power to reform
property settlement agreements that are incorporated by
reference, but not included in, the final divorce judgment, unless
the Family Court finds that the property settlement agreement is
ambiguous or the product of mutual mistake. When a property
settlement agreement is not ambiguous and not the product of
mutual mistake, the Family Court can refuse to enforce the
agreement to the extent that it is inequitable, but does not hold
the power to modify the agreement to ameliorate the inequity.
Therefore, the Family Court has the ability to direct the parties to
negotiate a new property settlement agreement for its review and
approval, or to order the parties to proceed to trial in the event the
property settlement agreement does not reflect the division of
property determined to be equitable by the Family Court.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Kathleen M. Gorman, filed for divorce from the
defendant, Daniel W. Gorman, on February 12, 2002, after more
than thirty-five years of marriage, claiming an irremediable
breakdown of the marriage had occurred, due to irreconcilable
differences.1 The defendant husband filed a counterclaim. 2 On
January 24, 2003, a hearing was held before the Family Court
during which the lawyers for both parties stated they desired to
make a written agreement regarding the division of property.3 An
absolute divorce was granted on February 7, 2003.4 On that day,
the Family Court also approved the written property settlement
agreement which stated that the defendant's "Employee Stock
Option Plan" (ESOP) was to be divided evenly between the
parties. 5
On April 15, 2003, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking
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clarification of the written property settlement agreement and the
intent of the parties in regard to the agreement, because she had
learned that the defendant held an additional stock plan, the
"Stock Bonus Plan," (SBP) which was not mentioned in the
original property settlement agreement. 6 The defendant objected
to this motion.7 Subsequently, on May 2, 2003, the plaintiff filed a
Rule 60(b) motion for relief (under the Family Court Rules of
Procedure for Domestic Relations)8 and a motion to modify the
property settlement agreement, claiming that the terms were
based on mistake of fact, misrepresentation, inadvertence, and/or
fraud, to which the defendant objected. 9 The plaintiff asserted
that because the defendant was not only a participant in the
ESOP, but also the SBP, then the property settlement agreement
did not represent the even division agreed upon by the parties in
the Family Court order. 10 The defendant argued that the property
settlement agreement should be read literally to exclude the SBP
because the agreement implicitly excludes non-specified plans
from inclusion. 1
After a hearing by the Family Court on July 15, 2003 to
address the discrepancy, the court issued a bench decision on
August 20, 2003.12 The court concluded that the property
settlement agreement was ambiguous as to whether the SBP was
to be divided among the parties, and, as a result, the property
settlement agreement should be construed as dividing equally
both the ESOP and the SBP, even though the SBP was not
specified in the written agreement. 3 To reach this decision, the
court considered the negotiations between the parties and the
testimony of the parties, which, the Family Court held,
demonstrated intent that all stock plans be divided equally
between the parties. 4 The court also stated that it would be
improper to reward the defendant for failing to clarify an apparent
misunderstanding by the plaintiff regarding the existence of the
6. Id. at 735.
7. Id.
8. See R.I. R. Pro. D.R. 60(b).




13. Id. at 736.
14. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
SBP.15 The court entered an order directing the division of all
stocks as of the date of the execution of the property settlement
agreement. 16 Following the entry of final judgment, the defendant
appealed. 17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the defendant argued that the agreement was
unambiguous because it specifically mentioned the ESOP and
made no mention of the SBP.18 In addition, the defendant argued
that the Family Court lacked the authority to reform the property
settlement agreement. 19
Finding of Ambiguity
The court first addressed the defendant's argument regarding
the ambiguity of the agreement.20 The court stated that the
Family Court has "broad power to review and to decide whether to
approve proposed property settlement agreements, given the
special status that the law accords to agreements between
spouses."2' Therefore, the Family Court was acting within its
statutory power to oversee divorce proceedings, which includes the
review of the division of marital assets. 22 When the Family Court
received the plaintiffs motions after the divorce was granted, it
treated the motions as Rule 60(b) motions, which allowed the
court to review the property settlement agreement and to realize
that the agreement did not embody the fifty-fifty division the
Family Court had determined was equitable.23
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that although it
understood the equitable concerns that led the Family Court to
determine that the agreement was ambiguous, it considered the
agreement to be an "unambiguous contractual document" because





19. Id. at 740.
20. Id. at 736-40.
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of the SBP.24 The Supreme Court held, however, that even if the
property settlement agreement was unambiguous, it was not self-
executing, and was still subject to review and approval by the
Family Court. 25 Therefore, although the court held that the
contract was unambiguous, it also held that the Family Court
acted within its powers when it reviewed the property settlement
agreement and determined that the agreement should not be
enforced due to the agreement's inequity.26
Modification of the Agreement
Next, the court addressed the defendant's argument that the
Family Court lacked the authority to reform the agreement.27 The
defendant argued that because the property settlement agreement
was not merged into the final divorce decree, it could only be
modified if both parties consented to the modification. 28 The court
started this portion of the analysis by stating that there must be
an initial finding of mutual mistake in contract formation before
that contract can be subject to judicial reformation. 29 Since the
Family Court stated that it did not find any evidence of mutual
mistake during the negotiations and the execution of the property
settlement agreement, that court is, therefore, bound by that
holding and its limitations. 30
The Family Court does not have the authority to reform or
modify a contract like the property settlement agreement that is
merely incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the divorce
decree, absent the consent of both parties. 31 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court found the property settlement agreement to be
unambiguous and found no evidence of mutual mistake, which left
reformation of the contract beyond the power of the Family Court
justice. 32 The court held that the Family Court has the power to
either order the parties to negotiate a new property settlement
24. Id. at 738.
25. Id. at 738-39.
26. Id. at 740.
27. Id. at 740-41.
28. Id. at 740.
29. Id.




agreement for review of and approval by that court, or to direct
the parties to proceed to trial.33
COMMENTARY
The court used the holding in this case to speak about the
limitations of the Family Court's powers. By articulating that the
Family Court does not have the power to alter an inequitable
property settlement agreement that is not part of the divorce
decree, the court ensures that the Family Court does not overstep
its statutory authority, which is admittedly broad when dealing
with divorce property settlement agreements. 34 Although the
holding appears to be correct in regards to statutory and contract
law, it has the effect of limiting the Family Court's ability to deal
with divorce settlements in a fair and timely manner, and
additionally the effect of making divorcing parties subject to
deceit by the other party.
In the interest of remaining true to established contract law,
the court has ensured that already long and difficult divorces are
potentially made longer. The court carefully applies contract law
to the property settlement agreement, even though it differs from
a standard contract because it is not immediately self-executing.
In addition, the property settlement agreement is clearly not a
traditional contract made at "arms-length," as it arises out of a
divorce proceeding, in which both sides can be hostile to the
opposing party's interests. Requiring parties to redraft and
resubmit their property settlement agreement each time a flaw is
found within the agreement only prolongs the difficulty of getting
divorced. The Family Court is charged with finding an equitable
way to divide property among former spouses, but under this
holding, can no longer use its discretion to achieve an equitable
result in a timely manner for both parties. By not allowing the
Family Court to repair a property settlement agreement so that it
represents the actual understanding achieved by the parties
during the divorce proceedings, this holding undermines the broad
discretion of the Family Court to deal with divorce proceedings.
When the Family Court modifies a property settlement
33. Id.
34. Id. at 737.
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agreement to represent the expressed intentions of the parties, it
saves both the time and the attorneys' fees that would be required
to draft a new agreement and have it approved by the court. The
additional legal fees and time wasted when the court must order
the parties to renegotiate a property settlement agreement can
end up punishing the deceived party for the misdeeds of the
deceiver. In addition, it gives one side an opportunity to
temporarily withhold a divisible asset from the other side.
Perhaps the best way to prevent such unfair advantage is to allow
the court to reform the agreement upon a showing of inequity.
Unfortunately, the Family Court no longer has that ability.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Family Court
does not have the ability to reform an inequitable property
settlement agreement unless there is a finding of mutual mistake
between the parties. Standard contract law applies to the
property settlement agreements that are not part of the divorce
decree and, as a result, contract law, which demands an initial
finding of mutual mistake, prior to reformation by the court,
applies. In this case, the property settlement agreement was
found to be inequitable, but due to a lack of mutual mistake, the
revisions made by the Family Court were not valid and the parties
need to either enter into a new property settlement agreement or
proceed to trial.
Elizabeth A. Suever
Family Law. In re Mackenzie C., 877 A.2d 674 (R.I. 2005).
In applying the Daubert standard for admission of scientific
evidence, in which the court acts as a "gatekeeper" to insure that
evidence is both relevant and reliable, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court ruled that a Family Court justice did not err in reversing an
earlier finding of abuse. The reversal was based on the admission
of new expert testimony as to a child's medical condition and its
potential contribution to the child's injuries, and as such, both the
trial justice's admission of the evidence and his subsequent
dismissal of the original abuse petition were made without error.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The case of Mackenzie C. came before the Rhode Island
Supreme Court after what the court termed a "complex [and]
Dickensian procedural history."1 It all began when the
Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed an ex
parte abuse and neglect petition against Mackenzie's parents on
December 28, 1998, after Mackenzie was brought to Hasbro
Children's Hospital at nine weeks old, crying uncontrollably, with
something seemingly wrong with her right arm.2 A probable
cause hearing began on January 8, 1999, but was discontinued at
the parents' request; subsequently, on April 12, 1999, DCYF filed
a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition, which alleged
"parental unfitness because of cruel or abusive conduct pursuant
to G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii)," 3 based in part on the treating
physician's opinion that Mackenzie suffered from "battered child
syndrome." 4
The trial occurred over twenty days, commencing on June 11,
1999, and concluding on March 23, 2000.5 Mackenzie's parents
presented one expert, Dr. Colin Paterson, who testified that
Mackenzie suffered from "temporary brittle bone disease," a
1. In re Mackenzie C., 877 A.2d 674, 676 (R.I. 2005).
2. Id. at 678.
3. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii)(2000).
4. 877 A.2d at 678.
5. Id. at 679.
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condition that could explain the nineteen fractures evident upon
her body at the time of the treating physician's examination.6
The trial justice rejected the parents' expert's testimony, and
found that the child "suffered from no abnormal bone disease ...
[or from] any, metabolic or endocrinology conditions."7
Additionally, the trial justice went on to find that the "conduct of
the parents to the child was of a cruel and abusive nature" and
that they were unfit due to this finding of abuse.8  As such,
Mackenzie was committed to DCYF's care, custody and control;
however, the court deferred deciding on the TPR petition until an
impartial psychiatric evaluation of both parents could be
conducted. 9 This evaluation was subsequently conducted by Dr.
Bernard Katz, whose recommendation that a three-year case plan
be developed by DCYF and completed by the parents prior to
dismissal of the termination petition was adopted by the court. 10
On January 12, 2001, DCYF filed for (and received) a stay of this
reunification plan from the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which
later additionally directed the Family Court to decide the TPR
petition on the merits."
On November 1, 2001, after several days of testimony, the
Family Court justice denied the TPR petition, finding that
Mackenzie and her parents deeply loved each other, and that
"there [wa]s no evidence whatsoever that ... the parents create[d]
any risk or constitute[d] any risk to the child if there [wa]s
reunification."12 The trial justice ordered that DCYF immediately
create a reunification plan, an order that DCYF filed an appeal to
on November 8, 2001, as well as filing a motion for a stay of the
order on November 20, 2001.13 The motion for stay was denied;
DCYF did then submit a reunification plan, which the trial justice
rejected, noting that it did not contain "any initial step[s] toward
gradual reunification."14





10. Id. at 679-80.





reconsideration and/or new trial as to the abuse petition, which
the Family Court justice had sustained. 15 This motion was
subsequently granted on October 23, 2003, when the case was
reopened, with the admission of new expert testimony (by Dr.
Cathleen Raggio) as to Mackenzie's medical condition, evidence
that simply did not exist at the original time of trial.16 On
November 5, 2004, the trial justice reversed his earlier finding of
abuse and neglect, noting that there was no competent medical
evidence at the time of trial to support the parents' position, but
that such evidence had since come into existence.17 The trial
justice considered two issues in reversing his earlier decision:
Whether Dr. Raggio's expert testimony was admissible as "based
on scientifically valid methodologies or principles" and sufficiently
tied to the facts of the case, and if so, if DCYF sustained "its
burden of proof with respect to the abuse" allegation with clear
and convincing evidence.18
The trial justice allowed the admission of Dr. Raggio's
testimony and concluded that the court was convinced "by the
medical testimony produced ... [and t]hat there is absolutely no
testimony with respect to any tendency of the parents to be
abusive."19 The court then concluded that the state had failed to
meet its burden of clear and convincing evidence and dismissed
the prior finding of abuse.20 The trial justice later issued a follow-
up order providing for visitation and gradual reunification; DCYF
responded with an appeal and a motion to stay the order. 21 On
appeal, DCYF raised several issues; the only one that the court
addressed was "whether the trial justice erred in dismissing the
abuse petition after reconsidering the parents' new evidence."22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In addressing DCYF's appeal of the trial justice's final
decision and order, the Rhode Island Supreme Court utilized a
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two-step analysis: first, it addressed the admissibility of Dr.
Raggio's expert testimony to determine if the trial justice abused
his discretion in allowing the evidence in; second, it analyzed
whether the trial justice erred in dismissing the original abuse
petition after considering the parents' newly admitted evidence. 23
Admissibility of Dr. Raggio's Expert Testimony
In appealing the trial justice's admission of Dr. Raggio's
testimony, DCYF claimed that this expert "fail[ed] to establish a
valid methodology to test her theories, including her inability to
test her theory, paucity of peer review, unknown rate of error, lack
of general acceptance in the orthopedic community" and, as such,
"her unique opinions ... w[ere] created merely for purposes of
testifying."24 The trial justice allowed Dr. Raggio's testimony in
based on her "superb credentials in the field," as well as his
interpretation of her testimony as applying "known scientific
principles of bone development" and not junk science. 25
In analyzing the trial justice's decision, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court applied the now familiar Daubert26 analysis, as
embodied in the language of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 27 in which the trial justice is viewed as a "gatekeeper" to
"ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted
is not only relevant, but [also] reliable."28 In such an analysis,
when a party is introducing potentially "novel" expert testimony,
the expert's testimony may only be admitted if the testimony will
be "scientific knowledge that ... will assist the trier of fact."29
23. Id.at 682-86.
24. Id. at 682-83.
25. Id. at 683.
26. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
27. FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating that: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of fact
or opinion.")
28. 877 A.2d at 683 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)).
29. Id. (quoting Dipetrillo v. Dow Chem. Co., 729 A.2d at 677, 687 (R.I.
1999)).
SURVEY SECTION
In reviewing the trial court's analysis, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court focused on the trial justice's findings as to Dr.
Raggio's credentials and the methodology that Dr. Raggio utilized
in forming her opinion as to Mackenzie's condition.30 The court
noted that a trial justice is not expected to become an expert
himself or herself as to the substance of the scientific area being
testified about, and need not focus on the expert's conclusions,
"but rather, whether the reasoning used in forming the expert
conclusion was sound."31 Additionally, in satisfying the Daubert
standard, the court found that Dr. Raggio's testimony would aid
the trier of fact (in this case, the trial court justice) in its analysis
and that the trial court justice did not abuse his discretion in
admitting the testimony as relevant.32
Dismissal of the Abuse Petition
In its appeal, DCYF also alleged that the trial justice erred in
dismissing the prior abuse petition, in light of the parents' newly
admitted testimony by Dr. Raggio. 33 DCYF claimed that Dr.
Raggio's diagnosis of Mackenzie as having Ehlers-Danlos
Syndrome (and her feeling that this was the causation of
Mackenzie's many fractures, rather than parental abuse) was not
supported by the evidence, and as such, the trial justice erred in
reversing his prior determination of abuse. 34
In examining the trial court's reversal and subsequent
dismissal of the prior abuse petition, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court focused on the lower court's original finding that there was
"no direct evidence of abuse on the part of the parents ... [but
that instead a permissible inference could be made that] the
parents had inflicted or allowed to be inflicted upon the child,
physical injury" and that "it is possible that in five years or so, any
difficulties may be resolved to the satisfaction of the entire
scientific-medical community."35  Indeed, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court noted, this appears to have been just the case, as
30. Id. at 684.
31. Id.
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four years later, with the emergence of Dr. Raggio's testimony, it
appeared that the child was suffering from "Ehlers-Danlos type
syndrome" and that this syndrome, rather than parental abuse,
was the cause (with other medical conditions) of the child's many
fractures. 36
Consequently, due to both the newly admitted expert
testimony and the lack of any direct physical evidence of abuse by
the parents, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's reversal of the earlier finding of abuse, and the lower
court's subsequent dismissal of the abuse petition altogether, as
DCYF failed to meet its evidentiary burden with clear and
convincing evidence. 37
COMMENTARY
From the time of the original ex parte order of detention by
the trial justice (December 25, 1998), until the time of the final
issuance of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's opinion (July 18,
2005), Mackenzie and her parents indeed embarked on what
turned out to be "a complex, Dickensian, procedural journey"38
that can only have created tremendous stress, turmoil, and
destruction to each of them as individuals and as a family unit.
Understanding that newly acquired medical knowledge and
technology are facts of life in an ever-changing information
landscape, it nonetheless seems unacceptable that this family
could not have found legal closure earlier (by one means or
another) and been allowed to get back on the path to reunification
and eventual healing. If nothing else, the history of Mackenzie's
case serves as a commentary on the entire child welfare and social
services structure within the state. The fact that the original trial
justice in this case did reconsider at all his own earlier finding of
abuse with the newly admitted evidence, is evidence that even in
the most difficult of cases, there is hope of progress.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a trial justice's
admission of newly discovered expert testimony as to a child's
36. Id. at 685-86.
37. Id. at 686.
38. Id. at 676.
SURVEY SECTION
medical condition was not in error and that the trial justice's
reconsideration and dismissal of the abuse petition was, based on
this new evidence of the child's Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome,
proper.39
Esme Noelle DeVault
39. Id. at 685-86.
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Property Law. Palazzolo v. State, No. 88-0297, 2005 WL
1645974 (R.I. Super. July 5, 2005). "Constitutional law does not
require the state to guarantee a bad investment."' Nor does a
regulatory taking occur where the background principles of public
nuisance or the public trust doctrine act to limit the plaintiffs
property rights. Where the plaintiffs "bundle of rights" do not
provide for the proposed use of the property, any regulation
proscribing that use does not result in a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Anthony Palazzolo, first acquired an interest in
the subject property in 1959.2 The site consisted of eighteen acres
of land south of Winnapaug Pond, "a tidal, salt water pond" in
Westerly, Rhode Island.3 Immediately after having acquired an
interest in the site, Palazzolo sold six lots located on the more
upland portions of the site.4 Approximately one half of the
remaining site lies below mean high water (MHW). 5  Soil
conditions make the majority of the site challenging for home
construction. 6  With the exception of an upland area,
redevelopment of much of the site would require significant
excavation of existing soils and "as much as six feet of fill." 7
Although several homes in the area have been constructed on
filled wetlands, filling has not generally occurred in any area of
the salt marsh.8 In addition to a valuable habitat for wildlife, the
salt marsh has an "amenity value" to the property owners in the





5. Id. The court accepted a survey filed with the court "as substantial
scientific evidence as to the location of the mean high water (MHW) mark in
1986," the year of the alleged taking. Id. at *2 n.16.
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area and the community. 9
On several occasions since the 1960s Palazzolo has sought
permission to fill his site for redevelopment.10 In 1985, Palazzolo
applied to the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management
Council (CRMC) to fill his site for construction of a beach facility.11
Palazollo claimed the date that application was denied, March 3,
1986, as the date his property was taken.12 Following a 1997
bench trial, the Superior Court held there was no taking on the
grounds that the regulations prohibiting development of the site
were in effect prior to Palazzolo's acquiring an interest in the
land.13 Because the regulations had been in effect at the time, the
court reasoned that Palazzolo "could not have had [any]
reasonable investment-backed expectations." 14 In addition, the
court held that Palazzolo had not been denied all beneficial use of
his property where the state would allow the development of one
lot valued at approximately $200,000.15 The trial court also found
that Palazzolo's development vision would constitute a public
nuisance, thus barring any compensation. 16
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the lower court
decision on the basis that the appeal was not ripe because
Palazzolo had never properly submitted a development application
to the CRMC.17 In 2001, the United States Supreme Court
reversed that decision, holding the case was ripe and remanded
the case for a Penn Central1s analysis. 19 The U.S. Supreme Court
also affirmed the conclusion that the regulations did not deprive
Palazzolo of all economic use of his property because "the value of
the upland portions [was] substantial."20 On June 24, 2002, the
9. Id. at *3.
10. Id. at *1 n.2. A 1960s application to fill his site with dredge
materials from Winnapaug Pond was followed by another application to fill
the site in 1983 and again in 1985. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.




17. Id. (citing Palazzolo v. R.I., 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000)).
18. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
19. See generally Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
20. Palazzolo v. State, 2005 WL 1645974 at *11 n.70 (quoting Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001)).
SURVEY SECTION
Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded the case to the Superior
Court. 21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On remand, the plaintiff disputed the precision of a survey
establishing the high water mark and argued that he could
economically develop his property. 22 Palazzolo further disputed
the classification of Winnapaug Pond as a tidal pond subject to the
public trust doctrine.23 The state, citing law of the case, countered
that, consistent with the court's conclusion at the first trial, the
development constitutes a public nuisance and thus bars a takings
claim. 24 Furthermore, the state argued that the public trust
doctrine precluded the economic development of Palazzolo's site
because nearly one-half of the site sat below the mean high water
mark and such portion did not belong to Palazzolo to develop. 25
Public and Private Nuisance
The Superior Court found Palazzolo's development plan
constituted a public nuisance at the first trial in 1997.26 Thus it
was within the court's discretion to let the prior ruling stand
under the law of the case.2 7 However, because significant new
evidence was introduced, the court reconsidered the state's claim
of nuisance. 28
Actionable nuisances fall into two classifications: public and
private. A private nuisance involves an interference with the use
and enjoyment of land. It involves a material interference with
the ordinary physical comfort or the reasonable use of one's
21. Id. at *1. "[Aldditional evidence was taken over eleven days to
augment the 1997 trial record" and a tidal survey was filed with the court. Id.




26. Id. (citing Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000) (affirming the
lower court's decision)).
27. Id. at *3-*4. The law of the case provides "that ordinarily after a
judge has decided an interlocutory matter in a pending suit, a second judge,
confronted at a subsequent phase of the suit with the same question in the
identical matter, should refrain from disturbing the first ruling." Id. at *4
(quoting State v. Infantolino, 355 A.2d 722, 726 (R.I. 1976)).
28. Id.
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property. A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with
a right common to the general public. It is behavior that
unreasonably interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort or
convenience of the general community. 29
The court found that the proposed development was
"practically certain" to result in "substantial damage" to the
ecology of Winnapaug Pond.30 Thus the court held that, because
clear and convincing evidence demonstrated the development
would constitute a public nuisance, Palazzolo had no right to
develop his site as proposed.31 Without a right to develop the site
as proposed, the state's denial of the same development could not
result in a taking.32
No neighboring property owner brought a claim of private
nuisance. 33 Even had Palazzolo's development been built, the
likely result would have been a non-actionable obstruction of the
neighbor's view.34 Thus, the court held Palazzolo's development
would not constitute a private nuisance. 35
Public Trust Doctrine
Citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,36 the court reiterated the point
that a taking cannot result from a prohibited use that was not
part of the land owner's title and that one's title is subject to
certain background principles such as nuisance and the public
trust doctrine.37 The public trust doctrine provides that land
below the high water mark is held by the state for the benefit of
the public.38 The court accepted the survey filed with the court as
29. Id. (quoting Citizens for Pres. of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d
53, 59 (R.I. 1980) (internal citations omitted)).
30. Id. at *5.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *6. "Historically the law of private nuisance has been applied to
conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land uses." Id. (quoting
Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 957 (R.I. 1994)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
37. Palazzolo, 2005 WL 1645974 at *6.
38. Id. at *7. The public trust doctrine is also incorporated into the Rhode
Island Constitution. Id. (citing R.I. CONST. art 1, §17).
SURVEY SECTION
accurately establishing the mean high water line for 1986 and
thus concluded that fifty percent of Palazzolo's site sat below that
mark.39 The court, also finding Winnapaug Pond a tidal body of
water, concluded that half of Palazzolo's land was subject to the
public trust doctrine.40 Because the doctrine applied to only half
of the site, it could not completely bar Palazzolo's taking claim.41
However, the court reasoned that it had a direct relationship to
his reasonable investment-backed expectations under a Penn
Central analysis.42
Penn Central Analysis
The remand instructed the court to analyze Palazzolo's claim
under the Penn Central test.43 Analysis under Penn Central
includes the following three factors: "(1) the character of
governmental action, (2) the economic impact of the action on the
claimant, and (3) the extent to which the action interfered with
the claimant's reasonable investment-backed expectations."44
Before conducting its analysis, the court concluded that the
relevant parcel under review did not include the six lots that
Palazzolo had sold shortly after he acquired his interest.45 The
regulatory scheme charged with the taking never applied to those
six lots.46
The court quickly addressed the character of the government's
action, along with the plaintiffs argument that he should not have
to bear the burden of this regulation alone.47 The court reasoned
that the restrictions on coastal development have the same impact
on all owners of tidal salt marsh.48 Thus, the regulatory scheme
did not particularly target the plaintiff.49 In addition, the court
reasoned it would be unreasonable to require the government to
39. Id. at *6.
40. Id.
41. Id. at *7.
42. See id.
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compensate property owners for every change in the general law. 50
Thus the character of the government's action here would not
constitute a taking.51
Likewise, the court found the circumstances failed to support
a taking under the second prong of the test.52 Accounting for the
unique costs required to develop this site and the amenity value of
the marsh, the court found Palazzolo's alleged loss of a three-
million dollar profit unreliable.5 3 A "battle of trial experts" ended
with the court accepting the state's presentation of expected
development costs and appraisal values.5 4 However, the court
noted that neither side accounted for the amenity value of the
existing landscape upon which any development would intrude.55
Thus the court found even the state's estimated profit might be
"optimistic."5 6 The court then concluded that Palazzolo would
benefit more financially by selling the property in its undeveloped
state because of the greater value in the upland area of the site
that allowed construction of a single home. 57 Regardless of the
effect of the public trust doctrine on curtailing the size of the
parcel, the court found the potential costs for the development
would result in a loss to the plaintiff.58 Thus the regulations
prohibiting that development could not have an adverse economic
impact on Palazzolo. 59
Pursuant to the remand, the court focused on the third factor
of the Penn Central analysis, Palazzolo's reasonable investment-
backed expectations. 60 Looking at Palazollo's earliest interest in
the land, the court concluded that whatever investment-backed
expectations he held, they were not "realistically achievable." 61 No
similar developments had ever been proposed for the area.62 The
immediate sale of the six "prime" buildable lots left Palazzolo with
50. Id. at *9 n.43 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 627).
51. Id. at *9.
52. Id. at*11.
53. Id. at *9, *10.54. Id. at *10.






61. Id. (emphasis omitted).
62. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
land that was "not readily capable of development."63 The court
pointed out that the original seller of the property had prior real
estate experience, must have known of the challenges to
developing the site, and presumed that these challenges
"undoubtedly weighed heavily in [his] practical decision to sell out
to Palazzolo." 64 Furthermore, because the public nature of land
below the mean high water mark "is an ancient doctrine," the
court found that Palazzolo knew or should have known that any
development would require filling the site which would require
state permission. 65 In fact, the court noted that, as early as 1962,
Palazzolo's application for a filling permit included an
acknowledgment that the filling was "within the public tide
waters of the state."66 Likewise, the court noted the application
forms gave notice of the state's regulation of tidewaters. 67 "Rhode
Island law regulated tidewaters and the filling of nearby flats as
early as 1876."68
The court then considered Greater Providence Chamber of
Commerce v. Rhode Island69 where the Rhode Island Supreme
Court issued guidance regarding parcels subject to the public trust
doctrine. 70 That guidance indicated that a coastal land owner
could establish free and clear title to land that is partially below
mean high water if the owner fills the land with the "acquiescence
or the express or implied approval of the state and improves upon
the land in justifiable reliance on the approval."71 Here, the
numerous denials of Palazzolo's requests for permits to fill his
land along with the fact the he had made no effort to improve the
land in reliance on any state action or acquiescence, negated the
possibility that he had established title to the land. 72 In short,
"[p]laintiff's title is clearly subject to the public trust doctrine."73
63. Id. at *12 n.73.
64. Id. at *12.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *12 n.75.
67. Id. at *14 n.78.
68. Id.
69. 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995).
70. Palazzolo, 2005 WL 1645974 at *13.
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Given the state's historical role in regulating the filling of
tidal waters, the public trust doctrine, the transfer of the prime
lots at the time of his investment, and the difficulties in
developing the site, the court found that "Palazzolo's reasonable
investment-backed expectations were modest."74
COMMENTARY
The opinion's conclusion is soundly rooted in the background
principles of nuisance. Nevertheless, the takings analysis raises a
few questions. For one, the court's totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis of Palazzolo's investment-backed expectations includes
evidence of his business associate's decision to sell to Palazzolo. Is
it reasonable to impute the business associate's real estate
experience and judgment to the plaintiff as an element in
determining the plaintiffs reasonable expectations? Is it also
reasonable to assign knowledge of the public trust doctrine's
application to land below the high water mark, as determined in
1986, when the investment-backed expectations are measured at
the time of his acquisition in 1959? Is an understanding of the
effect of the "ancient doctrine" of public trust on the bundle of
property rights, particularly the distinction between state
regulations and sovereign title, a reasonable element of the
average citizen's investment-backed expectations?
Notwithstanding these questions, the court's analysis reminds
us of a clear and simple threshold in takings analysis that often
gets overlooked by issues of compensation and, more recently, a
renewed interest in defining public use. The Fifth Amendment's
bar against taking private property without just compensation 75
applies to private property. The state cannot be charged with
taking a property interest that it already owns. Given Rhode
Island's extensive coastline, the market interest in waterfront
property and the state's legitimate interests in managing its
resources through coastal regulation will inevitably conflict. The
strength of the background principles in nuisance and the public
trust doctrine establish a solid foundation to resolve those
conflicts by defining property rights at the outset.
74. Id. at *14.
75. See U.S. CONST., amend. V.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Superior Court held that given the
circumstances presented in this case, the proposed development
would constitute a public nuisance and thus preclude any takings
claim.76 Regardless of that finding, the public trust doctrine
proscribed the plaintiffs development of one-half of the site.77 As
to the remaining land available for development, the court found
that the regulations did have an adverse economic impact where
the unique costs made development unprofitable.78 Furthermore,
a reasonable person would have recognized the problematic
character of the site, thus the plaintiff could have little or no
reasonable investment-backed expectations to develop the site as
proposed.79 Most directly, the plaintiffs "title did not include a
property right to develop the parcel as he proposed."80
Colin M. McNiece
76. See Palazzolo, 2005 WL 1645974 at *4-*5.
77. Id. at *6-*7.
78. Id. at *9-*11.
79. Id. at *12.
80. Id. at *15.
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State Affairs and Government. Tanner v. Town Council of
East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784 (R.I. 2005). Local citizens possess
standing to bring actions against public bodies under the Open
Meetings Act when a public notice hinders their right to be
informed of agenda items at public meetings. Remedial public
notice, in compliance with the Open Meetings Act, does not render
a case moot; the issue of the first violation remains justiciable.
Whether a violation of the Open Meetings Act has indeed occurred
is judged according to a "totality of the circumstances" standard,
taking into account how the public would perceive the notice as
compared to what actually occurred at the meeting. Finally,
attorney's fees, a mandatory award for successful plaintiffs in
Open Meetings Act suits, must be awarded according to a
standard of "justice and fairness."
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Open Meetings Act (OMA), as enacted by the Rhode
Island Legislature, requires that "public business be performed in
an open and public manner and that the citizens be advised of and
aware of the performance of the public officials and the
deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public
policy,"1 and that a "statement specifying the nature of the
business to be discussed" be provided to the public.2  The
controversy in Tanner v. Town Council of East Greenwich3 arose
from an alleged OMA violation which occurred, on October 19,
2001, when the East Greenwich town council posted a public
notice which was intended to inform local citizens of an October
23, 2001, town council meeting.4 In an attempt to comply with the
OMA, the public notice stated that, at the October 23, 2001
meeting, the agenda would include "Interviews for Potential
Board and Commission Appointments" to the town zoning and
1. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-1 (2000).
2. R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-46-6(b) (2000).
3. Tanner v. Town Council of E. Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 789 (R.I.
2005).
4. Id.
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planning boards.5 At the meeting, however, the town council not
only interviewed the potential appointees but also proceeded to
vote on them, selecting three of the siX. 6 Later, Frederick S.
Tanner decided to file a complaint against the town council,
claiming that it had violated the OMA, because it had not
provided proper notice in advance of the council's decision to vote. 7
On November 14, 2001, Mr. Tanner informed the town council
that he would bring suit against the town for failing to provide a
sufficient "statement specifying the nature" of what was actually
to occur at the October 23, 2001 meeting.8
In the face of Mr. Tanner's challenge, the town council posted
a second notice, regarding a November 19, 2001 meeting, which
would have on its agenda "Boards and Commissions
Appointments."9  During, that second meeting, however, the
council would refrain from the voting issue and instead schedule a
third meeting for November 26, 2001, at which time the council
would address the issue.'0 The council again posted a notice
which clearly indicated that a future vote would take place on the
board appointments." On November 26, 2001, the board
reaffirmed the three appointments previously made on October 23,
2001.12 Mr. Tanner did not challenge the November 26, 2001
appointments, but maintained that the violation of the OMA at
the October 23, 2001 meeting must be remedied. 13
In his complaint, Mr. Tanner moved for summary judgment
and an award of three possible remedies available under the
OMA: a civil fine, attorney's fees, and an injunction. 4 The
hearing justice granted summary judgment to Mr. Tanner, ,finding
that the notice led the public to believe that only interviews, and
not a vote on the appointments, would take place at the October




8. Id. at 789-90.




13. Id. at 789 n.3, 790.
14. Id. at 789-90.
15. Id. at 790.
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A later, second phase of the trial would decide Mr. Tanner's
remedy. At that later remedial hearing, the hearing justice
determined that a civil fine could not be imposed on the town
council because Mr. Tanner was unable to establish that the town
council's OMA violation was done "willfully or knowingly." 16 The
hearing justice awarded Mr. Tanner attorney's fees and costs in
the amount of $11,193.89.17 Unless such an award would be
"unjust," the award of attorney's fees is mandatory in instances of
OMA violations.' 8  The hearing justice found no special
circumstance that would render such an award "unjust."19 The
East Greenwich town council appealed the judgment to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, alleging four points of error.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
1. Standing
Mr. Tanner's standing to bring suit against the town council
was the first issue addressed by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court.21 The town council averred on appeal that Mr. Tanner's
status as a resident of East Greenwich did not in itself give him
standing to bring suit and that the alleged OMA violation had not
caused him any harm.22 The court readily noted, however, that
one has standing if a controversy causes "injury in fact" or if one is
granted standing as the "beneficiary of express statutory
authority."23 Mr. Tanner did not claim to suffer, nor did he
attempt to prove, any economic "injury in fact;" therefore, his
standing needed to rest on statutory authority.24 The OMA does
indeed grant standing to any "citizen or entity" who is "aggrieved
as a result of violations" of the OMA.25 Provided Mr. Tanner had
been "aggrieved" by the actions of the town council on October 23,
16. Id. at 791.
17. Id. at 790.
18. Id. at 800 (citing Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council, 774 A.2d 820,
825 (R.I. 2001)).
19. See id. at 790.
20. Id. at 791.
21. Id. at 792.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id. 792-93.
25. Id. at 792 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-8(a) (2000)).
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2001, he would possess the requisite standing.26
The term "aggrieved," however, is an ambiguous term; the
court noted that the legislature did not provide the term a
discernable definition.27 It would therefore be up to the court to
assign the term an interpretation not at odds with the legislative
purpose behind the statute. 28 By the language of the statute, the
court determined that the OMA served to protect a public right.29
The court stated that the OMA was not intended to protect the
"property or contract rights" of local citizens, but rather serves to
guarantee the right to be properly informed of the "performance,
deliberations, and decisions of government entities."30 Thus, any
act which hinders this right will cause a citizen to be
"aggrieved."31
Importantly, the court, drawing on precedent, made it clear
that one need not have had a "personal stake" in the agenda of a
public meeting to acquire standing under the OMA; the court cited
Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council,32 in which the court
determined that a citizen did not require a "personal stake" in the
"substance of the meeting to assert a right to attend a meeting of a
public body."33 As a consequence of the rule laid down in Solas,
the Tanner court determined that, in addition to a right to attend
a public meeting, one does not need a "personal stake" in the
business of a particular meeting to assert the right to properly be
"advised of the business to be conducted" at such a meeting.34
Improper notice, however, need not cause a plaintiff to miss a
public meeting to acquire standing; the court previously
determined that if a citizen did attend a meeting, but improper
26. See id.
27. Id. at 792.
28. Id. at 792-93.
29. Id. at 793. Reference to protection of a public right is found in the
statutory language of the OMA, which states that: "public business [is] to be
performed in an open and public manner" so that citizens can be "advised of
and aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and
decisions that go into the making of public policy." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-1
(2000).
30. 880 A.2d 793.
31. See id.
32. 774 A.2d 820 (R.I. 2001).




notice caused him to be "disadvantaged" or experience a "lack of
preparation or inability to respond to an issue," that citizen would
also be "aggrieved" under the OMA.35 Therefore, Mr. Tanner
possessed the requisite standing to bring his action against the
town council because, as a local citizen, he was able to allege that
the notice left him unaware of any intention by the council to vote
on the appointments and would leave him unprepared to respond
to such action.36
2. Mootness
The defendant town council's second point of error was the
issue of mootness.3 7 Because the council had, on November 19,
2001, posted notice for another meeting where "Boards and
Commission Appointments" would be on the agenda, they claimed
that any controversy raised by the October 23, 2001 meeting was
moot.38 In other words, concerned citizens would be able, at this
second meeting, to voice opinions on the appointments to the
zoning board, remedying any perceived inconvenience posed by
the first meeting.39 The court, however, found Mr. Tanner's
argument stronger.40
Mr. Tanner argued that the case could not be dismissed for
mootness because the matter was of "extreme public importance"
and "capable of repetition."41 Moreover, because the town council
had not, throughout the litigation, made any admission that its
October 23, 2001, behavior was at all improper, he argued that the
council intended to "engage in similar conduct in the future."42
Mr. Tanner also argued that, without a judgment in his favor,
public bodies subject to the OMA could give improper notice of
meetings, only to comply when challenged, thereby avoiding an
"adverse judgment."43
35. Id. (citing Graziano v. R.I. State Lottery Comm'n, 810 A.2d 215, 222
(R.I. 2002)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 793-94.
38. Id. at 789, 793-94.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 795.
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The court also made clear that just because one statutory
remedy has been rendered moot, the "viability of the case or the
remaining remedies" will not be affected.4 4 The OMA provides for
several possible remedies: injunctive relief, a civil fine of $5,000,
attorney's fees, or any combination of the three.4 5 The November
26, 2001 meeting effectively rendered any claim to injunctive relief
moot. 46 However, the possibility of attorney's fees or a civil fine, in
the event the court found the town council to have violated the
OMA, were still issues to be resolved and therefore justiciable. 47
3. The Open Meetings Act Violation
Whether the town council had in fact violated the OMA
required judicial interpretation of a certain portion of the statute
itself.48 Both of the parties differed on what was required by the
OMA mandate that notice of a public meeting necessitated a
"statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed."49
The town council, relying on the findings of the Attorney General,
averred that the OMA should be strictly construed to require only
the "nature" of any business conducted at a public meeting and
not an explicit mention of any intention to vote.50 Thus, the notice
posted prior to the October 23, 2001 meeting, which stated that
"Interviews for Potential Board and Commission Appointments,"
was the agenda, should have constituted a sufficient
"statement."51 Mr. Tanner, on the other hand, argued that the
posting was insufficient because more than the agenda item it
mentioned - interviews - took place.52 Therefore, the question of
what, exactly, was required by the term "statement" became the
central issue in determining the outcome of the case.53
The court noted that ambiguous statutory language, such as
the phrase "statement specifying the nature of the business to be
discussed," requires that the court not simply insert its own
44. Id. at 794-95.
45. Id. at 794 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-46-8(d) (2000)).
46. See id. at 795.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 795-96.
49. Id. at 795 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-46-6(b)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 789, 795.
52. Id. at 795.
53. Id. at 796.
SURVEY SECTION
interpretation; rather, the court must "glean the intent and
purpose of the Legislature" 54 and devise an interpretation
"consistent" with the Legislature's "policies or obvious purposes."55
Therefore, the Tanner court first determined the overall purpose
of the OMA before it attached any judicial interpretation to the
Act's language. 56
The "explicit purpose" the court found in the OMA was clear:
"[P]ublic business [must] be performed in an open and public
manner and that the citizens be advised of and aware of the
performance of public officials and the deliberations and decisions
that go into the making of public policy."57 To the court, this
section of the OMA was intended to give the public "greater
opportunity" to gain access to "issues of public importance," so
that the public can engage itself in "meaningful participation in
the decision-making process."58
With this central purpose of the OMA in mind, the court
determined that the legislature intended to provide the courts
with a "flexible standard" regarding what was required of the
requisite "statement specifying the nature of the business to be
discussed."59 The court consulted the jurisprudence of two sister
states confronted with a similar problem.60 The Supreme Courts
of both Colorado and Tennessee resolved the issue by establishing
a "totality of the circumstances standard."6' So too would the
Tanner Court.6 2  Understanding the balance between
"safeguarding the public's interest" and the "realities of local
government," the court declined to provide "'magic words" or
"specific guidelines" under the OMA requirement of public
notice.63 Instead, the court held that to comply with the OMA,
54. Id. (quoting Motola v. Cirello, 789 A.2d 421, 423 (R.I. 2002)).
55. Id. (quoting Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 850
A.2d 912, 923 (R.I. 2004)).
56. See id.




61. Id. at 796-97 (citing Memphis Pub. Co. v. City of Memphis, 513
S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tenn. 1974); Benson v. McCormick, 578 P.2d 651,653 (Colo.
1978)).
62. Id. at 797-99.
63. Id. at 797.
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public bodies must provide "fair notice" to the public in a manner
that would, under the "totality of the circumstances," "fairly
inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or
acted upon."64
Applying this "totality of the circumstances" standard to the
present case, the court found that the town council had not met
this standard. 65 The court stated that a notice which declares that
a meeting's agenda is to conduct "Interviews for Potential Board
and Commission Appointments" neither "states nor implies" that
any voting on these potential board members would occur.66 The
court referred to the dictionary definition of the word "interview"
and found the term to indicate only a "formal meeting ... in which
facts or statements are elicited from another."67 Relying on the
posted notice, a member of the public could not reasonably have
foreseen that, after these interviews, the council would vote on the
potential candidates. 68  Therefore, under the "totality of the
circumstances," it could not be held that the town council had
sufficiently provided a "statement specifying the nature of the
business to be discussed," because the council proceeded to make
decisions of importance beyond that included in the public notice.
However, the court determined that because of the ambiguous
statutory language, the town council's violation could not be
construed as "willful."69
To be sure, the court stopped short of requiring that all
decisions to vote at public meetings must be signaled in the
requisite public notice.70 The town council's violation lay in the
fact that its notice, describing interviews without mentioning an
intention to vote, was "misleading."71
4. Attorney's Fees
The town council's final point of error was the issue of
64. Id.
65. Id. at 798.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 798 n.17 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 916
(4th ed. 2000)).
68. Id. at 798.




attorney's fees. 72 The $11,193.89 awarded to the plaintiff by the
hearing justice was, in the town council's view, "unjust" due to
"special circumstances."73 The "special circumstanc[e]" argued by
the town council on appeal was that it should not be penalized for
acting in accordance with the findings of the Attorney General,
which stated that the intention to vote was not required on the
notice.74  However, even the Attorney General's findings
mentioned that the notice could not be "misleading."75 Under the
"totality of the circumstances," the court had already determined
that the town council's notice was in fact "misleading."76
The Tanner court noted that attorney's fees are mandatory
when an OMA violation has occurred, but that the legislature
granted the courts "a great deal of discretion" in determining the
amount of these fees.77 The purpose of the award was to "provide
an economic incentive to challenge violations of the OMA, deter
future violations, and penalize public bodies for noncompliance
with the act."78 The court held, however, that the "great deal of
discretion" the Legislature had provided the courts in determining
such an award, requires that the courts consider "the myriad of
circumstances" surrounding issues of public notice and the "tenets
of justice and fairness."79 Therefore, in addition to the burden
placed on the defendant to show "special circumstances," the court
must make certain that the award is "proportional to the breach
and the effect thereof."8 0
On the issue of attorney's fees, the Tanner court diverged with
the determinations of the hearing justice. Employing the "abuse
of discretion standard," the court concluded that the hearing
justice had only considered the fact that the council relied on the
opinions of the Attorney General as a "special circumstance" to
warrant mitigation of attorney's fees. 8' The Tanner court agreed





77. Id. at 800.
78. Id. at 794 n.10 (citing N.A.S. Imp., Corp. v. Chenson Enter., Inc., 968
F.2d 250, 254 (2d Cir. 1992)).
79. Id. at 800 (citing Edwards v. State, 677 A.2d 1347, 1349 (R.I. 1996)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 801.
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with the hearing justice's findings that such reliance on the
Attorney General's findings would not meet the standard of
"special circumstances," but that the greater issue of applying the
"inherent tenets of justice and fairness" remained.8 2 According to
the record, there was no indication that the hearing justice had
attempted to employ such standards to ensure that the remedy
was "proportional to the breach and effect thereof."83
Rather than remanding the case with instructions for the
hearing justice to consider the "tenets of justice and fairness," the
Tanner court determined, according to the full record before it,
that the award issue could be adjudicated on appeal.8 4 Adhering
to the standard of "justice and fairness," the court looked
favorably upon the actions that the town council had taken when
it later provided proper notice for the November 26, 2001,
meeting.8 5 In the court's view, the town council should not be
"further penalized when it [has taken] appropriate corrective
measures."8 6 Establishing that the council's October 23, 2001,
actions were not willful, that the statutory language was, at the
time, relatively unclear, and that the council acted to correct its
initial violation, the court reduced the award of attorney's fees to
$1,500.87
COMMENTARY
In a 1996 article, Professor B. Mitchell Simpson expressed
concern that the Rhode Island Supreme Court had "yet to rule on
many important points" regarding the OMA - points which had
already been decided upon by "other state supreme courts and the
United States Supreme Court."8 8 Chief among Simpson's concerns
was that the lack of Rhode Island Supreme Court guidance left
public bodies with only the advisory opinions of the Attorney
General when attempting to understand the OMA.89 Such a state




85. Id. at 802.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. B. Mitchell Simpson, III, The Open Meetings Law: Friend and Foe, 45
R.I. BAR J. 7, 8 (Oct. 1996).
89. Id.
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mentioned above, the East Greenwich town council relied on the
findings of the Attorney General.90 This finding supported an
interpretation that public notice under the OMA did not require
information about any vote that would take place at a public
meeting, provided the notice was not misleading.91 Without a
Rhode Island Supreme Court decision controlling the matter, it is
understandable that different parties would have different
interpretations of the OMA. Fortunately, Tanner provides greater
guidance by lending a degree of clarification on certain key
elements of the OMA.
On the issue of standing, the court's interpretation of the term
"aggrieved" was effectively a decision for the people. The court's
broad interpretation of the term enables a concerned citizen to
readily challenge those who violate this public right. However,
the court was careful to err on the side of political reality when it
determined that the requirements of public notice shall be subject
to a "totality of the circumstances" standard.92 Without such
consideration, the broad grant of standing would cause public
bodies to be liable for even the most questionable violations. This
end is also served by the obligation that the court imposed on the
lower courts to consider the "tenets of justice and fairness" when
determining the mandatory award of attorney's fees.93 Rather
than simply granting the maximum amount in all cases of OMA
violations, the court ensured that the character of the violation
itself and any corrective measures taken by the public body would
be weighed against the harm done to the plaintiff.
Fortunately, Tanner provides greater guidance to the lower
courts on several key provisions of the OMA. However, the court's
response created a flexible standard and therefore may leave room
for different understandings of related issues. The court's decision
in Tanner was a much-needed step towards the clarification of key
OMA provisions.
CONCLUSION
In all, Tanner established a broad interpretation as to who
90. Tanner, 880 A.2d at 795.
91. Id. at 784.
92. Id. at 797.
93. Id. at 801.
2006]
912 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.11:901
has standing to bring a claim alleging an OMA violation.
However, due to a realistic understanding of the function of public
bodies, the court refrained from providing an exact requirement
for what actually constitutes an OMA violation. The "totality of
the circumstances" standard sheds greater light on how a court
should determine whether a violation has occurred; but,
inevitably, this standard will ensure that differences of opinion
will arise from time to time as to whether a public body has indeed
violated the OMA.
Kevin Rolando
Tort Law. Esposito v. O'Hair, 886 A.2d 1197 (R.I. 2005).
The common law collateral source rule is a well-established
principle of Rhode Island law. Absent a statutory provision to the
contrary, the collateral source rule prevents defendants in tort
actions from reducing their liability by presenting evidence that
the injured party received compensation for injuries from a source
wholly independent of the tortfeasor. Rhode Island General Law §
9-19-34.1, which abrogates the common law collateral source rule,
details a list of collateral sources, including payments from any
"state income disability" act, that are admissible in malpractice
actions to reduce a plaintiffs damages. Medicaid is not a "state
income disability" act and thus is not an admissible collateral
source payment under § 9-19-34.1.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In March of 2001, the plaintiff, Marion Thomson, filed suit
against Atmed Treatment Center, Inc., Hani Zaki, M.D., Inc., and
three individual physicians: James P. O'Hair, Daniel Regan, and
Hani Zaki. 1 Thomson alleged that the defendants were negligent
when they failed to diagnose her with Hodgkins Lymphoma;
subsequently, on March 15, 2003, Thomson died from Hodgkins
Lymphoma. 2 After Thomson's death, her complaint was amended
to substitute Maria Esposito, executrix of Thomson's estate, as
plaintiff in the action.3 Additionally, Dr. Zaki's insurer, the
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode
Island (MMJUA) was added as a defendant. 4 In September of
2003, the parties reached a settlement agreement wherein
$440,000.00 was paid to the decedent's estate, while an additional
sum of $381,689.26, the cost of decedent's medical expenses, was
1. Esposito v. O'Hair, 886 A.2d 1197, 1198 (R.I. 2005).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1198 n.1 (citing R.I. GEN. LAwS § 27-7-2 (2002) (prohibiting a
plaintiff from bringing a direct action against an insurer while the insured
defendant is alive; Dr. Zaki passed away after the initial complaint was
filed)).
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set aside.5
The defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of
law, contending that the plaintiffs estate was not entitled to
recover medical expenses because they had been paid by Rhode
Island's Medicaid program.6 The defendants contended that
under Rhode Island General Law § 9-19-34.1, plaintiffs recovery
of medical expenses must be reduced by collateral source
payments made pursuant to a "state income disability" act.7
Plaintiff filed a cross motion, contending that Medicaid
benefits were not a "state income disability" act under § 9-19-34.1,
and as such, defendants were liable to the plaintiff estate for
Thomson's medical expenses.8 Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed
that, even if Medicaid payments were an admissible collateral
source under § 9-19-34.1, the statute would be preempted by
federal law, and thus would be unconstitutional. 9
In April of 2004, the court entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.10 The court reasoned that § 9-19-34.1 must be strictly
construed, as it abrogates the common law collateral source rule
in that it allows defendants to offset their liability by presenting
evidence that a third party paid the plaintiffs medical expenses."
The court found that Medicaid was not a state income disability
act within the meaning of § 9-19-34.1 because it does not
compensate individuals for lost income, and disability is not a
prerequisite to establishing eligibility for Medicaid benefits. 12
Because the court agreed with the plaintiff that Medicaid benefits
were not an admissible collateral source under § 9-19-34.1, it
declined to address the two constitutional arguments that were
raised.1 3 The defendants subsequently appealed. 4
5. Id. at 1198.
6. Id.
7. Id. (citing R.I. GEN LAws § 9-19-34.1 (2000)).
8. Id. Because there were no disputed issues of fact and the parties had
agreed as to the amount of damages, the motion justice applied a summary
judgment standard to the parties' motions. Id. at 1198 n.3.
9. Id. at 1198.







In 1976, as a result of the increasing concerns over the limited
availability and increasing cost of medical malpractice insurance
premiums, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted the
Medical Malpractice Reform Act.15 During that same legislative
session, the General Assembly also enacted Rhode Island General
Law § 42-14.1-1, authorizing the creation of the MMJUA.16 The
MMJUA provision was enacted to "stabilize the cost of medical
malpractice insurance by pooling expenses and losses in insurance
coverage." 17 The enactment of the Medical Malpractice Reform
Act also included the creation of a collateral source statute codified
as Rhode Island General Law § 9-19-34.' Prior to this legislation,
if an injured party received compensation for injuries from a
source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment could
not be deducted from the damages that the plaintiff would
otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.' 9 Section 9-19-34 effectively
abrogated the common law collateral source rule by making
collateral source benefits received by a plaintiff admissible in
medical malpractice actions against physicians. 20 As originally
enacted, the Rhode Island collateral source provision identified a
list of admissible collateral sources. 2' Among the list of admissible
collateral source benefits were payments received from "any state
or federal income disability or workers' compensation act."22
However, by 1986, concerns over the rising cost of medical
malpractice insurance had not subsided, and the MMJUA
experienced an accelerated negative financial position resulting in
a fund deficit; in response to these concerns, the legislature took
further action, passing An Act Relating to Malpractice.23 Similar
to the 1976 Act, the 1986 Act also included a collateral source
statute, Rhode Island General Law § 9-19-34.1.24 The newly
15. Id. (citing 1976 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 244).
16. Id. at 1200 (citing 1976 R.I. Pub. Laws ch.1).





21. Id. (quoting R.I GEN. LAws § 9-19-34 (1983)).
22. Id. (quoting R.I GEN. LAws § 9-19-34 (1983)).
23. Id. (citing 1986 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 350)
24. Id. at 1201.
2006] 915
916 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.11:913
enacted collateral source statute, which extended its coverage to
include the professional malpractice of dentists and dental
hygienists, applied only to medical malpractice actions occurring
after January 1, 1987.25 The new statute was markedly similar to
its predecessor; the only modification relevant to Esposito was
that the General Assembly removed reference to payments made
pursuant to "federal" income disability or workers' compensation
acts. 26  The relevant statutory language now reads: "[Tihe
defendant may introduce evidence of any amount payable as a
benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the personal injury pursuant
to any state income disability or workers compensation act. ..."27
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the defendants contended that § 9-19-34.1 was a
"remedial statute that should have been construed liberally to
include Medicaid payments."28 Defendants claimed that the
proposed construction of the collateral source statute is most
consistent with the legislature's goal of stabilizing the cost of
medical malpractice insurance premiums. 29  Furthermore,
defendants contended that Medicaid is an "income disability act"
within the meaning of § 9-19-34.1 because a person must become
"income disabled" to be eligible for benefits.30
Conversely, the plaintiff contended that the court should
strictly construe § 9-19-34.1 because it effectively abrogates the
common law collateral source rule.31 In support of this position,
the plaintiff noted that other jurisdictions have strictly construed
collateral source statutes that limit a plaintiffs recovery.32
"[Plaintiff] contend[ed] that these cases [were] consistent with this
Court's well established rule that statutes that abrogate the
common law must be strictly construed."33 The court agreed with
25. Id. (citing R.I GEN. LAws § 9-19-34.1 (1986)).
26. Id.
27. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-34.1 (1997).
28. 886 A.2d at 1199.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1204.
31. Id. at 1202.
32. Id. at 1202-03 (citing Jones v. Kramer, A.2d 170, 177-78 (Conn.
2004); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 761 So.2d 289, 293 (Fla. 2000); Oden v.
Chemung County Indus. Dev. Agency, N.E.2d 142, 144 (N.Y. 1995)).
33. Id. at 1203 (citing Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, 867 A.2d
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the plaintiff and held that Medicaid was not an admissible
collateral source payment under section 9-19-34.1. 34 In arriving at
its decision, the Esposito court considered the defendant's two
principal contentions: (1) that § 9-19-34.1 was a remedial statute
that should have been construed liberally to include Medicaid
payments; 35 and (2), that Medicaid is an income disability act
within the meaning of § 9-19-34.1.36
The court rejected defendant's contention that § 9-19-34.1 was
a remedial statute. 37  The court noted that "it is our view,
however, that a statute is not 'remedial' simply because its goal is
to improve societal woes."38 The court reasoned that if this were
the case, then all statutes would be considered remedial to some
extent.39 The court noted that a remedial statute is "one which
affords a remedy, or improves or facilitates remedies already
existing for the enforcement or rights of redress of wrongs."40 The
court reasoned that § 9-19-34.1 does not fit this definition because,
unlike a remedial statute, §9-19-34.1 narrows the common law
collateral source rule by reducing a plaintiffs recovery.4 1
Moreover, the court noted "whether we apply a strict or
liberal reading to § 9-19-34.1, we are not persuaded that the
legislature intended the term 'income disability act' to describe
this state's Medicaid program."42 The court reasoned that,
although some Medicaid recipients are disabled, Medicaid could
not be defined as an "income disability" act because many
Medicaid recipients are not disabled, such as those who are aged
sixty-five or older.43 Furthermore, the court noted that some
individuals who are disabled might not qualify for Medicaid
benefits if their incomes exceed a certain amount; thus "disability
is not the lynchpin to the receipt of Medicaid."44 Moreover, the
796, 803 (R.I. 2005)).
34. Id. at 1204.
35. Id. at 1199.
36. Id. at 1204.
37. Id. at 1203.
38. Id. (citing Ayers-Shaffner v. Solomon, 461 A.2d 396, 399 (R.I. 1983)).
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Ayers-Shaffner, 461 A.2d at 399).
41. Id. at 1203.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1203-04 (citing R.I. GEN LAws § 40-8-3 (1997)).
44. Id. at 1204.
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court found that individuals receiving Medicaid benefits do not
actually receive income under the program; the court noted that
payments are made directly to medical care providers.45
Ultimately, the court found that Medicaid is not a "sate income
disability" act under § 9-19-34.1 because, "even though some
Medicaid recipients may be disabled, these individuals do not
receive income under the program."46 Finally, the court noted that
"our holding that Medicaid is not an admissible collateral source
payment under § 9-19-34.1 renders it unnecessary for us to
address whether the statute is preempted by federal law or is
otherwise unconstitutional."47
COMMENTARY
Some observers may find the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
decision in Esposito as unjust in that it grants a windfall to the
plaintiffs estate by allowing the estate to gain at the taxpayers'
expense. An argument can be made that such a result is
inequitable in that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action who
is ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits, and instead secures
health coverage from a private insurer, will receive less
compensation than a Medicaid beneficiary because benefits
received from a private insurance company will be admissible to
offset the defendant's liability, unlike benefits received pursuant
to Medicaid. Even though the practical effect of the court's
decision may appear inequitable, it would be even more unjust to
relieve private tortfeasors and their insurers from liability at the
taxpayers' expense. While it seems more just in this case that the
plaintiff received the windfall rather than the defendants, neither
result is equitable. Perhaps Rhode Island General Law § 9-19-
34.1 should be amended so that all plaintiffs proceeding in a
medical malpractice action will be entitled to the same amount of
recovery regardless of whether the plaintiffs medical expenses






The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Medicaid is not a
"state income disability" act within the meaning of § 9-19-34.1
and, thus, Medicaid benefits were not an admissible collateral
source to be deducted from an estate's damages.48
Jason Van Volkenburgh
48. Id. at 1204.
2006]

Tort Law. Perrotti v. Gonicberg, 877 A.2d 631 (R.I. 2005). A
pregnant woman cannot recover under a theory of negligent
infliction of emotional distress for mental anguish without
physical symptomatology exceeding the "black cloud" that followed
her around until the child was born. Similarly, a pregnant woman
may not recover under an alternative theory of mental anguish
stemming from her concern for the health of her unborn child,
which was wholly unsupported by medical diagnostics and absent
any physical suffering associated with the pregnancy.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Jamie and Paul Perrotti were in an automobile accident
involving the defendant, Paul Gonicberg, which took place on
December 25, 1998.1 At the time of the accident, Mrs. Perrotti, a
passenger in the vehicle, was approximately six months
pregnant.2 Other occupants included the driver, Mr. Perrotti, and
a backseat passenger, the couple's two-year-old daughter, Ashley.3
Mrs. Perrotti sustained injuries to both her head and knee,
resulting from contact with the windshield and dashboard
respectively. 4 She received medical attention immediately
following the accident.5 Emergency personnel performed an
ultrasound and subsequently informed Mrs. Perrotti that
everything was fine with the baby.6 In addition to her physical
injuries, Mrs. Perrotti testified that she suffered emotional
injuries including being shaken up, nervous, and scared due to
concern regarding the well-being of her baby.7 Mrs. Perrotti
testified that a "black cloud" loomed over her for the eighty-eight
days from the day of the accident through the day that she






7. Id. at 634.
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delivered her baby, who was indeed healthy at delivery.8 Mrs.
Perrotti received no additional medical consultation or treatment
for any of the psychological symptoms contained in her testimony.9
Mrs. Perrotti filed a negligence action against Mr. Paul
Gonicberg seeking damages for physical and psychological
injuries.'0 Prior to trial, Gonicberg filed a motion in limine
seeking to prevent introduction of Mrs. Perrotti's testimony
regarding her psychological injuries, based on the lack of medical
evidence to support that claim.1  Gonicberg also sought to
preclude Mrs. Perrotti from introducing any evidence of physical
injury to passenger Ashley and any loss in wages resulting
therefrom.12 Mrs. Perrotti stipulated to the exclusion of evidence
regarding lost wages, but contested the remaining two items. 13
The trial justice granted Gonicberg's motion concerning Ashley's
injuries, but denied the motion regarding the psychological injury
testimony, in order to "see what plaintiff presents." 4
At trial, the parties stipulated to the issue of Gonicberg's
liability, leaving damages as the only consideration for the jury. 5
Prior to submitting the case to the jury, the trial justice
involuntarily dismissed Mrs. Perrotti's claim for emotional injury
resulting from the concern about the health of her unborn child.16
The jury subsequently awarded plaintiffs $750.17 Mrs. Perrotti
filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.'8 It was from this
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 633.




15. Id. at 633.
16. Id. at 635. The trial justice relied on Rule 50(a)(3) of the Rhode Island
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure for the authority to grant judgment
as a matter of law for defendants. Id. The rule states:
When a motion for judgment as a matter of law is made at the close
of the evidence offered by an opponent, the court in lieu of granting
the motion may order the claim involuntarily dismissed on such
terms and conditions as are just, and the dismissal shall be without
prejudice. In the absence of a motion, the court may take such action
on its own initiative.
R.I. SuP. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(3).
17. 878 A.2d. at 633.
18. Id.
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denial that the plaintiff appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court.19
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The plaintiffs appeal challenged the trial court's rulings,
which had prevented the jury from considering the psychological
injury claim and also from hearing evidence as to Ashley's
injuries. 20 Mrs. Perrotti cited the case of Arlan v. Cervini2l in
support of her claim that physical symptomatology is not required
when the plaintiff suffers from mental anguish caused by physical
bodily injury.22 Additionally, the plaintiff relied on Gagnon v.
Rhode Island Co.23 to illustrate the court's willingness to allow a
pregnant woman to recover damages for the mental anguish
resulting from her apprehension of potential birth deformities
after being physically injured. 24
Damages for Mental Suffering
The Rhode Island Supreme Court identified two potential
theories under which the plaintiff was entitled to recover: 1) the
theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress, as was utilized
by the trial court 25 and 2) the theory that a pregnant woman "is
entitled to damages for mental suffering despite the absence of
physical symptoms." 26
The court set forth the two elements necessary to prevail
under a theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress: first,
the plaintiff must be physically endangered by the defendant's
negligent acts as a result of her presence in the zone of danger; 27
second, the plaintiffs emotional injury must be accompanied by
physical symptomatology. 28
19. Id.
20. Id. at 635.
21. 478 A.2d 976 (R.I. 1984).
22. 877 A.2d at 635.
23. 101 A. 104 (R.I. 1917).
24. 877 A.2d at 635-36.
25. Id. at 636.
26. Id. at 638.
27. Id. at 636 (citing Jalowy v. Friendly Home, Inc., 818 A.2d 698, 710
(R.I. 2003) (citing Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1049, 1051 (R.I.
1994))).
28. Id. at 637. (citing Marchetti, 638 A.2d at 1052).
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As to the element of physical symptomatology, the court
recognized the "very fine line" which courts walk when
determining this threshold, noting that in the past the court had
adopted a "relaxed standard"29 as in Grieco v. Napolitano.30
However, the court distinguished that case on two grounds. First,
the court emphasized that the plaintiff in Grieco suffered from
physician-diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder.31 In contrast,
the court noted that Mrs. Perrotti lacked any medical support for
her assertions of emotional injury.32  Second, and more
importantly, the court pointed to the causal relationship between
the defendant's negligent actions in Grieco and that plaintiffs
symptoms. 33 Conversely, the court noted the complete lack of
connection between Mrs. Perrotti's physical injuries as caused by
the defendant (her scraped chin and knee) and her claimed
emotional injury (the looming "black cloud"). 34 In addition,
regardless of the causal connection between the negligent acts and
the mental anguish, the court found the "black cloud" which
plagued Mrs. Perrotti was not included in the symptomatology
required to establish a prima facie case under a theory of
negligent infliction of emotional distress.35 Consequently, the
court upheld the trial court's decision to grant judgment as a
matter of law for defendants under a theory of negligent infliction
of emotional distress. 36
The court then addressed the plaintiffs second legal theory,
that a pregnant woman is entitled to such damages even absent
physical symptoms. 37 The plaintiff relied on Arlan v. Cervini3s and
Gagnon v. Rhode Island.39 The court briefly distinguished both
cases. In Arlan, a plaintiff was able to recover damages for
29. Id. at 637-38.
30. 813 A.2d 994 (R.I. 2003). Grieco relied on cases that found symptoms
such as severe nightmares, headaches, suicidal thoughts, sleep disorders,
reduced libido, and fatigue to be sufficient physical manifestations of
emotional injuries. See id.







38. 478 A.2d 976 (R.I. 1984).
39. 101 A. 104 (R.I. 1917).
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mental anguish for her symptoms including nervousness, grief,
anxiety, and worry.40 However, the court easily distinguished
Mrs. Perrotti's suffering from that of the plaintiff in Arlan, whose
mental anguish sprung directly from extensive facial scarring,
caused by the accident in that case. 41 The court pointed to Mrs.
Perrotti's comparatively minor injuries and the lack of any "direct
relationship between the physical injuries suffered as a result of
the accident and the mental suffering claimed."42
The plaintiff in Gagnon was more analogous to Mrs. Perrotti,
but was equally distinguishable. In that case, the plaintiff, a
pregnant woman, was struck by a street car and immediately felt
pain in her back and side and felt the baby pushing toward one
side. 43 That plaintiff was awarded mental damages for the
apprehension and anxiety she suffered connected with her concern
for her unborn baby's health.44 In that case, the woman's right to
damages arose because she was "deprived of the right and the
satisfaction of bearing a sound child."4 5 Mrs. Perrotti contended
that Gagnon stood for the proposition that recovery for
"apprehension that [a woman] would give birth to a deformed
child" was allowable. 46
Mrs. Perrotti cited additional cases from other jurisdictions
supporting her claim.47  The court found two important
distinctions between Gagnon, the accompanying cases, and the
case of Mrs. Perrotti.48 First, all of the cases cited were in a time
period before reliable antenatal diagnosis.49 Second, the injuries
suffered by the plaintiffs in those cases were either directly to the
abdomen or consisted of symptoms related to the pregnancy
itself.50 The court stated that it was not willing to "close off the
40. Perrotti, 877 A.2d at 638 (citing Arlan, 478 A.2d at 978).
41. Id. at 638-39 (citing Arlan, 478 A.2d at 978).
42. Id. at 639.
43. Gagnon v. R.I. Co., 101 A. 104, 105 (R.I. 1917).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Perrotti, 877 A.2d at 640.
47. Id. (citing Prescott v. Robinson, 69 A. 522 (N.H. 1908); Fehely v.
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avenue of recovery.., for pregnant women who suffer mental
anguish as a result of a defendant's wrongful conduct;"51 however,
it contended that it was necessary to "reposition" the Gagnon
holding in a "twenty-first century context."5 2
The court listed the factors distinguishing those cases from
Mrs. Perrotti's: she sustained no injury to her abdomen; she did
not suffer from any pregnancy-related symptoms; she was
explicitly informed by medical personnel that the baby was fine;
she obtained an ultrasound which confirmed the health of the
baby; and, she did not seek any medical or psychological
treatment for her emotional symptoms. 5 3 In none of the cases by
Mrs. Perrotti were the plaintiffs assured of the health of the
baby.54 Finding this list of facts detrimental to Mrs. Perrotti's
case, the court held that "[Mrs. Perrotti may not recover for
mental anguish for a potential injury to her unborn child that is
wholly unsupported by any physical suffering during and after the
incident in question and that explicitly has been ruled out by
routine medical diagnostics."55
Evidence of the Minor Child's Injuries
Mrs. Perrotti also contended that Ashley's injuries were
relevant evidence as to her own apprehension and as to her
credibility as a plaintiff.5 6 The defendant pointed to the separate
claim filed on behalf of Ashley, and argued that any claim of loss
of consortium was relevant only to that separate claim. 57 The
court upheld the trial court's decision to prohibit the evidence of
Ashley's injuries without any significant discussion, finding no
indication of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial justice.58
51. Id. at 641.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 640-41.
54. Id. at 640.
55. Id. at 641.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 641-42.
58. Id. at 642.
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COMMENTARY
The court in this case emphatically limited its decision to the
facts at hand.5 9 While the advent of antenatal diagnosis ensures
that in most cases the mother can be assured of her child's safety,
the court did not take away the possibility that a pregnant woman
in such circumstances as Mrs. Perrottti might be able to recover
damages for mental anguish.60 Therefore, it is important to
question which factors were essential to the court's holding. The
court's analysis seems relatively effortless given this set of facts.
However, the opinion's implications for future cases remains
unclear considering the court's lack of guidance concerning which
factors were essential to the holding. Based on the court's
analysis, it appears that injury directly to the abdomen would
significantly advance a claim. But it remains unclear whether
such injury would be sufficient if the mother was assured by
medial personnel after an ultrasound or other similar testing that
the baby was fine. Similarly, the court places some emphasis on
the plaintiffs lack of treatment for her psychological symptoms,
but does not give any guidance as to whether such psychological
treatment would suffice to overcome a lack of physical
sympomatology or injury to the abdomen.
The court also left open the question of whether the
apprehension and anguish associated with the potential injury to
an unborn child are to be analyzed using an objective or subjective
standard. The court makes only a passing reference to the
emotions suffered by Mrs. Perrotti as they compared to the
average mother's emotional symptoms during pregnancy. There is
no guidance concerning whether an overly sensitive or
apprehensive mother would be able to recover if additional factors
were satisfied such as physical injury to the abdomen. This
uncertainty has subtle implications for future cases. Plaintiffs
could bring forward claims, unsure of which factors must be
emphasized above others, and unsure of the proper standard to
apply to each circumstance. However, this is similar to many
situations in which the court applies a "totality of the
circumstances" type standard. The court has chosen to make the
59. See id. at 640-42.
60. Id. at 641.
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determination on a case-by-case basis as to which factors will be
sufficient for recovery. Future litigants will have to analogize and
distinguish the various facts of their own claim against the many
considerations of the court in this case and those relied on by the
parties.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could
not recover for mental damages associated with her concern for
her unborn child's health absent physical injury directly affecting
the abdomen or symptoms directly related to such pregnancy. In
this case, the plaintiff, a pregnant woman injured by defendant's
negligence, received no psychological treatment and her concerns
were wholly unsupported by medical tests and personnel.
Consequently, she could not recover for her claimed psychological
injury.
Christine List
Tort Law. Seide v. State, 875 A.2d 1259 (R.I. 2005). The
public duty doctrine, which restricts tort liability for certain
governmental functions, is a judicially crafted exemption to the
sovereign immunity waiver of the Rhode Island Tort Claims Act.
However, the Rhode Island legislature has clearly and
unambiguously required emergency vehicles to operate "with due
regard for the safety of all persons," and expressly waived
protection for "the consequences of the driver's reckless disregard
for the safety of others," making the public duty doctrine
inapplicable to this case. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the questions of whether the driver's conduct was reckless,
and whether such conduct was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury, are generally questions for the jury.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Early on the morning of April 5, 1994, the plaintiff, Mary
Seide, en route home after spending Easter weekend with her
family, took a break to sleep in the passenger seat of her car; she
stopped about 100 to 150 feet behind a state police roadblock in
the northbound lane of interstate 95.1 She was jolted awake when
a stolen flatbed tow truck, traveling the wrong direction down the
interstate, swerved around the roadblock and slammed into her
car, seriously injuring her so that she had to be taken to the
hospital by ambulance. 2
The truck had been stolen in East Providence around
midnight, prompting an alert to the East Providence Police
Department. 3 Soon thereafter, a detective saw a truck matching
the description traveling west on interstate 195 and followed it,
without activating his lights or siren, to confirm it was the stolen
truck.4 As the detective followed the truck, it "traveled '[right
within the speed limit' and was not driven in an unusual
1. Seide v. State, 875 A.2d 1259, 1262, 1265 (R.I. 2005).
2. Id. at 1265.
3. Id. at 1262.
4. Id. at 1262, 1264.
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manner."5 After confirmation that the truck was stolen and the
arrival of two other police cruisers, the three officers activated
their lights and sirens and attempted to stop the truck, but the
driver swerved toward the cruisers and refused to stop.6
For the next thirty minutes, the officers pursued the truck as
it tried to evade them by exiting and re-entering the interstates
and speeding through downtown Providence, not stopping for red
lights or stop signs.7 The truck was traveling between sixty and
seventy miles an hour, swerving at the pursuing police cruisers,
driving over sidewalks, and running down "a small tree or sign"
along the side of the road.8 The truck re-entered interstate 95,
heading south in the northbound lane at speeds over ninety miles
an hour, with at least three police cruisers in pursuit.9 Even
though traffic was "light to non-existent," back at police
headquarters the supervising officer, Lieutenant Barlow, realized
that the situation had become unsafe and ordered his officers to
end their pursuit.10 One officer left the highway, but two officers,
while slowing and discontinuing efforts to stop the truck, stayed
on the highway with emergency lights energized." The truck
continued south in the northbound lane of the interstate, where it
encountered the roadblock, swerved around, and slammed into the
plaintiffs car.' 2
On March 27, 1997, Seide filed suit in Superior Court, seeking
damages for injuries she alleged were sustained when the stolen
truck slammed into her car.' 3  The Superior Court granted
judgment as a matter of law to the remaining defendants, 14
5. Id. at 1264.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1262-64.
8. Id. at 1264.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1264-65.
11. Id. at 1265.
12. Id. The driver of the truck later entered a plea of nolo contendere to
five counts, for which he received one year in prison, with the remainder of
the sentences suspended and with subsequent probation. Id. at 1263 n.1.
13. Id. at 1263-64.
14. Id. at 1265. The suit named the defendants as: "the State of Rhode
Island; the Rhode Island State Police and state police officers Captain Gary
Treml and Corporal Ernest Quarry; the City of East Providence and its
treasurer; and East Providence police officers Detective Diogo Mello and
Patrolman Robert Warzycha." Id. at 1263. While "the City of Providence and
its treasurer, the City of Pawtucket and its treasurer, and Jerry's Chevron"
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concluding that they were "immune from suit under the Public
Duty Doctrine," and that the plaintiff had failed to produce any
evidence that the police conduct was the proximate cause of the
accident.15 The plaintiff subsequently appealed.16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that: (1) the defendants were
not shielded by the public duty doctrine because their conduct
during the high-speed chase was reckless; and (2) judgment as a
matter of law was improperly granted on the issue of proximate
cause.17 The Rhode Island Supreme Court considered this the
"first occasion" to consider whether the legislature statutorily
waived immunity under the public duty doctrine, and determined
that "[t]he Public Duty Doctrine will not shield... defendants
from liability for injuries proximately arising from their reckless
conduct or in circumstances in which no real emergency exists." 18
Therefore, the public duty doctrine was not a per se bar to the
plaintiffs suit and judgment as a matter of law was improperly
granted.' 9 Because the defendants had no sovereign immunity, it
was for a jury to decide whether the officers' conduct was reckless
and whether a real emergency existed.20 The issue of proximate
cause was also inappropriate for judgment as a matter of law
because the facts and reasonable inferences, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, could have reasonably led the
jury to conclude that the police should have terminated the
pursuit before the plaintiff was injured, and that continuing the
pursuit "was in reckless disregard for the safety of others."2' The
court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new
trial.22
(the owner of the truck) were also named in the original suit, they were not
parties to the appeal. Id. at 1264 n.2.
15. Id. at 1265.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1267, 1269.
19. Id. at 1268.
20. See id. at 1269-71.
21. Id. at 1269.
22. Id. at 1272.
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Public Duty Doctrine
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, governmental
entities are immune from private suits unless such immunity is
waived; 23 the Rhode Island legislature has waived sovereign
immunity statutorily through the Rhode Island Tort Claims Act
(RITCA).24 The court stated that RITCA purports to provide a
broad waiver of immunity and make all governmental entities
"liable in all actions of tort in the same manner as a private
individual or corporation," 25 but the presumption is that the "'the
Legislature did not intend to deprive the state of any sovereign
power 'unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed or arises by
necessary implication from the statutory language."'26 Therefore,
the court created the public duty doctrine to "restrict tort liability
for the state and its municipalities for governmental functions,
albeit with certain exceptions."27
One of the exceptions to the public duty doctrine arises in the
operation of emergency vehicles; the court discussed how one
statute affords certain privileges to the drivers in the performance
of their duties, but another statute limits the protection. 28 Prior to
the creation of the public duty doctrine, the court had concluded
that, if the driver of an emergency vehicle exhibited a "reckless
disregard for the safety of others," the privileges extended to him
by law would be withheld.29 After the creation of the public duty
doctrine, the court decided it must re-examine "whether § 31-12-9
continue[d] to constitute a legislative waiver of immunity under
23. See id. at 1266-68.
24. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-31-1 (1997 & Supp. 2005).
25. 875 A.2d 1267 n.9 (quoting R.I. GEN LAws § 9-31-1 (1997 & Supp.
2005)).
26. Id. at 1268 (quoting Torres v. Damicis, 853 A.2d 1233, 1237 (R.I.
2004) (internal citation and brackets omitted)).
27. Id. at 1267 (citing Calhoun v. City of Providence, 390 A.2d 350 (R.I.
1978)).
28. Id. at 1266-68 (discussing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-12-9 (2002) and § 31-
12-6(a) (2002)). In Rhode Island, drivers of emergency vehicles are privileged
to disregard many traffic laws in the performance of their duties. See R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 31-12-7 (2002). But drivers must also exercise "due care for the
safety of all persons," and are not protected "from the consequences of [their]
reckless disregard for the safety of others." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-12-9 (2002).
29. 875 A.2d at 1267 (citing Roberts v. Kettelle, 356 A.2d 207, 213-14
(R.I. 1976)).
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the Public Duty Doctrine."30
The court stated that, as a matter of statutory construction, if
the intent of the legislature is "clear and unambiguous,"31 even
when the language is "closely parsed and strictly construed,"' 32
such intent supersedes any judicially crafted limitations. 33 The
court went on to say that the statutory language of § 31-12-9 was
"clear and unambiguous," explicitly indicating the legislature's
intent.34 Therefore, the court determined that the legislature
expressly waived sovereign immunity when the conduct of
emergency vehicle drivers is in "reckless disregard for the safety of
others," and the judicially crafted public duty doctrine provides no
shield.35
Proximate Cause
The plaintiff in Seide alleged that the defendants acted "in
reckless disregard for the safety of others;" in order to survive a
motion for judgment as a matter of law, the trial judge had to find
that "sufficient evidence upon which reasonable persons could
conclude that the officer was not confronted with a true emergency
or that he or she conducted the pursuit in reckless disregard for
the safety of others and, but for this reckless conduct, injury to
plaintiff would not have occurred."36 The court then determined
that the "existence and the extent of a duty of care are questions
of law... [but] whether such duty has been breached and whether
proximate cause [exists] are the questions for the factfinder."37
The court looked to the record and determined that the
plaintiff had "produced evidence that reasonably could [have] lead
to the conclusion that the officers' decision to continue the pursuit
and their failure to terminate the chase earlier, when they
realized the danger it posed to themselves as well as innocent
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 1268 (quoting Torres v. Damicis, 853 A.2d 1233, 1237 (R.I.
2004)).
33. See id. at 1267-68.
34. See id. at 1268 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-12-9 (2002)).
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Rodrigues v. Miriam Hosp., 623 A.2d 456, 461 (R.I.
1993)).
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citizens, was in reckless disregard for the safety of others."38 The
court further determined that the evidence "reasonably could lead
to the inference that [the truck driver] drove onto Route 95
because the police continued to chase him and that they should
have terminated the pursuit at a point before the plaintiff was
injured."39 Because sufficient evidence was presented, the court
held that "[t]he issue of proximate cause was a determination for
the jury," and that judgment as a matter of law was improperly
granted. 40
The court then addressed the defendants' claim on appeal
that the driver's actions were an independent intervening cause
which warranted judgment as a matter of law.4 1 The court stated
that "[i]ntervening cause exists when an independent and
unforeseeable intervening or secondary act of negligence occurs,
after the alleged tortfeasor's negligence, and that secondary act
becomes the sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries."42
However, if the intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable,
then "the causal chain remains unbroken."43 The court discussed
that if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that
the intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable, then
foreseeability is a question for the jury, not the trial judge.44 Here,
it was for the jury to decide whether the stolen truck would have
continued to travel the wrong direction on the interstate if the
police had not continued to follow. 45
Duty of Care
The defendants claimed expert testimony was required so
that the jury could understand the "proper manner of conducting a
high-speed pursuit, and in particular when to break off... the
pursuit."46 Expert testimony is required for matters not obvious to
38. Id. at 1269.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1271.
41. Id. at 1270-71.
42. Id. at 1270 (quoting Contois v. Town of W. Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019,
1027 (R.I. 2004)) (emphasis added).
43. Id. (quoting Almeida v. Town of N. Providence, 468 A.2d 915, 917
(R.I. 1983)).
44. See id. at 1270-71.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 1271.
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a lay person or beyond common knowledge.47 However, the court
did not require expert testimony because "ordinary, intelligent lay
juror[s]" understand traffic laws, and the jury could "draw upon
its collective experience" to decide if the officers' conduct was in
reckless disregard for the safety of others.48
Police Pursuit Policy
The court discussed how the East Providence Police
Department, in accordance with state law,49 established a
department-wide pursuit policy that stated that chases "should
never be carried to the extent as to appreciably endanger the lives
and property of either innocent users of the highway, the violator,
or the officer.. . ,,50 The court determined that this policy
established the standard of care owed by the officers, and that
"violation of th[is] polic[yl could serve as evidence of the
defendants' reckless disregard for the safety of others."51
COMMENTARY
This case illustrates the tragic results of what can go wrong in
a high-speed police chase - an innocent bystander was severely
injured.52 But, it is also illustrates the conflicts between various
public policies and the issues of institutional competence and
judicial restraint.
Public Policy
On one hand is a very sympathetic plaintiff - an innocent
bystander who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong
time and had her life changed forever. Is it fair to deny her
recovery when there was absolutely no fault on her part? Yet, on
the other hand, there are the brave and loyal police officers that
sacrifice for our community. They risk their lives to protect us
from predation by those who refuse to live by society's rules and
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-12-6(b) (2002).
50. 875 A.2d at 1272.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1265.
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that ask only that we are as loyal to them as they are to us. Is it
fair to hold them individually accountable for the acts of the
criminals from whom they are trying to protect us in the first
place?
It seems unlikely that someone who steals trucks would have
the means to make reparations to the injured plaintiff, so the
plaintiff looked to the city. But, in this instance, the city has
carefully crafted a police pursuit policy that shifts the onus to the
officer to make the decision whether a police chase will
"appreciably endanger the lives and property of either innocent
users of the highway, the violator, or the officer," and directs that
pursuits shall "never be carried to [such an] extent."53 The only
way to ensure the plaintiff receives reparations is to find that the
individual officers failed in their duty to the public. But, finding
for the plaintiff has its attendant consequences - a sense of
disloyalty to those who protect and serve the public, the personal
impact on the lives and careers of the officers involved, and the
broader future implications of the decision. This opinion may
make police more reluctant to pursue fleeing criminals, who will
quickly learn that the more dangerous they are in the course of
flight, the more likely the police will terminate the pursuit, and
the more likely the criminal will evade capture. These are the
types of questions that the Seide jury will face on remand.
Perhaps the trial judge, recognizing that this was a no-win
decision for the jury, took the issue from them and decided that, as
a matter of law, the defendants were not liable.5 4 This segues to
the next issue: who should decide what the public policy should
be?
Institutional Competence / Judicial Restraint
Courts and legislatures have long operated in tension when it
comes to deciding public policy. Legislatures speak with the
collective voice of the people, but react slowly, and often only in
response to past events where the outcome was unpopular,
53. Id. at 1272. Is there any high-speed chase which would not involve
danger to the officer and/or the suspect involved? If not, there is no truly
meaningful choice on the part of the officer, and the policy merely shifts the
risk from the organization, which is better situated to bear that risk, to the
individual officer.
54. Id. at 1265.
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providing prospective relief for future occurrences, but no remedy
for the individual circumstances that initiated the controversy.
Courts can shape policy by their response to the individual
circumstances of the case or controversy before them, and, by stare
decisis, shape the response to similar future circumstances. Yet
when judges intervene, particularly on politically divisive topics,
there may be backlash allegations of judicial activism and
legislating from the bench.
This is the challenge faced by the courts in this case. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court had already crafted the public duty
doctrine, 55 which was used by the trial judge to shield the officers
from liability.56 Or the doctrine of independent intervening cause
could have vitiated the proximate cause requisite to liability. 57
However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court precluded the trial
judge from invoking the protection of these doctrines on remand.58
While the court could have shaped public policy directly by
upholding either basis for the judgment as a matter of law, its
decision to remand the case is a much more subtle strategic
maneuver.
While government officials may empathize with the plight of
the plaintiff, their duty is to preserve scarce public resources for
the good of the many, even at the cost of a few individuals. As
long as the public duty and independent intervening cause
doctrines acted as potential shields to all liability for the
defendants, meaningful settlement negotiation was unlikely. But,
by remanding the case without the protection of the doctrines, the
city has been given the incentive to settle the case, because
minimizing liability is in the taxpayers' best interest. This allows
the city to make reparations to the deserving plaintiff without
necessarily finding that the individual officers were at fault. 59
55. Id. at 1267 (citing Calhoun v. City of Providence, 390 A.2d 350 (R.I.
1978)). The public duty doctrine itself may have run counter to the public
policy of a broad waiver of sovereign immunity granted by the legislature in
the Rhode Island Tort Claims Act. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-31-1 (1997 & Supp.
2005).
56. 875 A.2d at 1265.
57. See id. at 1270-71.
58. See id. at 1268, 1270-72.
59. This is not to say that officers should have blanket immunity to act
recklessly, merely that internal police procedures, rather than the courts, can
determine whether further action is required regarding the officers' actions,
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If the issue is forced to trial, the jury will be faced with the
unenviable choices outlined above. However, no matter which
way the jury decides, the resulting public furor 60 may move the
legislature to clarify policy, thereby still achieving the strategic
goal of shaping public policy.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that "[t]he
Public Duty Doctrine will not shield ... defendants from liability
for injuries proximately arising from their reckless conduct or in
independent of any pressure to compensate the injured plaintiff.
One lingering concern involves the court's notion that a post facto
analysis of the suspect's purported crime should be weighed as a factor in
determining whether the pursuit was justified. See id. at 1269 (inferring
that there may have been no "real emergency" because stealing the truck was
merely a property crime, and that it was not until officers tried to stop the
truck that the dangerous pursuit began). This minimizes the fact that a
mere traffic violation may in reality be the reason that a violent felon is
stopped by police. See e.g., Pam Belluck, Fugitive in Gay Bar Attacks Dies
After Shootout With Arkansas Police, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at A14. In a
recent incident, a fugitive suspect in the hatchet attack and shooting of
several patrons of a New Bedford, Massachusetts bar shot and killed an
Arkansas police officer during a routine traffic stop. A twenty-mile police
pursuit ensued, with the chase ending only after police deployed spike strips
to puncture the suspect's tires, causing a crash. During a subsequent
shootout with police, the suspect shot and killed the passenger in his car
before turning the gun on himself and committing suicide. Id.; see also
Rampage Suspect's Death Called Suicide, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2006, at A12.
The presumption should be that a fleeing suspect is a danger to
society and that the liability of the officer should not hang on a subsequent
evaluation of whether the suspect committed a crime serious enough to
warrant pursuit. Additionally, pursuit should rarely be terminated in
response to a suspect's dangerous action; otherwise the policy teaches
suspects to flee through criminal Darwinism - those who stop are arrested;
those who flee escape and will flee again next time. While innocent
bystanders injured in a police pursuit should not have to bear the burden of
their own damages, the majority of pursuing police officers are no more at
fault than the victims. The blame needs to lie where it belongs - on the
criminals who choose to run from the police. That is why settlement, without
simultaneously judging officer culpability, achieves the best possible outcome
for both the injured plaintiff and the individual officers.
60. If the jury were to find for the plaintiff, the possible resulting rise in
aborted police pursuits would likely lead to more incidents of criminals
initiating pursuits in the first instance, creating public outcry that the police
need to be tougher on crime. If the jury were to find for the defendants, the
innocent and sympathetic plaintiff may suffer, which could be discordant
with the public's sense of equity.
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circumstances in which no real emergency exists;" 61 as such, the
public duty doctrine was not a per se bar to the plaintiffs suit and
judgment as a matter of law was improperly granted.62 The issue
of proximate cause was also inappropriate for judgment as a
matter of law because the facts and reasonable inferences, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could have
reasonably led the jury to conclude that the police should have
terminated the pursuit before the plaintiff was injured, and that
continuing the pursuit "was in reckless disregard for the safety of
others."63 The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the judgment
of the lower court and remanded the case for a new trial.64
Brian K. Koshulsky
61. 875 A.2d. at 1267, 1269.
62. Id. at 1268.
63. Id. at 1269.
64. Id. at 1272.
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Tort Law. Tedesco v. Connors, 871 A.2d 920 (R.I. 2005). The
applicability of the egregious conduct exception to the public duty
doctrine, which allows a plaintiff to "pierce the protective shell"
afforded by the public duty doctrine, is a mixed question of law
and fact. While the existence of a legal duty is purely a question of
law to be determined by a judge, there still exist certain
"predicate" or "duty-triggering" facts, the determination of which
must be left to the jury. Specifically, the predicate facts inherent
in the "egregious conduct exception" are: "whether the
governmental entity created or allowed for the persistence of
circumstances that forced a reasonably prudent person into a
position of extreme peril, and then failed to remedy that peril in a
reasonable time." If no genuine factual dispute exists as to these
two predicate facts, only then is judgment as a matter of law
(JML) appropriate.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Dawn Tedesco was injured when the front tire of her bicycle
slipped into a sewer grate while she was riding on a public
highway in the town of Johnston, Rhode Island.' The bars of the
sewer grate ran parallel to the road, thus allowing the front tire of
Tedesco's bicycle to slip through. 2 Tedesco brought suit against
both the town of Johnston and the Rhode Island Department of
Transportation (DOT); the town decided to settle.3 Tedesco's claim
against DOT centered on one particular fact: Fifteen years earlier
DOT had circulated a design policy memorandum discussing the
hazards of parallel bar sewer grates to bicyclists. 4 DOT
subsequently adopted a policy of replacing parallel bar sewer
grates with bicycle safe sewer grates, though it had not yet
replaced the grate in this instance. 5
At the end of Tedesco's case, DOT moved for JML based, in
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part, on the public duty doctrine. 6 The judge determined that the
public duty doctrine shielded the DOT in this case and that the
egregious conduct exception was inapplicable. 7 DOT's motion for
JML was therefore granted; Tedesco subsequently appealed.8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Tedesco did not argue that the public duty
doctrine was inapplicable to her case; rather, she argued that the
DOT's conduct in this case was such that it should trigger the
egregious conduct exception to that doctrine.9 After discussing the
public duty doctrine and the egregious conduct exception
generally, the court went on to frame the issues presented in
terms of the standard for JML.10 In that context, this case offered
a question of first impression: Whether applicability of the
egregious conduct exception to the public duty doctrine is a
question of law for the judge or a question of fact for the jury.11 If
applicability of the egregious conduct exception is a question of
fact for the jury, then a judge could only grant a motion for JML
when the facts concerning the conduct of the otherwise immune
government entity are not genuinely in dispute.' 2 The approach
adopted by the court was to treat applicability of the egregious
conduct exception as a mixed question of law and fact, with
certain "duty-triggering" facts left for determination by the jury. 13
If those "duty-triggering" facts are genuinely in dispute,
determination of the applicability of the egregious conduct
standard as a matter of law will amount to a judicial assumption
of the fact-finding function.' 4 The court found in the case at hand
that the existence of a fifteen-year-old memorandum concerning
the dangers posed to bicyclists from parallel design sewer grates
left room for a reasonable juror to find that the DOT's conduct was
6. Id. DOT also claimed that it had no legal duty to insure the safety of
its roads for bicyclists. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 924.
9. Id. at 924.
10. See id. at 924-26.
11. Id. at 924-25.
12. Id. at 925.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 925-26.
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egregious. 15 The court therefore reversed the trial court's
judgment as a matter of law and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 16
The Egregious Conduct Exception Generally
The public duty doctrine itself requires a two-step analysis. 17
First, a court determines whether the doctrine applies to the
particular facts of the case.' 8 Second, the court must determine
whether one of two exceptions to the public duty doctrine
applies.' 9 Those two exceptions are: (1) the special duty exception,
and (2) the egregious conduct exception. 20 The plaintiff in this
case did not challenge the application of the public duty doctrine;
additionally, she waived any argument concerning the special
duty exception.21 Thus, the only remaining issue was application
of the egregious conduct exception. 22
The egregious conduct exception will allow a plaintiff to
"pierce the protective shell" afforded a government entity under
the public duty doctrine only if that entity's conduct rises to the
level of egregiousness. 23 Whether a government entity's conduct is
in fact egregious will depend upon three factors: (1) the entity's
role in creating or allowing the persistence of "circumstances that
forced a reasonably prudent person into a position of extreme
peril;" (2) the entity's actual or constructive knowledge of those
circumstances; and (3) given a reasonable amount of time, failure
to eliminate those circumstances. 24 Unless a plaintiff satisfies all
three of these elements, the government entity will be immune
from liability.25
15. Id. at 928.
16. Id. at 930.




21. Id. at 923 n.2.
22. Id. at 924.
23. Id. (quoting Catri v. Hopkins, 609 A.2d 966, 968 (R.I. 1992)).
24. Id. (quoting Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I. 1992))
25. Id.
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Question of Fact versus Question of Law
Rhode Island case law before this case was somewhat
ambiguous as to whether the application of the egregious conduct
exception was a question of fact or a question of law.26 However,
in an earlier case, Kuznair v. Keach,27 the court addressed this
identical issue in the context of the special duty exception.28 The
court in Tedesco found prior treatment of the egregious conduct
exception "renders it indistinguishable from the special duty
exception and [the] holding in Kuznair."29 The court therefore
applied the analysis from Kuznair to the egregious conduct
doctrine in Tedesco to arrive at its characterization of the
egregious conduct exception as a question of both law and fact. 30
The ultimate holding of the court in Tedesco was that
applicability of the egregious conduct exception is a question of
both law and fact.31 It is a question of law because it involves the
analysis of a legal duty, and "[t]he existence of a legal duty is
purely a question of law ... "32 Additionally, it is a "fact-
intensive" inquiry which involves the determination of certain
duty-triggering facts.33 The trial justice will decide whether a
legal duty ultimately exists under the egregious conduct
exception, but she will often require the assistance of the jury if
certain predicate facts are genuinely disputed. 34
In the case of the egregious conduct exception, the court
"[s]pecifically" identified the predicate or duty-triggering facts. 35
The court appeard to identify only two of the three elements of the
egregious conduct exception as involving duty-triggering facts: the
creation of or allowing of the persistence of circumstances that put
a reasonably prudent person into extreme peril, and the failure to
remedy that peril in a reasonable time.36 Digested further, it
would appear that the question whether there was extreme peril
26. See id. at 925.
27. 709 A.2d 1050 (R.I. 1998).
28. See id.
29. 871 A.2d at 925.
30. Id. at 925-26.
31. Id. at 926.
32. Id. at 925 (quoting Kuznair, 709 A.2d at 1055).
33. Id.




or a reasonable time to rectify that peril are duty-triggering
facts.37 Thus, the court found that it is the sole province of the
jury to decide these duty-triggering facts in the face of any
genuine dispute.38
The Tedesco court stressed that its holding should not act as
an absolute bar to JML.39 Rather, the decision only acts to bar
JML in situations where duty-triggering facts are genuinely in
dispute.40 In other words, if a plaintiff fails to offer legally
sufficient evidence to allow a juror to find for her on each element
of the egregious conduct standard, then JML dismissing the
plaintiffs case is appropriate.41 Conversely, in the rare case
where a plaintiff offers sufficient evidence such that a reasonable
juror could not fail to conclude that the government's conduct was
egregious, JML is likewise appropriate, and the jury can be
instructed only as to the law of negligence. 42
Jury Instructions
The court also incorporated the guidance of the Kuznair court
concerning proper form of jury instructions in cases involving an
exception to the public duty doctrine.43 Jury instructions in a case
involving the egregious conduct exception should "incorporate the
elements of egregious conduct into the elements of negligence."44
The court provided an example:
In order to find the defendant's conduct is egregious, you
must find (1) the defendant created or allowed for the
persistence of circumstances that would force a
reasonably prudent person into a position of extreme
peril; (2) the defendant knew or should have known of the
perilous circumstances; and (3) the defendant, after a
reasonable amount of time to eliminate the dangerous
condition, failed to do so. If the plaintiff fails to prove
defendant's conduct was egregious by a preponderance of
37. See id.
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the evidence, you must return a verdict in favor of the
defendant. If you do find that the defendant's conduct is
egregious by a preponderance of the evidence, then, and
only then, may you proceed to determine whether the
defendant's egregious conduct was the proximate cause of
any damages suffered by the plaintiff, and the amount of
those damages.45
Application of the Mixed Question Rule to the Facts of Tedesco
The Tedesco court reviewed the trial justice's decision "bound
by the same rules and standards as the trial justice."46 Using this
standard, according to the court, the trial justice's error was
"clear."47 By producing the DOT memorandum, Tedesco offered
sufficient evidentiary bases to allow a reasonable juror to conclude
that the defendant's conduct in this instance was egregious. 48 The
error occurred when the trial justice decided certain duty-
triggering facts, mainly citing the fact that Rhode Island has
20,000 to 30,000 sewer grates, to arrive at the conclusion that the
defendant's conduct was not egregious. 49 In deciding these facts,
the court invaded the jury's fact-finding responsibilities.50
COMMENTARY
As the Tedesco court itself noted, the public duty doctrine is
"much maligned."51 Any unhappiness about the public duty
doctrine almost certainly arises from its long and confused history,
as the Tedesco court also noted. 52 Unfortunately, the decision in
Tedesco is likely to further confound the already confused doctrine
and its two well-meaning exceptions.
First, the nature of a "duty-triggering" fact in relationship to
the three well-established elements of the egregious conduct
exception is not entirely clear. As already noted here, the court
seems to quite specifically state that the duty-triggering facts
45. Id. at 926-27.
46. Id. at 927 (quoting Mills v. State Sales, Inc. 824 A.2d 461, 472 (R.I.
2003)).
47. Id. at 928.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 927-28.
50. See id. at 928.
51. Id. at 929.
52. See id. at 930.
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relate only to whether there is extreme peril, and whether the
defendant remedied that peril in reasonable time. 53 Notice, actual
or constructive, does not appear to require the determination of
any duty-triggering facts. 54 It is not clear why notice issues
should not involve predicate duty-triggering facts, and this
distinction is at odds with the notion of a "fact-intensive inquiry."
Second, the Tedesco decision takes great pains to analogize to
the decision in Kuznair in reaching its conclusions.5 5 This does
not necessarily seem like a wise course of action considering the
confusion that already surrounds the special duty exception. 56 If
division of labor between the trial justice and the jury is desirable,
it would make sense to avoid the murky waters of the special duty
exception in establishing a system to accomplish that task.
Only time will tell whether the rule in Tedesco can be
managed with a degree of efficiency by the trial justices of Rhode
Island's Superior Courts; the somewhat confusing distinction
between duty-triggering facts and the exception they establish will
certainly require time to work out.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Tedesco held that the
egregious conduct exception to the public duty doctrine is a mixed
question of law and fact.57 Analogizing to the court's previous
decision in Kuznair, the court held that while the existence of a
legal duty is purely a question of law to be left to the court, certain
duty-triggering facts, if any exist and are genuinely disputed,
must be decided by a jury as the finder of fact.58
Terrence P. Haas
53. Id. at 925.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 924-25.
56. See generally Aaron R. Baker, Comment, Untangling the Public Duty
Doctrine, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 731 (2005) (discussing Rhode Island's
public duty doctrine and the difficulties surrounding it).




Tort/Property Law. Lucier v. Impact Recreation, Ltd., 864
A.2d 635 (R.I. 2005). A commercial landlord is not liable for
injuries that the guest of a tenant suffered on leased premises,
unless the injury results from the landlord's breach of a covenant
to repair in the lease, or from a latent defect known to the
landlord but unknown to the tenant or guest, or because the
landlord subsequently has assumed the duty to repair.
Additionally, a lease that requires a commercial landlord's
approval of any improvements that the tenant may make to the
premises and provides that the landlord will maintain the
structure of a building, allowing the landlord to enter the property
at all reasonable times, does not equate to the landlord having
control over the premises. Furthermore, negligent entrustment,
that is, breach of the landlord's duty to ensure that the
commercial tenant is not engaging in an activity that is inherently
dangerous, is not a basis for liability. Regardless of negligent
entrustment not being a basis for liability, the landlord's
insistence on the tenant procuring liability insurance and having
guests sign waivers and release of liability forms does not show
that the activity engaged in by the tenant was inherently
dangerous.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Roland and Kerri Lucier are the parents of Timothy Lucier,
who was injured at a skateboard facility operated by Impact
Recreation, Ltd. (Impact) on premises it was leasing from Eugene
Voll.1 When the injury occurred, Impact was leasing a portion of a
larger building from Voll; the lease restricted the use of the
premises to a bicycle, skateboarding, and in-line skating park.2
Under the lease, Voll was required to maintain the structure of
the building as well as the building's exterior; Impact was
required to maintain the interior of the building.3 The lease
further provided that Impact obtain Voll's approval before making
1. Lucier v. Impact Recreation, Ltd., 864 A.2d 635, 637-38 (R.I. 2005).
2. Id. at 637.
3. Id.
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any alterations or improvements to the property.4 Additionally,
under the lease, Impact could install trade fixtures on the
premises that would remain the property of Impact regardless of
the manner of their installation. Finally, of note in the lease was
a requirement that Impact obtain a general liability policy and
require all participants to execute a waiver and release of liability
before participating in activities on the premises.6
On March 16, 2001, Timothy's father brought him and several
of his friends to the skateboard facility to celebrate Timothy's
birthday.7 At the skateboard facility, Timothy's father signed the
required waiver.8 Timothy put on protective gear and began to
skateboard.9 After roughly an hour, Timothy went down a ramp
and the front wheel of his skateboard caught inside a small hole in
the ramp causing him to fall. 10 In an attempt to execute a safety
maneuver and shield his face, Timothy fell on his right leg causing
it to snap." As a result of Timothy's fall, he suffered a spiral
fracture in a growth plate of his right leg. 12
The Luciers filed this premises liability action against Voll,
Impact, and one of Impact's principals, alleging failure to
maintain safe conditions, failure by the landlord to ensure that
the commercial tenant was not engaging in an inherently
dangerous activity, and breach of duty due to negligently
maintained, dangerous conditions on the property.13  Default
judgment was entered against Impact; Voll moved for summary
judgment.1 4 The motion justice granted Voll's motion for summary
judgment. 5 Plaintiffs subsequently filed an appeal on May 17,
2004.16









13. Id. at 637.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 637 n.2.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the motion justice erred
in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment.'7 The
Luciers claimed that the defendant, as landlord, had a duty to
safely maintain the premises.' 8 Alternatively, the Luciers argued
that the defendant never surrendered full possession of the
premises. 9 Lastly, the plaintiffs claimed that since the defendant
let his premises for the purpose of carrying on an inherently
dangerous activity, he had a nondelegable duty to ensure that the
proper precautions were taken in connection with carrying out
that activity. ° Upon de novo review, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court affirmed the motion justice's order of summary judgment,
stating that the general rule remains that a nonresidential
landlord is not liable for injuries that the guest of a tenant suffers
on the leased premises, with three exceptions. 2' The court
additionally held that the defendant did not have control over the
property and that the skateboard park was not an "inherently
dangerous" facility.22
Premises Liability
The court principally focused its analysis on premises
liability.2  Rhode Island premises liability law imposes an
affirmative duty upon owners and possessors of property "to
exercise reasonable care for the safety of persons reasonably
expected to be on the premises ... includ[ing] an obligation to
protect against the risks of dangerous conditions existing on the
premises," provided the landowner knows of, or reasonably should
know of, the dangerous condition.24  However, the court stated
that the general rule in Rhode Island concerning nonresidential
property is that a landlord is not liable for injuries that the guest
17. Id. at 637.
18. Id. at 639.
19. Id. at 640.
20. Id. at 641.
21. Id. at 640.
22. Id. at 641-42.
23. See 639-41.
24. Id. at 639 (citing Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Ass'n, Inc., 820 A.2d
929, 935 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Tancrelle v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 756 A.2d
744, 752 (R.I. 2000))).
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of a tenant suffers on the leased premises unless one of three
exceptions are met.2 5  These three exceptions require that the
injury result from one of the following: (1) "the landlord's breach of
a covenant to repair in the lease [or (2)] from a latent defect
known to the landlord but not known to the tenant or guest [or (3)]
because the landlord subsequently has assumed the duty to
repair. " 26 In this instance, the court held that the plaintiffs had
failed to present evidence sufficient to support any of the three
exceptions to the general rule, and as such, the defendant was not
27liable for the injuries to their son.
Additionally, the court noted that when land is leased to a
tenant, property law "regards the lease as equivalent to the sale of
the premises for the term [of the lease] .,,2 The court recognized
that even if the defendant remained responsible for maintaining
the exterior of the structure, required that Impact get approval
first before making alterations to the premises, and retained the
right to enter the property, he still did not retain control over the
premises. Rather, these lease provisions were merely intended to




As of the time of the Lucier decision, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court had never recognized negligent entrustment as a
basis for liability and it declined to do so in Lucier as well. 3' The
plaintiffs argued that the defendant had leased his premises for
the purpose of conducting an inherently dangerous activity and
therefore had a duty to make sure that reasonable precautions
were taken in connection with that activity. 3' The plaintiffs'
argument continued to assert that the defendant acknowledged
that skateboarding was a dangerous activity by requiring that
25. Id. at 640.
26. Id. (quoting E. Coast Collision & Restoration, Inc., v. Allyn, 742 A.2d
273, 276 (R.I. 1999)).
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 63 at 434 (5th ed. 1984)).
29. Id. at 640.




Impact maintain a liability insurance policy and have participants
sign a waiver and release.32 The court did not address the
plaintiffs' negligent entrustment claim because they failed to
present any competent evidence that skateboarding was an
inherently dangerous activity. 13 Moreover, the fact that the
defendant thought the activity to be sufficiently hazardous to
merit the procurement of liability insurance and the signing of
waivers did not indicate that the activity was inherently
dangerous.34
COMMENTARY
This decision reinforces the general rule in Rhode Island that
insulates commercial landlords from liability for injuries to their
35tenants or their tenants' guests. Commercial landlords are
encouraged to adopt a "hands-off' approach towards leased
property or else be subject to liability.3 6 While this decision seems
as though it may punish attentive landlords, in reality, it relieves
commercial landlords of an especially burdensome responsibility
of constant inspection of their leased property.
Were commercial landlords liable for the injuries of their
tenants or guests, landlords would have to become full-time
maintenance men for their tenants in order to avoid potential
liability. Even absent a covenant to repair, if commercial
landlords were to be held liable for tenants' and guests' injuries,
landlords would be forced to watch their leased property under a
microscope and repair defects in fixtures on the premises
regardless of whether or not they were installed by the tenant.
This duty would be inconvenient for commercial landlords who
often lease numerous properties simultaneously, as well as for
tenants whose business operations would be interrupted regularly
by landlords' inspections of every small detail of their operation.
Additionally, when a specialized business leases a landlord's
premises, specialized fixtures may be installed by the tenant that
the landlord would not be familiar with and would not be qualified
to recognize defects in, let alone repair. Using the case at hand as




35. See id. at 639-41.
36. See id.
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the difference between a skateboarding ramp that was constructed
safely and one that was not safe for normal use. A rule different
from the one articulated in this case would require commercial
landlords to become intimately acquainted with even the smallest
details of their tenants' places of business.
Also of note is the court's decision that an activity is not
inherently dangerous simply because the landlord insists that the
tenant obtain liability insurance and has participants sign
waivers. If, as the plaintiffs suggest, a landlord were to have a
nondelegable duty to ensure precautions are taken in connection
with carrying out inherently dangerous activities, and an activity
is presumed to be inherently dangerous if the landlord requires
the tenant to obtain liability insurance,37 then cautious landlords
would be condemning themselves to a higher duty of care by
seeking to protect their interests by requiring that their tenants
obtain a liability policy. Alternatively, by not requiring the tenant
to obtain liability insurance, the activity would not be presumed to
be inherently dangerous, thus contributing to a lower duty of care,
but potentially subjecting the landlord to liability that may have
been otherwise covered by the tenant's liability policy. This
paradoxically punishes landlords for seeking to insulate
themselves from liability. In a parallel example, if an overly
cautious landlord were to require a tenant who is operating a
retail store to obtain liability insurance, then the landlord's
insistence on the insurance would be evidence that retail sale is
an inherently dangerous activity. Thus, the consequences of the
court rendering a different decision would have been extremely
unfair to landlords seeking to protect their own interests.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that commercial
landlords are not liable for injuries to their tenants or guests,
unless the injury results from the landlord's breach of a covenant
to repair, from a latent defect known to the landlord but not the
tenant, or because the landlord has assumed the duty to repair. 3"
Additionally, the court held that just because a landlord is
required to maintain the exterior of a leased building, approve of
37. See id.
38. Id. at 640.
SURVEY SECTION
any alterations to the premises, and retain the right to enter the
premises at any reasonable time, does not mean that the landlord
retained control over the premises. 9  Finally, a landlord's
insistence on a tenant's procuring liability insurance and having
guests sign waivers and release of liability forms does not show
that the activity engaged in by the tenant was inherently
dangerous for purposes of negligent entrustment.40 In this case,
the defendant commercial landlord had no duty to the plaintiffs




40. Id. at 641.
41. Id. at 642.
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2005 PUBLIC LAWS OF NOTE
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 75. An Act Relating to Sexual
Offender Registration and Community Notification. Amends prior
sex offender registration and community notification statute to
provide that local police departments shall now disclose to the
general public information pertaining to registered offenders of a
city or town that have been determined to be level 2 or level 3
offenders, consistent with parole board guidelines. Amends R.I.
Gen. Laws §§ 11-37.1-11 and 11-37.1-12.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 79. The Rhode Island Autism
Spectrum Disorder Evaluation and Treatment Act. Authorizes the
Rhode Island Department of Health (subject to appropriation
and/or receipt of other resources) to provide appropriate testing
and screening models to determine a proper diagnosis of Autism
Spectrum Disorders (ASD) and create a case management system
to properly catalogue such diagnoses, as well as authorizing
outreach/education programs about ASD. Creates R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 23-79.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 142. An Act Relating to Lead
Hazard Mitigation. Expands upon and replaces earlier statutory
definitions related to lead poisoning prevention and mitigation.
Also incorporates a sunset provision and provides for some
exceptions for pre-1978 rental dwellings and provisions pertinent
to historic dwellings. Amends R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 23-24.6-4, 23-
24.6-17 and 23-24.6-23.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch 153. An Act Relating to Domestic
Relations - Domestic Abuse Prevention. Provides that upon notice
and a hearing, domestic abuse protective orders issued by the
Family Court may include an order that a defendant surrender
physical possession of firearms in his or her care, possession,
custody or control. Provides for an exemption for sworn peace
officers and active members of the military service or others
required by their employment to carry a firearm. Amends R.I.
Gen. Laws § 15-15-3.
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2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 156. An Act Relating to Health and
Safety - The Long-Term Care Reform Act of 2005 - Nursing
Facility Quality Monitoring and Early Intervention for Resident
Safety. Mandates that complaints regarding nursing facilities
(that do not constitute abuse, neglect or mistreatment) be
investigated within twenty-four hours of reporting, if the patient's
health or safety is determined to be in "immediate jeopardy." Also
allows the director to appoint independent quality monitors at the
facility's expense for deficiencies that constitute "immediate
jeopardy" for residents/patients. Creates R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-17-
12.5.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 225. An Act Relating to Identity
Theft Protection. Mandates that businesses owning or licensing
unencrypted computerized personal information shall implement
and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to
protect the information from unauthorized access, use, or
disclosure. Provides that state agencies and persons owning such
data shall disclose any breach of the security system under which
it is kept to Rhode Island residents. Requires notification of
breaches be made promptly and reasonably following the
determination of a breach, unless delay is warranted so as not to
impede a criminal investigation. Imposes a civil penalty for
violations of the act that shall be no more than $100 per
occurrence, nor more than $25,000 total per defendant. Creates
R.I. Gen. Laws §11-49.2.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 236. An Act Relating to State
Affairs and Government - State Lottery. Abolishes the Lottery
Commission and in its place creates a lottery division at the
Department of Administration as well as a permanent Joint
Committee on State Lottery composed of eight members, four from
the Senate and four from the House of Representatives, to provide
oversight to the state lottery and make recommendations to the
General Assembly and propose legislation regarding the state
lottery. Amends R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-61-1 to 42-61-8, 42-61-10,
42-61-12, and 42-61-15. Creates R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 22-14.2-1 and
22-14.2-2.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 244. An Act Relating to Education.
Prohibits the sale or distribution of performance-enhancing
dietary supplements by teachers, coaches, school officials and
employees to students and requires that mandatory first aid
2005 PUBLIC LAWS OF NOTE
courses for athletic coaches include information relating to such
supplements. Also, makes it a misdemeanor to sell such
supplements to a minor. Creates R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 16-21.4-1 to
16-21.4-4 and 11-9-21.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 318. An Act Relating to Separation
of Powers. Enacts separation of powers provisions pertaining to
the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation. Amends
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-64-8 and 42-64-28.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 360. An Act Relating to Military
Affairs and Defense - National Security Infrastructure Support
Act. Creates a "National Security Infrastructure Support Fund,"
which shall be administered by the Economic Development
Corporation, with funds being allocated to provide grants and
loans to improve infrastructure (such as water, sewer, electric,
gas, rail, and road systems), secure real estate and property to
protect against encroachment around security installations, and to
increase mission-related capabilities of national security
infrastructure located within Rhode Island. Creates R.I. Gen.
Laws § 30-32-1 to 30-32-7 and 42-64.7.13.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch 377. An Act Relating to State
Affairs and Government. Establishes within the office of the
Attorney General a Civil Rights Advocate and allows the Attorney
General to bring civil actions against those who intentionally
interfere in the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of
rights secured by the United States and Rhode Island
Constitutions. Additionally, the act provides for a civil penalty of
not more than $5,000 to be levied against those adjudged violators
of the act. Creates R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-9.3-1 to 42-9.3-4.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 400. An Act Relating to State
Affairs and Government - Department of Children, Youth and
Families. Mandates that the Department of Children, Youth and
Families (DCYF) and the Department Of Human Services (DHS)
cooperate to develop a continuum of care for children's behavioral
health services that encourages alternative psychiatric services
outside of hospitalization. Also mandates that persons under the
age of eighteen receiving medical benefits from DCYF undergo an
initial health crisis intervention prior to voluntary admission to
facilities provided for by the chapter. Creates R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-
72-5.2 and amends R.I. Gen. Laws § 40.1.-5-6 and 40.1-5-26.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 409. An Act Relating to Education.
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Establishes procedures for interrogations of minor children by law
enforcement in school or at school-sponsored activities, allowing
pupils to request the presence of a parent, guardian, or adult
family member during questioning and prohibiting questioning
from taking place in a public classroom or hallway, except in
exigent circumstances. Creates R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 16-21.5-1 to 16-
21.5-5.
2005 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 442. An Act Relating to Food and
Drugs - The Edward 0. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical
Marijuana Act. Provides that a qualifying patient in possession of
a registry identification card shall not be subject to arrest,
prosecution, or penalty in any manner for possessing twelve or
fewer marijuana plants or one-half ounce of usable marijuana.
Creates R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 21-28.6-1 to 21-28.6-11.
